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
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18 OACSFOR

IN REPLY REFER TO

19 OT-UT-694298

9 February 1970

AGDA (M) (3 Feb 70)

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps
Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

9 Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 69.

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11 14 Nov 69 12 54p

2 Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Operational Significant Activities

a. (U) Command and Organization.

(1) (U) Command.

(a) On 1 August 1969, BG William E. Shedd III assumed the duties of the Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps. BG Shedd formerly was the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

(b) On 5 August 1969, COL Charles J. Bailey, Jr., USMC, assumed duties as Deputy Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps in relief of COL Harry L. Givens, USMC, who departed for interim assignment with HQ III MAF and subsequent reassignment to HQ FMF Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.

(c) On 29 August 1969, BG Allan G. Pixton returned from special leave to Hawaii and reassumed command of XXIV Corps Artillery.

(d) On 22 October 1969, BG Shedd departed for a special 30 day leave to the Philippines and BG Pixton assumed duties as Acting Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps.

(2) (U) Organization.

(a) During the reporting period the 3d and 9th Regt Landing Teams, 3d Marine Division departed XXIV Corps on the occasion of their redeployment from Republic of Vietnam.

(b) On 10 October 1969 the 1st Bn, 39th Artillery was assigned to HQ, XXIV Corps and replaced the 2d Bn, 138th Artillery which departed Vietnam.

(c) During this quarter the 1st 8" How. Battery, Fleet Marine Force, was reassigned out of XXIV Corps Area.

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CONFIDENTIALOperational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)b. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence(1) (C) Enemy Situation:

(a) General: During the past quarter, major enemy units in XXIV Corps AO generally endeavored to avoid decisive contact with Allied forces. No enemy attacks of battalion or larger size were initiated, and only isolated company size attacks occurred throughout the quarter. Enemy initiated activity was characterized by light to moderate intensity attacks by rocket/mortar/RPG fire, mining of LOCs, very small unit ground attacks, and a low level of propaganda, proselyting, terrorism and other politically related activity. Enemy activity was largely designed to bolster the diminishing effectiveness of the VC Local Force/VC Infrastructure apparatus in the populated lowland areas of the Corps, and to discredit the GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Once the fall rice harvest began, enemy units of Military Region TRI-THIEN-HUE (MRTTH) concentrated almost exclusively on attempts to secure much needed rice. Continual Allied ambushes in the lowlands and along the edge of the piedmont have extracted a heavy toll of casualties among rice collection parties. Most recent PWs, ralliers and documents from MRTTH elements have recounted severe food shortages and fear of participating in rice collection missions due to Allied ambushes. In the B5 Front AO, the 84th Rocket Artillery Regt and the 31st Infantry Regt were the most consistently active NVA combat units. These units initiated selected attacks by rocket fire over a wide front in the eastern and central QUANG TRI (P), with favorite targets being VANDERGRIFT Combat Base, DONG HA Combat Base, and the Alpha and Charlie Bases south of the eastern DMZ. The 31st Regt operated throughout the quarter in a widely dispersed AO, engaged primarily in propaganda/proselyting in the CAM LO/CAM VU Resettlement Area, and sporadic, harassing mortar/RPG fire and mining of Allied LOC's. Other B5 Front elements conducted sporadic tactical activity, deploying small elements from bases within and north of the DMZ.

(b) QUANG TRI (P)

1. In Quang Tri (P), early August marked the identification of 9th Regt/304th NVA Division in contact with 3rd Marine Regt elements south of the central DMZ, and the 49th Bn/QUANG BINH Provincial Unit (QBPU) in contact with elements of 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Div (Mech) and the 3d Marines. Several company size contacts below the central DMZ during the first half of August resulted in over 150 confirmed enemy KIA. The KIA were about equally divided between the 9th NVA Regt and the 49th Bn/QBPU. A short lived, but rather intense upsurge in attacks-by-fire occurred 12 August, as several Allied targets in the LEATHERNECK SQUARE area of QUANG TRI (P) were struck with rocket and mortar fire. These attacks can most likely be attributed to the 84th Hrt/Arty Regt. On 18 and 19 August, 1/2 ARVN Bn initiated tactical contacts with the 49th Bn/QBPU southwest of COM THIEU. These contacts resulted in 87 enemy KIA and only 16 ARVN WIA, and led to the withdrawal of the 49th Bn after it had suffered nearly 200 confirmed KIA during the month. Sporadic contacts with small 9th NVA Regt elements in the central DMZ area occurred during the last half of August,

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although most were friendly initiated. The 9th Regt operated with platoon to company size elements spread just south of the central DMZ in defensive positions, while larger forces occupied reinforcing positions within the DMZ. Mining activity increased along Rte 9 during late August, while anti-aircraft fire (.50 cal) remained at a higher than normal level throughout the month. Elsewhere in QUANG TRI (P), enemy activity was light throughout August. Delta Force reconnaissance teams were inserted into the Vietnamese SALIENT beginning 5 August and, by virtue of their lack of contact, provided indication that the 24th NVA Regt had vacated the area. The lowlands were generally quiet throughout August with the only significant incident being the attack on QUANG TRI Combat Base with 31 rockets (122mm) on 31 August. The attack was probably conducted by the K34 Arty Bn, 7th Front and resulted in 2 US KIA and 9 US WIA.

2 Enemy activity in the province declined to a low level during the first half of September. The death of HO CHI MINH on 2 September (and resultant 8-11 Sep truce), coupled with Typhoon Doris, which struck the Corps AO between 1-3 September undoubtedly contributed to the low level of activity. In the eastern DMZ area there were several mortar and rocket attacks, which included four mortar attacks on A2 Base (YD 213743), and two rocket attacks on DONG HA Combat Base. These attacks probably were initiated by 84th Arty Regt and/or 31st NVA Regt elements and produced very light casualties and minimal damage. A decrease in ground contacts, moderate anti-aircraft fire along the southern trace of the DMZ, and sporadic attacks by fire characterized enemy activity in the central DMZ area during early September. The 9th Regt continued to exhibit very limited interest in the central DMZ area, and rarely initiated contact other than harassing mortar fire. During the later half of September the 9th Regt, 304th Div remained in its established AO in the central DMZ, and except for a brief spot of contact from the 16th-19th, the Regt was generally content to avoid significant contact. On 19 Sep a notebook was found following a contact in the west-central DMZ area, which identified the 246th NVA Regt in contact. Subsequently, a PW from the 2d Bn, 246th Regt was captured. He revealed that his unit had recently been assigned a combat mission after having operated in a transportation role in the western DMZ area throughout 1969. To date, contacts believed to involve the 246th Regt have been light and sporadic. Aerial reconnaissance forces of the 101st Airborne Div have continued to contact small groups of enemy in the 246th Regt's AO. On 24 September, three PW's from a reconnaissance team of the 1st Bn, 27th Regt were captured south of CON THIEN. These PW's provided the first evidence of the return of the 27th Regimental elements to contact in the east-central DMZ. Documents captured during a contact a few days later in this area contained further indications of the presence of the 1st Bn, 27th Regt.

