

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (26 Feb 69) FOR: OT UT 684168

6 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Battalion, 83d Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

:

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

I Incl
as

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1st Battalion, 83d Artillery

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 83d ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96308

AVGAZ-CO

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U).

THRU: Commanding General
XXIV Corps Artillery
ATTN: AVII-ATC
APO 96308

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-CCT
APO 96308

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: CPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

Operational Report – Lessons Learned for quarter ending 31 October 1969, is submitted in compliance with
USARV Regulation 525-15 and AR 525-15.

1. (C) . Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) During the entire reporting period this Headquarters remained assigned to XXIV
Corps Artillery.

(2) Base Camp Locations:

(a) Headquarters Battery:

:

1. During the entire reporting period, Headquarters Battery was located at Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151 – Reference Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50.000).

(b) Service Battery

1. During the entire reporting period, Service Battery was located at Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151 – Reference Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50.000).

(c) Battery A:

1. 1 Aug 68 to 22 Aug 68 – FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

2. 22 Aug 68 to 10 Sept – FSB Boyd (YD 741132; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

3. 10 Sept 68 to 14 Sept 68 - FSB Anzio (YD 934072; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

4. 14 Sept 68 to 17 Sept 68 – LZ Quick (YD 903032; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

5. 17 Sept 68 to 23 Oct 68 – FSB Anzio (YD 934072; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

6. 24 Oct 68 to 31 Oct 68 – LZ Tomahawk (ZD 116015; Ref Map Sheet 6541 I, 1:50000)

(d) Battery B:

1. 1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68 – Gia Le Combat base (YD 835151; Ref Map Sheet 6541I, 1:50000).

2. 31 Oct 68 moved to FSB Sally (YD 644277; Ref Map Sheet 6541I, 1:50000).

(e) Battery C:

1. 2 Aug 68 to 28 Oct 68 – FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

2. 29 OCT 68 to 31 Oct 68 – FSB Boyd (YD 741132; Ref Map Sheet 6441I, 1:50000).

(3) Command Changes:

(a) Headquarters Battery:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>
CPT Richard C. Chambers, Jr.	CPT John R. Mania	8 Oct 68

(a) Service Battery:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>
CPT John B. Norwood	CPT Benjamin M. Frias	26 Aug 68

(a) Battery A:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Date</u>
CPT John W. Yore	CPT Willie E Griffith	15 Aug 68

(4) Personnel Strength as of 31 Oct 68:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
Authorized	37	6	522	565
Assigned	34	3	441	478
Present for Duty	34	3	517	554

(5) Critical MOS Shortages:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>
0200	CPT	1	0
0200	LT	1	0
631A	WO	1	0
062B0	WO	2	0
13Z50	E8	7	3
93F40	E7	1	0
94B40	E7	5	2
76Y40	E6	6	3
31G40	E5	3	1
13E20	E5/E4	32	24
31B20	E4	1	0
13A10	E3	148	92

(6) Personnel Changes During Quarter:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Losses</u>	<u>Gains</u>
05	0	0
04	0	0
03	7	3
02	6	7
01	8	3
W0	2	1
E9	1	0
E8	4	1
E7	5	3
E6	1	16
E5	10	43
E4	17	78
E3	32	83
E2	56	33
E1	2	4

(7) Casualties:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
KIA	0
Died of Battle Wounds	0
Missing in Action	0
Wounded in Action	0
Non-Battle Deaths	0

(8) Medical Service Statistics:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Total Patients Visit	274
Admitted to Hospital	26
IRHA	0
Evacuated Out of Country (Non-Hostile)	3
(IRHA)	0
Malaria Cases	2

(9) Awards and Decorations:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Presented</u>	<u>Pending</u>
Bronze Star	21	15
Air Medal	1	6
ARCOM	26	4
Purple Heart	7	0
Certificates of Achievement	0	63

(10) Judicial and Non-Judicial Actions:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
General Courts-Martial	0
Special Courts-Martial	2
Summary Courts-Martial	1
Article 15	18

(11) Reportable Accidents:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Vehicle	5
Personnel	0

(12) R & R: During the entire reporting period, this Headquarters has received a sufficient quantity of R&R allocations.

(a) Out of Country R & R:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Number</u>
Hawaii	32
Australia	15
Japan	7
Kuala Lumpur	4
Bangkok	18
Taipei	13

Singapore	10
Panang	4
Manila	8

(b) In-Country R & R:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Number</u>
China Beach, Da Nang	50

(13) Safety: Realizing the importance of eliminating unnecessary casualties through the adherence to basic safety precautions, the Headquarter conducted on 25 Sept 68 a 2-1/2 hours presentation on weapons and weapons safety. Such topics as the careless handling of weapons and munitions were discussed.

This Headquarters also has an appointed safety council to review the battalion safety program.

b. Operations:

(1) Deployment of the battalion and missions executed during this reporting period:

(a) Headquarters and Service Batteries:

1 During the entire reporting period, this headquarters was assigned to the XXIV Corps Artillery with a tactical mission of GSR to the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.

2. Headquarter and Service Batteries continued to provide the administrative and logistical support for this headquarters from their location at Gia Le Combat Base.

(b) Battery A (8inch Howitzer)

1. During this reporting period, Battery A made five (5) separate road marches to several different fire support bases located within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Area of Operations. Although Battery A made several moves during this period, they remained at all times under the fire and administrative control of this Headquarters.

2. Battery A retubed from 175mm Gun to 8 inch Howitzer on 22 Aug 1968.

(c) Battery B (8 inch Howitzer)

1. From 1 August 1968 to 31 Oct 1968, battery B was located at Gia Le Combat Base. With the treat of the third offensive in the Hue area, Battery B was located approximately 7000 meters to the South of the city.

2. On 31 October 1968, Battery B road marched from Gia Le Combat base to LZ Sally. Th emission remained GSR 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.

(d) Battery C (175mm Gun):

1. On 1 August 1968, after retubing to 175mm Guns, battery C road marched from FSB Boyd to FSB Bastogne in support of the projected operation Sommerset Plains in the A Shau Valley.

2. Although Battery C provided GSR fire in support of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery, they continued to interdict the A Shau Valley from their position at FSB Bastogne. Battery C also provided fire support to the 1st AC Division (Air xxx).

(2) Battalion Activities:

(a) The battalion FDC controlled, assigned, and checked the fires of three (3) firing batteries during this period. The battalion FDC coordinated and controlled fires in support of several operations at one time, and was successful in its mission of tactical and technical fire direction. There were no artillery accidents nor incidents during this reporting period.

(b) Operation Nevada Eagle.

1. Operation Nevada Eagle continued throughout this reporting period. Al batteries under the control of the battalion fired in support of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) operations.

	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	1291	364
Rounds	7041	1536

(c) Operation Jeb Stuart III:

1. Operation Jeb Stuart III continued during this reporting period. Only one firing element, battery C, fired in support of the operation.

	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	0	701
Rounds	0	2491

(d) A Shau Interdiction Program:

1. During this reporting period, the 175mm batteries fired into the A Shau Valley on numerous intelligence targets. A total of 428 missions were fired and 2112 rounds were expended in support of the interdiction program.

(e) III MAF

1. During this reporting period, firing batteries assigned to this Headquarters fired 66 missions and expended 525 rounds in support of the III Marine Amphibious Forces.

(f) Sponsorship of the 2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery:

1. During this reporting period, this Headquarters initiated correspondence with the sponsored unit. Many questions such as MTOEs, weapons density, repair parts load lists, and unit strengths, required answers prior to initiating ground work preparation. In turn, this Headquarter answered many questions in reference to whom should accompany the advanced party, critical items of equipment in Viet Nam, and what type of comfort items should be brought along. This headquarters was kept informed on the current training status of the sponsored unit.

3. After initial correspondence was enacted, and many questions answered, sponsorship plans were drafted to accept the new unit in accordance with USARV Reg 220-10 w/C1. Since the arrival dates, the port of debarkation, and the mode of transportation remained in question, alternate plans were drafted to accept the advance party, the main body, and finally the equipment in-country.

4. A 30 day period of in-country training was formulated to be presented to the sponsored unit based upon the requirements outlined in USARV Reg 350-1. Included in the training program was a period of cross training at both the battalion and battery level whereby key personnel of the sponsored unit would be trained by personnel of this Headquarters.

5. Coordination was made by the S-4, this Headquarters, to acquire the necessary real estate to position the sponsored unit's Headquarters and Service Batteries, and three (3) firing batteries. Coordination was also made to procure the necessary classes of supplies and services prior to the arrival time of the main body. Building and barrier materials were requisitioned to arrive prior to the main body. The S-4 coordinated the movement of the personnel and equipment from Da Nang, the port of debarkation, to Phu Bai, their final destination.