3 During early October continued evidence was received of renewed tactical involvement south of the east-central DMZ by the 27th Regt. This unit was apparently operating out of a base north of the DMZ and rotating company to battalion size elements into SVN to conduct short periods of tactical activity. Lack of significant contact with the 9th Regt/304th Div during October indicates it has probably pulled back above the DMZ. The

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9th Regt sustained an estimated 400 plus KIA during its two month period of commitment in the central DMZ area, and very likely is entering a period of refitting, although some regimental support companies may continue occasional tactical activity. Thus far evidence that another unit has assumed the 9th Regt's previously established AO is lacking, although the 27th Regt has displayed a measure of interest in the area.

4 Throughout the quarter, VCI and VC local force activity in the QUANG TRI (P) lowlands remained exceptionally light. PW's, ralliers and documents recounted very serious difficulties being encountered by the VC/VCI. Documented problem areas run the gamut from inability to obtain adequate food and supplies, to lack of support from the lowland populace, to friction between local forces and NVA elements of the 7th Front. The 7th Front was entirely unsuccessful in regaining any measure of influence within QUANG TRI (P), and continued evidence of its struggle for sustenance was received throughout the quarter.

5 A continuation of very sporadic, token harassment in the lowlands of THRIEU PHONG, HAI LANG and MAI LINH districts may be expected during the coming quarter. In the eastern and central DMZ areas present indications favor periodic attacks by rocket/mortar fire, minings along Rte 9 and LEATHER-NECK SQUARE, and occasional ground/sapper-style attacks of platoon to company size. NVA units based above the DMZ will probably continue to keep the bulk of their forces out of contact while rotating company size elements into SVN for short-lived tactical activity. The onset of good weather in LAOS during the impending Northeast Monsoon will encourage heightened infiltration of replacement packets into the QUANG TRI (P) interior; however, their number will be limited by difficulty in providing them adequate support upon arrival.

(c) THUA THIEN (P).

1 Throughout the reporting period enemy activity was very light as enemy units in THUA THIEN (P) successfully avoided any major contact with Allied forces. As has been the pattern throughout most of this year, the enemy limited his offensive activities to attacks by rocket, mortar, and RPG fire while ground operations were in no case larger than platoon size. The overwhelming majority of engagements with enemy forces were squad size contacts. In a departure from the pattern of recent months, there was no readily distinguishable monthly upsurge or high point in August, September or October in THUA THIEN (P).

2 In the A SHAU VALLEY enemy activity ground to a halt in early August as the 29th and 803rd Regt elements withdrew all but small reconnaissance units into the sanctuary of Base Area 611. With the close of all Allied FSB's in the valley and the onset of unfavorable weather which hindered Allied aircraft and surveillance capabilities, the enemy is now being afforded the opportunity to reopen the valley supply lines. It must be noted however, that to date Allied surveillance has not detected any large scale enemy movement either into or across the valley. The absence of this anticipated movement may be attributable to limited surveillance due to restrictive weather conditions during early October or the enemy may have been successful in establishing a satisfactory bypass circumventing the A SHAU. As weather

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conditions gradually improve west of the valley in LAOS, an influx of enemy personnel and equipment may be expected into BA's 611 and 607.

3 On 18 August, Operation CUMBERLAND THUNDER commenced with elements of the 101st Abn Div (AM) targeted against the 5th NVA Regt in its traditional AO. Contact with the enemy was minimal as 5th Regt units carefully avoided contact, evaded Allied units and escaped to the sanctuary across the border into LAOS. Any preplanned offensive activity by the 5th Regt was undoubtedly pre-empted by Allied control of the A SHAU supply line. Consequently during this reporting period, the 5th Regiment was forced to occupy itself with food foraging missions into the lowlands to stave off complete starvation. PW's and ralliers from the regiment during the reporting period repeatedly reported the regiment's critical food shortage and supply problem. Activity by the K32 Rocket Arty Bn during August, September, and October decreased dramatically. Only 12 attacks by rocket fire occurred in the unit's normal AO. PHU BAI CB received three of the attacks, the last on 27 August; CAMP EAGLE received five, the last on 23 August; and HUE City four attacks, the last on 15 September. There was an apparent increase in reconnaissance activity against major Allied bases in the lowlands area of the 5th Regt AO, as both CAMP EAGLE and PHU BAI CB reported many instances of night activity forward of their perimeter barriers.

4 The 4th Regt also found itself the target of Allied preemptive efforts as combined 101st Abn Div (AM) and 54th ARVN Regt elements launched Operation CLAIBORNE CHUTE on 20 August. True to previously established patterns, the enemy elected to avoid any major confrontation with the Allies. Again logistical problems probably prevented the enemy from offering any serious resistance. Consequently the 4th NVA Regt has been involved in limited objectives such as interdicting the HUE-DANANG RR and extensive rice gathering missions in the "bowling alley" area. The actions are attributable to small elements of the regiment, as the bulk of the regiment probably withdrew to areas offering improved supply capabilities.

5 The 6th Regt remained out of major contact during the reporting period and withdrew all but minor company sized elements to more logistically favorable areas. Those elements left behind in the PHONG DIEN (D) piedmont, however, operated very closely with VC local forces and might have successfully strengthened the VC and VCI in the area. Attacks by rocket, mortar, and RPG were the rule in the 6th Regt AO with main targets being CAMP EVANS, LZ SALLY, and PK-17. No extensive damage or casualties resulted from these limited activities.

6 Throughout the lowlands, activity by local forces took the form of terrorism in conjunction with extensive rice procurement during the fall harvest. However, rice denial operations resulted in the abortion of many of those missions. Results in numbers of enemy KIA, WIA, PW and ralliers from the ambush tactics graphically demonstrated the success of this technique. Heavy monsoon rains during the first ten days of October resulted in the destruction of the bulk of unharvested rice and probably washed away numerous

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pre-positioned caches. Consequently, it is expected that the plight of most NVA and VC combatants in all areas of THUA THIEN (P) will become even more desperate.

(d) **Enemy Capabilities.** The enemy has the capability to attack-by-fire, interdict LOC's, conduct short-lived ground attacks in up to multi-battalion strength, and engage in limited terrorist/propaganda/political activities. Enemy forces will probably continue to avoid significant ground contact, engage in sporadic attacks-by-fire, minings and other harassment, and concentrate on collecting and stockpiling rice and supplies in preparation of possible future offensive activities.

(2) (C) **Intelligence Collection.**

(a) **General:** The Collection Division continued to perform its mission by providing the G2 with all available information in a timely, accurate, and coordinated manner. The Division monitored 23 MAGV Special Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR), 12 special collection programs and coordinated the collection effort of the four (4) branches of the division: IPW, Ground Reconnaissance, Technical Intelligence, and Ground Surveillance. As a special collection task liaison visits were made to the G2, 1st ARVN Division and US G2 Advisor. Of particular interest was a visit to determine VC/NVA rice gathering activities. Specific methods, gathering areas, and transportation routes were discussed. There was a free exchange on both sides with frequent challenges to each other's opinions. This open discussion resulted in new ideas being surfaced while other knowledge of the enemy was reconfirmed. The discussion was equally beneficial to the G2 sections of the 1st ARVN Division and XXIV Corps.

(b) **Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch:**

1 There was a marked increase in the number of human sources exploited during the reporting period as compared to the previous period. During August 1969 HOI CHANHS from the THUA THIEN Province lowland areas provided important information leading to several cache locations, provided intelligence for future operations, and led to the rally of other HOI CHANHS. A total of 18 HOI CHANHS were received during August 1969 from the lowlands of THUA THIEN Province. Close coordination among all interrogation elements within the Corps AD increased the accuracy of the information being obtained from human sources. Emphasis was placed on translation of ARVN interrogation reports and dissemination by local US elements to all intelligence units having interests. Continued liaison with interrogating elements and Order of Battle Sections at the various levels in the Corps provided the interrogators with sound intelligence which enabled them to properly question each human source.

2 During the reporting period a dedicated courier system for evacuation of captured enemy documents to the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC)

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in Saigon was initiated. Documents were forwarded by subordinate elements to the G2 Collection Division and then forwarded to III MAF on the daily helicopter courier. III MAF, in turn, forwarded the documents to CDEC by courier the following day. A readout was made and a translation returned to III MAF the following morning after the document arrived at CDEC. Full readouts of important documents were provided when requested. This new system decreased the time required for a field unit to receive a readout from 3-4 weeks to 3-4 days. It also provided the readout information to all using agencies. Close liaison with 1st ARVN Div G2 continued to provide document readouts on "loaned" documents (documents captured by the ARVN elements) for exploitation and dissemination through US intelligence channels. Daily liaison was conducted with 1st ARVN Div Combined Division Interrogation Center (CDIC) and both US and ARVN benefited by more complete exploitation of sources contained therein.

(c) Technical Intelligence: During the period numerous technical intelligence items were monitored and passed to the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC). The CMEC Field Team attached to this headquarters continued to provide invaluable assistance to units in the field. Additionally, this branch registered numerous war trophies to include 130 rifles and 38 pistols. Although most items of technical intelligence interest had been previously reported, there were several significant, unusual items.

1 On 20 Aug 69 a bulldozer was discovered in the A SHAU Valley. The item was of Russian manufacture and was in poor condition indicating it had been in its present location several months. The bulldozer was extracted from the A SHAU Valley for further examination. The item was identified as an M-80 Bulldozer with an engine of approximately 80HP. The bulldozer weighs 15,000 lbs and is similar to the US D-7 tractor. This is the first acquisition of this model bulldozer in RVN.

2 On 1 Sep an enemy periscope was found on a trail in the Piedmont 10 km southwest of the QUANG TRI City. The item was identified as a periscope from the commander's cupola of a PT-76 Soviet Amphibious Tank. There have been no tanks reported in the Corps AO and it is believed this item was used as some type of vision device not associated with its primary purpose.

3 On 7 Sep an enemy rangefinder was discovered on a sweep operation 5 km south of CAMP EVANS. The item was identified as a Rangefinder, 1 meter base model, manufactured in Russia. It is a coincidence rangefinder and has range markers for 100m, 200m and 500m. The tube is partially filled with helium and a desiccant. This item is used in conjunction with anti-aircraft weapons.

(d) Ground Reconnaissance Branch:

Aggressive ground reconnaissance in the XXIV Corps area of operation continued to produce positive results as 395 long range ground reconnaissance patrols performed intelligence collection missions. These patrols engaged in 60 contacts, resulting in 74 enemy KIA and 3 enemy PW's. In addition, there were 147 enemy sightings without contact that provided intelligence data on numerous enemy personnel movements, the location of enemy bunker complexes,

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and the location of enemy base camps. In addition to the patrols from XXIV Corps units, the B-52 (Project Delta) 5th SFG operated in the XXIV Corps Area of operation during the period and provided considerable intelligence in northwestern QUANG TRI Province and the BA LONG Valley area. Intelligence on enemy presence in the CAM River Valley, (NW QUANG TRI Province) produced by the Delta Force patrols, was a significant factor in the decision to launch the 101st Airborne Division Operation "Norton Falls". The Delta Force patrols penetrated the NVA Seventh Front's rear area in the DA KRONG Valley. Aggressive patrolling harassed the enemy and provided numerous targets for artillery and air strikes, further disrupting the enemy's supply lines and other rear area operations.

(e) Ground Surveillance Branch:

1 During the reporting period the Ground Surveillance Branch was reorganized from an independent division reporting directly to the G2 into a branch within the Collection Division.

2 The Ground Surveillance Branch continued its assigned Duel Blade/Duffel Bag missions and in addition initiated the XXIV Corps Tight Jaw program. ARVN has enthusiastically participated in the Tight Jaw program; they established three new readout sites and implanted 12 new Tight Jaw sensor strings. All regiments of the 1st ARVN Division implanted sensor strings in their AO's. They responded to sensor target detections with organic artillery and followed the artillery engagements with sweeps of the area when possible. These sweeps resulted in the finding of numerous blood trails and items of enemy equipment. In one case, a sweep conducted by the 54th ARVN Regt found 4 NVA KIA and 1 PW WIA.

3 The US sensor program also continued to expand during the reporting period. Plans were completed to provide for the orderly transfer of the sensor mission from the departing 3d Mar Div to the 101st Abn Div and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech). This planning included the establishment of a Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) from resources of the 3d Mar Div. The 3d Mar Div SCAMP will remain in-country for approximately 60 days after departure of the division to insure the continuity of the Corps sensor program.

4 During the reporting quarter the 101st Abn Div received a Sensor Analogue Relay System (SARS). It was employed in the A SHAU Valley on Signal Hill to relay to PSB Rendezvous. When the 101st Abn Div withdrew from the A SHAU Valley the SARS was displaced to Camp Eagle with a planned use of providing an extension of the present readout capability to the west.