6. Coordination was made by the S-2, this Headquarters for the issue of the basic load of maps, for the sponsored unit. Perimeter defense coordinators at the firing positions were informed as to the arrival of the new unit, and plans were made to integrate them into the perimeter defenses within three (3) days.

7. The S-1, this Headquarter, coordinated the procurement of all pertinent USARV, MACV, and XXIV Corps publications. Stars and Stripes, the film accounts and the necessary R&R quotas were also requisitioned at that time. Finance was contacted as to the arrival so that the initial MPC conversion could be accomplished. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) band was procured to play for the arrival of the advance party and the main body.

8. XXIV Corps Signal was contacted as to the arrival of the new unit. A command frequency was established prior to arrival of the advanced party and conduct of fire frequencies were to be established upon receipt of a tactical mission from XXIV Corps. The crypto account, to include KAC Codes and KAK lists were established upon arrival of the crypto custodian.

9. On 24 September 1968, this Headquarters briefed Brigadier General Allen G. Pixton, XXIV Corps Artillery Commanding General on the preparations made thus far for the sponsorship of the 2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery. Again, on 4 October 1968, this Headquarters briefed Major General Schweiter, Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps on the current status relating to the sponsorship. Both briefing proved to be highly satisfactory.

10. On 13 October 1968, a delegation from this Headquarters headed by LTC Clifford Worthy Jr., the Battalion Commander, met the advanced party of the 2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery. Also on hand to meet the new unit were Major General Clifford D. Drake, deputy Commander, XXIV Corps, General Allen G. Pixton, commanding General, XXIV Corp Artillery. After the official welcoming, the new unit was transported to the 1st Bn, 83d Artillery Headquarters where they received a briefing on the current friendly and enemy situation.

11. On 26 October 1968, the first flight of the main body arrived at Phu Bai. On hand to greet the main body was Brigadier General Allen G. Pixton, Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery, LTC Clifford Worthy Jr., and Robert W. Cundiff, Battalion Commander, 2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery. After the official welcome by General Pixton, the new unit moved to their new location.

12. On 30 October 1968, the 2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery closed into RVN. At the present time, cross-training of key battery and fire direction personnel is taking place at battalion and battery level. The new unit is in receipt of all their equipment, and are presently in the process of preparing their firing positions for occupation. Upon completion of their in-country training, the 2nd Battalion, 138th artillery will assume their tactical mission in the Republic of Vietnam.

(3) Ammunition Expenditures and Missions Fired:

	<u>8 inch</u>		<u>175mm</u>	
	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Rounds</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
Battery A	593	4146	283	988
Battery B	904	3658	-----	-----
<u>Battery C</u>	-----	-----	<u>1309</u>	<u>5523</u>
Total	1497	7804	1592	6511

c. Training:

(1) On the job and individual training continued in all units of the battalion during this reporting period.

(2) All newly arrived replacement personnel during this reporting period have received an eight (8) hour block of instruction as outlined in the Battalion SOP. All replacement training is formulated from the requirements outlined in USARV Reg 350-1. Included in the replacement training is the obtaining of battle sight zero at the rifle range. All replacement training is accomplished within seven (7) days after arrival in-country.

(3) The driver training program initiated during the past reporting period has been successful. All personnel periodically receive instructions on safety, Vietnamese road signs, and defensive driving in the Republic of Vietnam.

(4) XXIV Corps Artillery has initiated a school for Fire Direction Officers and Forward Observers. As of the end of this reporting period, this Headquarters has received four (4) allocations to attend the FDO school and one (1) allocation to attend the FO school.

(5) This Headquarters continues to administer an instructional type fire direction examination to all firing battery officers, battalion fire direction officers, and chief computers. This program has proven to be highly successful as evidenced by the fact that this battalion continues to have a record of no artillery accidents or incidents.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Daily intelligence continues to be gathered from all available sources and is consolidated and disseminated to the battalion through a daily INTSUM.

(2) PERINTRExx 1-68 and 2-69 are currently on hand and provide most of the enemy order of battle pertinent to our needs within the battalion.

(3) The battalion continues to provide air observers for XXIV Corps. The area of prime interest during this reporting period has been the Visual Reconnaissance flights into the A Chau Valley.

e. Logistics:

(1) Monthly deadline percentages: 10% Vehicles per day.

(2) Miles traveled by ammunition trains: 6,062 miles.

(3) Number of air sorties flown: 87 – CH-47 sorties.

(4) Resupply:

(a) Class I - 88 tons

(b) Class II - 144 tons

(c) Class III - 12,000 gallons

(d) Class V - 650 tons by road
385 tons by air

f. Communications:

(1) The communications section provided satisfactory communications throughout the reporting period in spite of a shortage of critical personnel within the communications sections at times.

(2) Gun direction computer N-18 (FADAC) continues to be a problem. This Headquarters has had two units in the Direct Support Maintenance for an excessive period of time because of the non-availability of repair parts (memory units).

Section II

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned) (U)

1. (C) Personnel and Administration:

a. ITEM: Monthly Officers Returning Roster.

(1) Discussion: The failure of the originator to insure the timely distribution of this roster has caused the late receipt of assignment instructions for several officers. Presently one officer is within five (5) days of his normal DEROS and is still without reassignment instructions. Five (5) phone calls have been made and two messages have been dispatched to date to obtain reassignment instructions.

(2) Conclusion: Lack of positive follow-up action by the originator is apparently the cause and a need to remedy this situation is required to avoid unnecessary delay in reassignment.

b. ITEM: Advanced Overseas Returns Roster (AORR).

(1) Discussion: Monthly Advanced Overseas Returnees Rosters (AORR) are being received by this Headquarters. Once corrections are made and returned to the originator, necessary actions are not being taken. This Headquarter is required to verify the roster and then return the roster to the originator. The originator, in turn, forwards to this Headquarters an AORR verification roster. Each month during this reporting period, a negative verification roster has been received from the originator when there were still numerous outstanding reassignment instructions.

(2) Conclusion: Cards are not being prepared on personnel reported on the AORR as required by existing regulations.

2. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Helicopter Support for Heavy Artillery.

(1) Discussion: Reference is made to ORLL, this Headquarters dated 1 Aug 1968, for the period ending 31 October 1968 remains as stated in the above reference. Helicopter transportation is still required for command and staff visits, movement of mail, critical repair parts and critical items of supply.

(2) Conclusion: The widespread deployment of heavy artillery batteries requires responsive helicopter support for the batteries and battalion headquarters.

b., ITEM: Computation of Velocity Error for the 175mm Gun.

(1) Discussion: As a result of the short tube life and the accompanying significant reduction of muzzle velocity error corrections to firing data can not be accomplished in the normal manner, i.e., computation of a "Met plus VE" utilizing the velocity error, determined from the most recent registration/calibration (para 21-14, FM 6-40). This method would yield inaccurate data since the 175mm gun, unlike howitzers, is not characterized by a virtually constant velocity error. Due to the short tube life on the M113 cannon (300 full charge service rounds) and the high cost of ammunition, frequent registrations to determine current velocity error would be impractical. A solution developed in this command calls for an application of a velocity error based on the tube life of the cannon and the charge fired. An attempt was made to obtain velocity errors based on registration conducted for each zone corresponding to tube life at 50-round intervals from 0 to 300 EFC. This data is tabulated (see example table as inclosure 1) and is referred to for computation in the normal manner (Met plus VE); however, instead of using the VE determined by the last registration conducted with the firing piece, the VE is obtained by referring to the table discussed above by entering the table corresponding to the zone and tube life (to the nearest 50 rounds EFC) of the cannon being fired. Beta data contained in this velocity error table is continually refined by averaging data obtained by subsequent registrations. This procedure has proven to be quite accurate.

(2) Conclusion: That Section VI to Chapter 22 of FM 6-40 and paragraph 6 of Introduction Section to FT 175-A-) (Rev II) be expanded to include a solution to the unique velocity error problem associated with 175mm gun. As an interim measure, this Headquarters recommends that this information be disseminated by incorporation into a Fire Direction Cannon Note or in an Artillery Trends.

c. ITEM: Premature functioning of the M572 Point Detonating Fuze.

(1) Discussion: The M572 has been the only fuze issued to units of this Headquarters for use with the 175mm gun. Premature functioning repeatedly occurs when firing during period of heavy rain fall. In light rains, premature functioning occurs when the M572 is used in conjunction with the 175mm projectile when Zone 3 is fired.

(2) Conclusion: That a more reliable fuze be issued to units located where heavy rainfall is prevalent.

d. ITEM: Maintenance Problems with the M107, 175mm gun and M110, 8" howitzer.