(3) (C) Counterintelligence

(a) LIAISON: Although liaison between Security Division and various intelligence agencies in XXIV Corps A/O was established, increased emphasis continued to be placed on more timely intelligence through more frequent

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liaison visits. Efforts were continued to establish liaison with GVN National Police; however, this effort was hampered due to changes in National Police personnel.

(b) EARLY WARNING NETWORK: Emphasis continued on Early Warning Network (EWN). With the addition of more human resources, the EWN expanded over that of last quarter. Through intelligence gained from casual informants, effective ambushes were set up which resulted in several VC KIA and numerous contacts where enemy casualties were unknown.

(c) ATTACK AGAINST THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI): Included in the Security Division's mission is the coordinating with, and monitoring of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG program in its attack against the VCI. Liaison with District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers increased and enhanced and improved the flow of information from the DIOCC's and PIOCC's to the US tactical units, helping to intensify US tactical units' involvement in the attack against the VCI.

(d) SECURITY: A great deal of emphasis was placed on destruction of official waste in order to deny the enemy classified, and unclassified but useful, information (i.e., personal letters, official rosters, maps, daily bulletins, etc.). During the last quarter periodic checks of the classified destruction areas revealed that more emphasis and rigid control of classified document destruction was needed. A program was developed to enhance security which resulted in immediate improvement of the situation. The main point of the program was to emphasize the constant need of security awareness.

c. (C) OPERATIONS.

(1) (C) The XXIV Corps Area of Operation, which was extended south into Quang Nam Province to permit elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in conjunction with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) to conduct Operation Campbell Streamer, reverted to its original trace upon termination of that operation on 13 August 1969. On 22 October 1969, the XXIV Corps AO was modified in its southeastern most extremity to permit extension of the 1st Marine Division boundary north and west of the Hai Van Pass and the Dam Lap An area. This XXIV Corps-1st Marine Division Boundary change shifts responsibility for security of the northwestern portion of the Hai Van Pass; the Lang Co Bridge; QL-1 and the Hue-Da Nang Railroad north and west to the vic of Hill 88 to the 2d Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment. No other modifications to the XXIV Corps AO were effected during the reporting period.

(2) (C) The following operations terminated during the report period:

(a) Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER:

This operation initiated the 101st Airborne Division (AM) spring-summer offensive in the southern and western portion of THUA THIEN Province.

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Extensive airmobile, reconnaissance in force and search and ambush operations were conducted. Ground contacts and attacks by fire occurred frequently. The operation commenced 1 March 1969 and terminated 14 August 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>C/SH</u>
332	1688	1523	1	1675	41	5	472	1612	185

(b) Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS:

Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducted extensive operations in the A SHAU Valley designed to deny the enemy the use of the valley and to keep Route 547 open. Frequent ground contacts continued throughout the operation. The operation commenced 8 June 1969 and terminated 15 August 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>C/SH</u>
87	408	378	0	393	7	0	0	174	47

(c) Operation IROQUOIS GROVE:

The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) conducted search and clear operations to eliminate the VC/VCI in the coastal lowlands south of QUANG TRI City. Operations were also conducted to prevent the enemy from interdicting Route 9, infiltrating from the Con Thien Corridor to the Cam Le area and procuring rice in the lowlands. This operation commenced 19 June 1969 and terminated 25 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>C/SH</u>
13	130	108	1	134	10	3	0	71	11

(d) Operation ARLINGTON CANYON:

In response to enemy rocket attacks on Vandergrift Combat Base, elements of the 3d Marine Division conducted a quick reaction operation to interdict the enemy's routes of access into this area and deny him the opportunity to conduct further rocket attacks. The operation commenced 3 July 1969 and terminated 21 September 1969 with the following results:

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<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
10	29	28	0	23	0	0	0	8	0

(e) Operation CAMPBELL STREAMER:

Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in conjunction with GVN forces conducted search and clear and RIF operations in the area west of the HAI VAN Pass and the ELEPHANT VALLEY area. Squad size ambushes were deployed in an area paralleling Route 1 astride enemy infiltration routes. The operation commenced 13 July 1969 and terminated 14 August 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
2	5	5	0	24	1	0	0	38	6

(f) Operation IDAHO CANYON:

3d Marine Division elements conducted search and clear operations designed to prevent enemy forces from interdicting Route 9. Units were deployed along and just south of the southern half of the DMZ to destroy enemy staging areas. This operation was characterized by frequent attacks by fire and periodic heavy contacts just south of the DMZ. Usually these heavy contacts occurred while friendly units were in night defensive positions and consisted of mortar, sapper and ground attacks. The operation commenced 16 July 1969 and terminated 25 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
105	440	396	0	565	5	2	0	155	48

(g) Operation GEORGIA TAR:

A search and clear operation was conducted northeast of KHE SANH by elements of the 4th Marine Regiment. The operation commenced 16 July 1969 and terminated 25 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
1	44	23	0	40	0	0	1	15	0

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(h) Operation RICHLAND SQUARE:

This operation, originally designated CAROLINA BLASTER on 15 August 1969, was renamed RICHLAND SQUARE on 17 August 1969. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducted airmobile assaults, RIF, search, and ambush operations against the 5th NVA Regiment throughout the 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO. The operation commenced 17 August 1969 and terminated 28 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
23	214	163	0	196	4	0	0	140	28

(i) Operation LOUISIANA LEE:

Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in conjunction with forces of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) conducted operations in the southern A SHAU Valley with emphasis on locating the 5th NVA Regiment's infiltration routes in that portion of the valley. Simultaneously the forces conducted numerous feints in the western portion of the valley. The operation commenced 16 August 1969 and terminated 28 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
14	69	45	0	66	1	0	0	44	15

(j) Operation CUMBERLAND THUNDER:

101st Airborne Division (AM) elements in coordination with the 3d Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), conducted operations targeted against the 5th NVA Regiment known to be operating in southern THUA THIEN Province in the vicinity of FSB's SPEAR and NUTS. The operation commenced 18 August 1969 and terminated 28 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
0	26	21	0	85	1	0	0	35	3

(k) Operation CLAIBORNE CHUTE:

Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducted operations in the lowlands and piedmont regions of THUA THIEN Province northwest of HUE and in the vicinity of former BASE AREA 101. This operation was characterized by detailed search, RIF and extensive ambushes in the vicinity of Route 1 to interdict enemy infiltration toward the pacified areas of THUA THIEN and QUANG

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TRI Provinces. The operation commenced 20 August 1969 and terminated 28 September 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
4	63	41	0	38	2	0	0	36	4

(1) 3d Marine Division Operation (Unnamed):

Elements of the 4th Marine Regiment conducted security missions at Vandergrift Combat Base, Elliot Combat Base, the KHE GIO Bridge and the Cam Lo Bridge. Search and clear operations northwest of the VCB were conducted. Concurrently elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) conducted search and clear operations from fixed bases within their AO. The operation commenced 26 September 1969 and terminated 22 October 1969 with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IW</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
25	179	58	0	127	7	2	6	43	21

(3) (C) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph d.

(a) REPUBLIC SQUARE:

This operation is designed to find, fix and destroy enemy forces within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO. Elements of the division are conducting detailed search, LOC patrols, and ambushes to neutralize local VC/VCI forces. Operations are conducted in PHU LOC District in conjunction with Regional and Popular Forces along Route 1 to interdict enemy efforts to infiltrate and harass the civilian population. In PHONG DIEN District, the piedmont area south of Hue, and in an area vicinity LZ SALLY, operations are targeted to deny the enemy access to the populated areas. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) continues its active participation in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program in THUA THIEN Province. The operation commenced on 29 September 1969.

(b) NORTON FALLS:

Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) are conducting extensive operations in an AO northwest of VANDERGRIFT CB to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and base areas and to screen the redeployment of the 4th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division. The operation commenced on 2 October 1969.

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(c) FULTON SQUARE:

This operational nickname is given to current search and clear operations by the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) within their assigned AO. The operation commenced on 22 October 1969.

(d) Statistical data of current operations:

FRIENDLY

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>STARTING DATE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>
REPUBLIC SQUARE	29 Sep 69	15	69	63	0
NORTON FALLS	2 Oct 69	5	21	19	0
FULTON SQUARE	22 Oct 69	1	6	4	0

ENEMY

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>STARTING DATE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
REPUBLIC SQUARE	29 Sep 69	123	12	3	0	80	4
NORTON FALLS	2 Oct 69	57	1	0	0	19	1
FULTON SQUARE	22 Oct 69	14	0	0	0	5	3

(4) (C) Task Force Clearwater:

(a) Patrol elements of Task Force Clearwater detected 52,055 vessels on the inland waterways of Northern IGTZ during the reporting period. They boarded and searched 16,179 vessels and inspected 23,024 vessels without boarding. In addition, 133,104 persons were checked for proper identification of which 422 were detained. The majority of the detentions were attributable to improper I.D. cards and curfew and restricted area violations.

(b) Task Force Clearwater, in cooperation and coordination with Coastal Group Forces and other GVN naval elements, has actively participated in XXIV Corps rice denial/protection operations by patrolling the inland waterways in the Corps AO.

(c) During Operation Saturate, a province planned combined search and clear operation in THUA THIEN Province, TF Clearwater's 521st River Security Group supported US and ARVN forces by establishing blockades on inland water-fronts to prevent the escape of the VC.

(d) The enemy continued mining attempts on the Cua Viet LOC during the period. Six mines were detonated as a result of daily mine sweeps and one mine was recovered. EOD personnel deactivated the mine and sent it to Saigon

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for exploitation. No logistic craft or patrol boats were damaged by enemy mine activity on either the Qua Viet or the Perfume Rivers.

(e) Nineteen US initiated contacts were made by TF Clearwater PBR's and eleven enemy initiated attacks took place. The results were one US WIA and five enemy KIA. One PBR received minor damage from small arms fire and two LCM-8's were damaged by rocket attacks.

(f) Civic Action Programs continued to receive emphasis with 59 MEDCAP/DENTCAP's conducted in villages throughout their AO. The MINI-MEDCAP Program continues to be successful with the regular PBR crews distributing medical supplies to hamlets along the river for the treatment of minor ailments.

(g) The VIP program on the Qua Viet continues to produce excellent results. Children along the river banks were paid \$VN 58,930 for munitions turned over to the PBR crews.

(5) (C) Phase II Redeployment.

(a) During the reporting period the first two of four USMC embarkation units redeployed. The 3d Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division returned to CONUS while the 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment plus various divisional elements moved to OKINAWA. The third embarkation unit, consisting of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, elements of the 3d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment plus other divisional support elements stood down on 22 October 1969 in preparation for their departure to Okinawa in early November. To date, a total of 7,450 USMC personnel and 9,892 USMC spaces have redeployed. Six U.S. Army units consisting of 733 personnel and 1,571 spaces have redeployed. On 27 October 1969, B Btry, 6-33 Arty, stood down in preparation for reducing this unit to zero strength by 8 November 1969.

(b) The XXIV Corps Redeployment Planning Group, in addition to monitoring the above redeployments, also formulated the intra-Corps restationing plan for units remaining in the Corps AO. This plan was approved by the Commanding General, XXIV Corps and is now in the execution phase.

d. (C) LOGISTICS

(1) (U) General: During the period covered by this report, the plans and procedures for logistics support in the XXIV Corps area of operations (AO) remained unchanged.

(2) (C) Operations:

(a) During the period the 9th Marine Regimental landing team completed redeployment to Okinawa. A total of 7,451 personnel and 14,945 S/T of cargo was redeployed.

(b) The 3d Marine Division began redeployment operations during this

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period. The division is divided into four embarkation increments:

Embarkation Unit Alpha - BLT 3

Embarkation Unit Bravo-1 - BLT 1/4

Embarkation Unit Bravo-2 - BLT 2/4

Embarkation Unit Bravo-3 - BLT 3/4

Units within the division began to stand down 20 Sep 69 with unit stand downs continuing until 5 Nov. The actual embarkation of units began in early October and is scheduled to be complete by the end of November.

(c) The following Army Reserve units redeployed to CONUS and were replaced by the units indicated:

<u>USAR Unit</u>	<u>Regular Army Unit</u>
1002d S&S Co	148th S&S Co
HQ, 336th Ord Bn	HQ, 528th Ord Bn
413th Fin Det	Det, 64th Fin Co
173d QM POL Ops Co	528th POL Sup Co
842d POL Sup Co	848th POL Ops Plt
259th QM Bn	26th Gp POL Sec
513th Ord Bn HQ & Main Spt Co	2d Ord Bn HQ & Main Spt Co
237th CS Co	55th CS Co

(d) During the month of July discussions were held with Da Nang Support Command regarding an increase in stockage of Class I supplies at Phu Bai in anticipation of the monsoon season. The Support Command requested authority from 1st Log Comd to increase A/B ration stockage from 7 to 12 days, and C rations from 5 to 7 days during the period 1 Aug 69 - 1 Mar 70. Approval was received in late August and stockage equalled the new stock objective by mid-September.

(e) Transportation:

1. 101st Airborne Div (AM) move: In Aug, the 1st Bde of the 101st Abn Div began redeployment from TAM KY back to NICTZ. The first element arrived at CAMP EVANS by C-130 on the 10th. The last increment arrived at Tan My by LST at 1215 hrs, 15 Aug 69. Summaries of the move are as follows: Major units moved: 1/501 Inf Bn; 1/502 Inf Bn; 2/320 Arty Bn (-). By Air: 1417 PAX; 166 S/T cargo; 34 sorties. By Sea: 387 PAX; 934 S/T Cargo; 5 LST trips.