(1) Discussion: Firing off to one side of the gun or howitzer has caused problems with spade cylinders and hydraulic line breaks.

(2) Conclusion: Maintenance problems have been significantly reduced by limiting the on-carriage traverse of the M107, 175mm gun, to 200 mils left and right from center of traverse and by limiting the on-carriage traverse of the M110, 8" howitzer to 300 mils left and right of center of traverse. This limitation was (has) virtually eliminated problems with spade cylinders and hydraulic line breaks associated with firing off to one side of the gun or howitzer.

e. ITEM: Communications within the Firing Battery.

(1) Discussion: Due to the significant displacement required between pieces of a heavy artillery battery to obtain optimum distribution of the effect in the target area, communications within the firing battery present a significant problem. Normal wire communications are adequate for transmitting firing data; however, a separate system is required to alert the firing battery of fire missions and to provide a back-up should the wire communications fail.

(2) Conclusion: That equipment for a public address system be included in the TO&E of all heavy artillery batteries. An alternate solution would be to issue battery-operated megaphones to each firing battery.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None

4. (U) Intelligence: None.

5. (U) Logistics:

a. ITEM: Lifting Devices for Heavy Artillery Batteries.

(1) Discussion: Due to the positioning requirements of heavy artillery in a combat zone, batteries must be able to function independent of their parent Headquarters. One problem arising from this situation is associated with ammunition resupply. The firing batteries have no organic lifting devices. As a result, ammunition must be loaded and unloaded by manual labor. This constitutes a considerable investment in man-hours.

(2) Conclusion: That a M578 VTR be added to the TO&E of each firing battery and an M62 wrecker to the service battery for use by the ammunition trains. If added, the lifting devices would also alleviate the problems encountered in obtaining necessary lifting devices at isolated locations for the purpose of changing tubes.

b. ITEM: Retransmission of Radio Unit AN/VRC-49.

(1) Discussion: Frequently the firing batteries are so widespread from the parent headquarters that communications becomes very critical. When operating at greater ranges than that of the AN/VRC-46, several problems have been experienced by this headquarter when trying to maintain radio contact with all of the battalion.

(2) Conclusion: That a minimum of one (1) AN/VRV-46 be authorized by TO&E to the Communications Platoon of each heavy artillery battalion.

Part II (Recommendations) (U)

1. (U) Personnel and Administration: None.
2. (C) Operations: That consideration be given to include a solution to the unique velocity error problem associated with the 175mm gun on future gunnery procedures and publications.
3. (U) Intelligence: None.
4. (U) Training and Organization: None.
5. (C) Logistics: That lifting devices be included on all heavy artillery batteries' TO&Es.

Part III (Headquarter, Department of the Army Survey Information) (U)

(U) Survival, Escape and Evasion: None.

CLIFFORD WORTHY JR.
LTC, FA
Commanding

1 Incl -

AVII-ATC (1 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

DA, HQ XXIV CORPS ARTY: AVII-ATC, APO San Francisco 96308, 2 Nov 68.

TO: HQ XXIV CORPS, ATTN: AVII-GST, APO San Francisco 96308

1. (?) Concur with observations and recommendations in Section 2 of report except as indicated in subsequent paragraphs.
2. (C) Paragraph 2b, Lesson Learned #2, Computation of velocity error. Concur with the observation and recommendation that FM 6-40 and FT 175-A-C be expanded to include a solution to the 175mm Gun VE problem. However, non-concur with the system and evaluation discussed in subparagraph (2).
 - a. Although it is not stated in the evaluation, the system uses a VE for any tube registered and subsequently applies this data to any and all weapons in the battery. The period during which the system was developed covered about one year, included some 35 registrations and involved about 75 different tubes. When ever conditions permitted and a tube was near a 50 round expenditure point, the tube VE was determined and averaged with other data already used to form the table. Although some individual tubes were registered more than once, many were never registered and the average number of registrations was about one per two tubes.
 - b. There is a clear need for some system of developing usable information on the basis of unavoidable sketchy VE data. The attempt made by 1st Bn, 83d Artillery is a good attempt and in consonance with FM 6-40 (para 2-8c). This headquarters does not concur with the use of VEs without control of specific tubes. Even among howitzers, where performance is more predictable than it is with guns, artillery practice is not to assume performance for new tubes (FM 6-40, para 2-9c).
 - c. A recommended alternative procedure is to attempt to gain complete VE versus tube life curves for a specific number of individual tubes. If the set of curves forms a sufficiently large sample size (perhaps 20 curves) and if there is a pattern, a single registration with a new tube should put it "on a curve" showing VEs considerable better than those now available or produced by the system presented.
3. (C) Paragraph 2e. Lesson Learned #5, communications within the Firing Battery. Non-concur. The current family of public address systems is not designed for prolonged field use and is unreliable. In addition, power source for most PA sets is a 1.5 kw generator which is another item whose reliability under prolonged stress is questionable. Other notification means should be explored. The present dual wire concept provides a built-in back-up circuit. Telephone set TA-312/PT, has a ringing circuit which notifies the called party, and is a simple, more reliable piece of equipment than a PA Set. MTOE action will be initiated by the unit to add the required number of telephones to the TOE. In the interim, audio signals should not be overlooked, such as provided by whistle, thunderer, and improvised metal-on-metal signals.