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2 101st Airborne Div (AM) airdrops: During August and September the 101st Abn Div conducted two tactical airdrops to exercise its resupply procedures for the A SHAU Valley. Both drops utilized the Container Delivery System (CDS). On 28 Aug 69, three C-130 aircraft dropped 48 containers filled with 45 S/T of Class I, III and V cargo at coordinates YC 495825. The farthest load from target was only 100 yards off center. The 1st Log Comd inserted a four-man team to recover the containers and expedite their return to Cam Ranh Bay. On 15 Sep 69, at 1100 hrs, the second drop was conducted in the vicinity of FSB RENDEZVOUS. Two aircraft dropped 32 containers of Class I, III and V cargo. Containers were then hooked to Phu Bai, loaded on C-130's and returned to Cam Ranh Bay.

3 Perfume River Crossings: On Sep 69, the float bridge across the Perfume River at Hue was removed in anticipation of heavy rains. The railroad bridge CL 60 is defile; and the civilian highway bridge, which was upgraded from a Class 10 to a Class 18 bridge over the summer and reopened to traffic on 1 Sep 69, will take two direction traffic with military traffic limited to Class 4 vehicles (3/4 ton). The Rhino Ferry was moved from Tan My ramp to the Hue/Cornfield ramp and services US military vehicles only. Heavy vehicles (tanks, retrievers, M-109's) however, must be transferred by LCM-8 provided by NSA Det TAN MY as coordinated by G4 Trans Div, HQ, XXIV Corps. At present a training program is underway to train seven Vietnamese civilians to operate the ferry. It is anticipated that the ferry operation and equipment will be turned over to the GVN at a later date.

e. (C) Personnel Administration.

(1) (U) Civilian Personnel Management. The number of direct hire Vietnamese Nationals in the command remained constant at 47. Funds for the employment of daily hire employees were increased substantially for the 4th Qtr CY 69.

(2) (C) Maintenance of unit strength. Unit strength remained at an acceptable level throughout the reporting period.

(3) (U) Medical

(a) During the reporting period excellent medical support continued to be provided in the Corps AO. The 85th Evacuation Hospital was expanded to 150 beds to accommodate the additional workload created when the 22d Surgical Hospital was reduced to zero strength. Considerable work was done at the 85th Evac Hospital to improve patient and personnel quarters and patient protective facilities.

(b) A group therapy program to assist in identifying and alleviating personnel psychological problems was initiated at the Headquarters Company Aid Station. Preliminary results indicate that the program is achieving the desired results.

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(c) In the civic action area, support to the Dong Ha Children's Hospital is expected to continue on a reduced basis. During the reporting period Corps units provided medical support to assist in combating the hemorrhagic fever (dengue) outbreak in Hue. Construction of the PHU BAI Hospital has been cancelled based on guidance received through medical channels.

(4) Religious Coverage

(a) Religious coverage continued to be adequate throughout the Corps notwithstanding the turbulence created by the redeployment of units. This can be attributed in part to efficient and effective cross service support between Army, Navy and Marine chaplains.

(b) Individual participation in religious activities was greatly enhanced during the reporting period through an increase in the number of Sunday services, the conduct of services at remote locations and the initiation of a daily chapel program at Camp Hochmuth Chapel. The daily chapel program consists of Catholic and Protestant services and a religious film period.

(c) The one Jewish Chaplain assigned to Corps continues to give coverage to the entire AO. Lay leaders, trained and supervised by the Jewish Chaplain, contribute materially to the accomplishment of Jewish religious activities.

(5) (U) Discipline Law and Order.

(a) Clear delineation of the Corps Provost Marshall responsibilities and specific delineation of areas of primary responsibility between divisional and non-divisional Military Police units were achieved during the reporting period. Additionally, coordination problems existing between Army and Marine military police and other criminal investigative agencies were corrected by the assignment of specified areas and routes to specific units.

(b) Plans for the realignment of military police responsibilities following withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division to include those related to prisoners of war were completed prior to movement of the Division.

(c) Combat and combat support operations conducted by military police in conjunction with National Police and ARVN Military police reached a high point in the security of LOCs and reduction of incidents and hostile activities in the villages. A significant lessening of convoy harassment during the quarter was also realized as a result of the use of recently acquired V-100 armored cars as convoy escorts. This equipment materially enhanced escort firepower and reduced reaction time.

f. (U) Inspector General

NONE

g. (U) Information

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- (1) (U) Coverage was furnished the following major events:
 - (a) Redeployment of the 3d Marine Division (continuing).
 - (b) Visit of RVN President Thieu to Hue for the burial of victims from Tet 1968.
 - (c) Realignment of forces in XXIV Corps AO resulting from the announced redeployment of the 3d Marine Division.
- (2) (U) Four interviews were arranged and coordinated with the Commanding General, one with the Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff, and five with General Staff sections for members of the press.
- (3) (U) During the period 185 news releases were made on XXIV Corps activities.
- (4) (U) Coverage of news events by civilian media was arranged and coordinated for 191 correspondents. Of these, 119 remained at least one night in the XXIV Corps Press Camp.
 - h. (U) Command Historian

NONE
 - i. (C) Army Aviation
 - (1) (U) The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) received one additional OH-6A on 17 August 1969. The total aircraft assets of the company include ten UH-1's, six OH-6's (two hand received from HQ, XXIV Corps Arty), and two U-21's.
 - (2) (C) Aviation support for the 1st Bde, 5th Mech previously supported by the USMC, became a matter of concern with the redeployment of the 3d Marine Div. Additional aviation assets were requested from MACV. However, MACV indicated that additional helicopter assets will not be allocated to ICTZ at this time and requested that III MAF review the requirements for helicopter support throughout ICTZ and reallocate current assets as necessary. As an interim measure, the 101st Abn Div (AM) has been tasked by Corps to support the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) with essential aviation support.
 - j. (C) SIGNAL
 - (1) (C) CAMP EAGLE Cable Distribution System. During this reporting period, the CAMP EAGLE cable distribution system was expanded and rehabilitated. This action afforded a greater number of telephone subscribers direct access to the CAMP EAGLE AN/MTC-9 switchboard and resulted in an overall improvement in telephone service. In addition, four small unit switchboards were deactivated.
 - (2) (C) Wideband AUTOSEVOCOM

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(a) On 13 August 1969, a Wideband AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal was installed at the 108th Artillery Group TOC, Dong Ha. This terminal is a subscriber off secure switchboard (SECORD) 80.

(b) On 17 August 1969 an AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal was installed for the Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery. This terminal is a subscriber off SECORD 35.

(c) On 23 September 1969 the Commanding General's AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal was reconfigured to include a booth located in the Command Sergeant Major's Office. The telephone instrument and TSEC/KY-3 are located in this booth with an extension provided in the Commanding General's Office. Installation of this configuration has provided staff personnel better access to secure voice service.

(3) (C) Communication Economy. In August 1969, as a part of overall communication economy efforts, the 60 word per minute, secure teletype circuit from Da Nang Minor Relay to XXIV Corps TOC was deactivated. Suitable alternate routes offering the same service were available. This deactivation eliminated duplication of facilities.

(4) (C) VHF Support for FSB RENDEZVOUS. On 29 August 1969 action was initiated to install a 12-channel VHF system from CAMP EAGLE to FSB RENDEZVOUS in support of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM), which relocated from FSB BERCHTESGADEN. Contingency assets of XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69, consisting of equipment and personnel of the 63rd Signal Battalion, 12th Signal Group, were utilized to establish the required system within 36 hours of implementation of the OPLAN. Initial quality of circuits provided by this system were marginal and inconsistent due to the long distance and intervening terrain involved. When efforts to improve this system met with negative results, a relay was established on Hill 859 which provided the desired circuit quality and reliability. This system remained active until 23 September 1969, when it was deactivated upon relocation of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM) to CAMP EVANS.

(5) (C) VHF Support for FSB BLAZE. On 30 August 1969 contingency assets of XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69 were again committed to provide for the installation of a 12-channel VHF system from CAMP EAGLE to FSB BLAZE. Personnel and equipment of the 63rd Signal Battalion, 12th Signal Group were utilized to accomplish the installation. Initial results proved the long distance and intervening terrain between CAMP EAGLE and FSB BLAZE would hinder the establishment of circuits of acceptable quality. In an attempt to improve circuit quality, the system was reestablished from FSB BLAZE to HUE and relayed from HUE to CAMP EAGLE. This path also proved marginal, with circuit quality of about the same level as was characteristic of the previous path direct to CAMP EAGLE. A relay was being planned for installation at FSB RAKKASAN which would allow the required system, CAMP EAGLE to FSB BLAZE, to be established with one relay. Before this relay could be established, the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM) relocated to CAMP EVANS negating the system requirement.

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(6) (C) VHF Support for CAMP EAGLE.

(a) With the relocation of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM), from FSB REN-DEZVOUS to CAMP EAGLE and MAI LOC a 12 channel VHF system, FFHO3, was installed from MAI LOC to QUANG TRI Combat Base, under the provision of XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69. Equipment and personnel of the 63rd Signal Battalion, 12th Signal Group installed this system on 1 October and began activating circuits on an emergency basis. The establishment of this Corps Area Communication System allowed the 101st Abn Div (AM) to deactivate a 4-channel system which had been installed from Mai Loc to Quang Tri to initially support the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM).

(b) The relocation of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM) to CAMP EVANS and MAI LOC manifestly increased the communication requirement between CAMP EVANS and CAMP EAGLE. The channel capacity of the one 12-channel VHF system from CAMP EVANS to CAMP EAGLE was not sufficient to meet the total communication requirements. To alleviate this lack of channel capacity, an additional 12-channel VHF system was installed from CAMP EVANS to CAMP EAGLE. This system, FFHO2, enabled necessary command, control and administrative circuits to be established between the 3d Bde and the 101st Abn Div Hqs and will add flexibility to future communications needs at Camp Evans.

(7) (C) Microwave System from PHU BAI to CAMP EAGLE. On 4 September 1969, action was initiated by the XXIV Corps Signal Officer to install a 45-channel microwave system from PHU BAI to CAMP EAGLE. This system was necessitated by the failure of the 400 pair PHU BAI - CAMP EAGLE - GIA LE tie cable. The request was submitted to USARV on 4 September 1969 and subsequent approval received on 6 September 1969. Assets of the 37th Signal Battalion, 12th Signal Group were made available and installation of the system began 14 September 1969. Installation of the system, FFMO3, was completed on 17 September 1969 and high precedence circuits transferred to it. On 2 October 1969 two back up, 12-channel VHF systems, FFHO1 and FFH88, from PHU BAI to CAMP EAGLE were deactivated. These systems were no longer required as a result of the channel capacity made available by the AN/TRC-29 microwave system.

(8) (U) Audio Visual Support Center, Det E, 221st Signal Company, (Pictorial), established an audio-visual sub-center at Phu Bai Combat Base on 10 September 1969. The audio visual sub-center is serving training programs of units in the NICTZ in the following ways: (1) Provides training to qualify personnel to operate audio visual equipment (2) Supplies audio visual equipment for training use (3) Supplies training films, slides and vu-graph transparencies.

(9) (U) Expansion of PHU BAI Dial Telephone Exchange. On 15 May 1969, Gustan Hirsch Organization (GHO Contractors) began installation of a 1000 line expansion at the PHU BAI Dial telephone exchange. This expansion was completed on 28 September 1969 and provided for a 2000 line dial exchange serving the PHU BAI complex. In addition, necessary reconfiguration was accomplished so class "C" subscribers will be able to direct distance dial in ICTZ when secondary trunks are activated in the near future.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
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(10) (U) Improvement of CAMP RED DEVIL Telephone Service. An AN/MTC-1 switchboard obtained from USARV assets was installed at Camp Red Devil by 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 1 October 1969. Installation of the AN/MTC-1 permitted consolidation of CAMP RED DEVIL telephone subscribers on one switchboard, eliminating the following switchboards: (a) 75th Spt Bn (b) 5th Bn, 4th Arty (c) A Co, 7th Engr Bn. Telephone service at CAMP RED DEVIL has improved considerably as a result of this consolidation.

(11) (C) Narrowband AUTOSEVOCOM. On 3 October 1969, a narrowband AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal was installed at 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) TOC, Camp Red Devil. This terminal is a subscriber off SECORD 35 located at Phu Bai and provides for exchange of information up to and including TOP SECRET.

(12) (C) Increased Communication Support of GVN Forces.

(a) During this reporting period increased emphasis and interest placed on the pacification program and GVN Forces (RF/PF) necessitated activation of sole user voice circuits from XXIV Corps DYNAMIC TOC switchboard to the Province Senior Advisors at HUE and QUANG TRI and to the Marine 4th Combined Action Group at Quang Tri Combat Base. These circuits enabled the XXIV Corps Headquarters to receive immediate reports from units involved in GVN operations in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces.