AVII-ATC (1 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery
for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

4. (C) Paragraph 5a, Lesson Learned #6, Lifting Devices for Heavy Artillery Batteries. Non-concur. The requirement for a VTR or wrecker cannot be justified for lifting ammunition or assisting in tube changes. The firing battery has M548 Cargo carriers, each with a boom and winch which can be used to load ammunition. The direct support maintenance unit has responsibility for tube changes and the equipment required for the job. Changing a gun tube is not authorized at unit organizational maintenance level.

5. (C) Paragraph 5b, Lesson Learned #7, Retransmission Radio Unit, AN/VRC-49. Concur. The unit will initiate MTOE action to add this piece of equipment to TOE.

ALLAN G. PIXTON
SG, USA
Commanding

AVII-GCT (1 NOV 68) 2nd Ind.

MAJ Sanderson.rjd/2506

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR 65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96308

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO SF 96375

1. (U) The ORLL of the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, has been review at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 2: Commander's Observations, evaluations and Recommendation:

a. Concur with XXIV Corps Artillery Indorsement without further comment.

Comments on basic report are below.

b. Item: Helicopter support for heavy artillery, page 12, para 2a. Concur. While there has been continuous improvement of aviation support for artillery battalions of XXIV Corps Artillery in the past six months, additional support is still required. Request HQ, USARV review priorities for the issue of aircraft to XXIV Corp Artillery battalion in view of the absence of general support aviation assets in NICTZ.

c. Item: Functioning of the M572 Point Detonating Fuse, page 13, para 2c. The reporting unit has been requested to submit this information on an Equipment Improvement Report IAW TM 38-750.

d. Item: Maintenance problems with M107, 175mm Gun and M110, 8" Howitzer. The reporting unit has been requested to submit this information in an Equipment Improvement Report IAW TM 38-750.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. R. Taylor
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Copies furn:
CG, XXIV Corp Arty
CO, 1st Bn, 83d Arty

AVHGC-DST (1 NOV 68) 3d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR 65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GOP-DT

1. (U) This headquarter has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning, helicopter support for heavy artillery, page 12, paragraph 2a and 2b. Concur. Four OH-6 helicopters were issued to XXIV Corps in December 1968. Two of these were assigned against TOE 6-436G for the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery.

b. (U) Reference item concerning computation of velocity error for the 175mm gun, page 13, paragraph 2b and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2. Concur with the observation and recommendation that FM 6-40 and FT 175-A-O be expanded to include a solution to the 175mm gun VE problem. However, the differing solutions presented in the basic letter and in the 1st Indorsement thereto indicates the complexity of this particular gunnery problem. Recommend the item with the comments of the 1st Indorsement be forwarded to the USAAMS, Fort Siull, for evaluation and further study.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ XXIV Corps
HQ 1/83d Arty

GPOP-DT (1 Nov 68) 4th Ind. (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR 65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

JOHN F. DUNN
Colonel, AGC
Deputy Adjutant General

VELOCITY ERROR TABLE (U)
(Avg for tubes used by this Bn)

ROUNDS REMAINING						
ZONE	50	100	150	200	250	300
ZN 1 VE						
ZN 2 VE		*33.8 *L1		-14.2 L6		
ZN 3 VE		-25.8 "R2	-17.9 L4	-10.1 L0	-6.7 L12	-1.7 L9

*Deft Corr Computed IAW 6-40 Paragraph 21-17