(b) In addition, a 12 channel VHF system was installed between Hue MACV and Camp Eagle to facilitate communication between 101st Abn Div (AM) and 1st ARVN Div. On 3 October 1969 action was initiated to install this system. On 5 October 1969 installation of the system, FFHQ4, was completed and six circuits from 101st Abn Div (AM) to 1st ARVN Div and MACV at HUE were activated on an immediate basis. This system will be used to establish circuits which will permit coordination of artillery fires between US and ARVN Forces, combined operations, and district/hamlet defense.

(13) (C) Communication Center Reconfiguration. Analysis of force deployments resulted in a reconfiguration of Commcenters at QUANG TRI and DONG HA. The 3d Marine Division fixed commcenter at Dong Ha was deactivated and an AN/TGC-37 was activated to provide interim service for departing Marine units. 12th Signal Group will assume area service responsibilities for DONG HA and have positioned an AN/MSG-29, with a secure 60 word per minute teletype circuit to the PHU BAI Army Commcenter, in the 108th Artillery Group Compound. In QUANG TRI, two 60 word per minute, secure teletype circuits were established from 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) to XXIV Corps TOC and QUANG TRI Army Commcenters. These circuits link 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) directly to XXIV Corps in both operational and area teletype nets.

(14) (U) Improvement of Message Handling. The XXIV Corps Message Center Review Board met three times during the quarter to review message preparation and processing procedures of XXIV Corps Staff Sections and OPCON units. Results of the review indicate messages average less than two minor discrepancies. The majority of discrepancies were format errors due to implementation of the new AR 105-31 on 1 July 1969.

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(15) (U) Investigation of Communication Equipment. A DA directed communication investigation encompassing all organic communications equipment held by TOE Army units was made of all TOE units OPCON to XXIV Corps. This investigation required a determination of what each unit had on hand, how it was being used, and a cost analysis of this use. The results of this investigation were forwarded to USARV on 5 October 1969.

k. (C) Engineer

(1) (U) Command and Staff Relationships. There were no changes in the command and engineer staff relationships during the reporting period. Two Army engineer combat battalions in NICTZ are tasked by III MAF and provide general support to XXIV Corps. One Fleet Marine Force Engineer Battalion and one FMF Bridge Company have been in general support of 3d Marine Division and were tasked by III MAF. Five Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees) of the 32d Naval Construction Regiment have been working in the Corps AO and are tasked by COMNAVFORV, thru 3d Naval Construction Brigade, upon request of III MAF. CG, XXIV Corps has had no direct tasking authority over these supporting engineer units, but all units respond to requests from organic engineer units for back-up support on combat support and operational support missions.

(2) (C) Phase II Redeployment of Forces. During the quarter, the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and other Marine and Navy forces was announced. By the end of the quarter the organic marine engineer battalion and the supporting marine battalion and bridge company (-) had departed or were in stand-down posture. Four of the five Seabee battalions will be redeployed or restationed in-country. By 1 Jan 70, these reductions will leave less than half of the US engineer forces which had previously operated in the Corps AO. One platoon (reinf) of the Marine Bridge Company will remain; it is OPCON III MAF, direct support to XXIV Corps, and can be directly tasked by CG, XXIV Corps.

(3) (U) Engineer tasks completed during the reporting period.

(a) Construction of LANG CO Bridge (ZC 836957).

(b) Restoration of HUE vehicle bridge to 2 lane, Class 18.

(c) Construction of 2 CH-47 hangars and 1 UH-1 hangars in XXIV Corps AO (this completed all programmed hangars).

(4) (C) Continuing projects.

(a) SONG BO Railroad Bridge (YD 614278) approximately 80% completed at the end of the reporting period.

(b) DONG HA Bridge (YD 242611) approximately 75% complete at the end of the reporting period, due for completion by 18 November.

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(c) Land Clearing. The 59th Land Clearing Company continued to clear tank trails and areas adjacent to Route 548 in the A SHAU VALLEY. Approximately 1,100 acres were cleared until temporary withdrawal from the valley in mid-September. Rainfall in the valley required diversion of some of the land-clearing effort to keeping trails open and assisting tracked vehicles in the withdrawal. After stand-down for maintenance, land clearing operations were conducted in the vicinity of NAM HOA (YD 762129), west and south of FSB JACK (YD 495287), and in PHU THU District (support of Operation SATURATE). Approximately 3,500 acres were cleared on these projects by the end of the reporting period. Studies of the land clearing requirements to support a program of increasing ARVN's land mobility (see para 4f below) have developed several additional land clearing projects to be undertaken in priority, during the next and following quarters.

(d) Primary Lines of Communication (QL-1 and QL-9). There were 39 miles of first lift and 100 miles of second lift bituminous paving placed during the reporting period.

(e) Route 547. Between FSB BLAZE (YD 535020) and FSB RENDEZVOUS (YC 433967), the upgrading to pioneer road condition was completed to permit passage of all tracked vehicles and of wheeled vehicles up to 5 ton. Drainage structures between FSB BLAZE and FSB BASTOGNE (YD 620091) were improved. Continued maintenance and repair was required to keep the road open for support of tactical forces until mid-September.

(f) Secondary LOC's (Tactical Roads). Work continued on upgrading of Routes 560, 555A, 555B extension to Gia Pang (YD 552541), and 547A 549. During the quarter a concept was developed with the objective of identifying work to be initiated now which would improve ARVN's capability to defend the population as US forces were reduced and ARVN became progressively more dependent on ground mobility. The three interrelated projects which resulted from a study included construction of access roads to selected fire support bases and construction of a tactical line of communication behind those bases. Work on three of the access roads was started during the reporting period.

1. (C) G5 Activities.

(1) (C) Civic Action Activities

(a) During the reporting period military civic action projects were emphasized and carried out under continuing favorable security conditions existing in the AO. All projects were approved by province to insure support of the 1969 Pacification Objectives and contributed to the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) Security/Development rating of hamlets targeted by province for pacification. XXIV Corps units contributed 11,209 man days (10 hour day) in completing 339 civic action projects out of 507 undertaken with 73% of the projects being of the self-help variety.

(b) Major projects undertaken by XXIV Corps.

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1 Units supported 30,000 military dependents of the 1st ARVN Division, RF/PF, and National Police in celebrating TET Trung (Children's Autumn Festival) on 26 September 1969 by providing 571,000 \$VN to purchase candy, lanterns and toys. MG Wheeler, Deputy Commanding General XXIV Corps attended presentation ceremonies with MG Truong, 1st ARVN Division, at the Division's Xa Toc dependent housing in the Hue Citadel.

2 Disaster Relief Control Center (DRCC) Operations:

a Communications were established with 101st Abn Div, 3d Mar Div, TF Clearwater, and both provinces and the DRCC began operations at 020100 Sep 69 for Typhoon Doris. The typhoon damage centered in the northern portion of Quang Tri Province and consisted of extensive damage to roof structures. The local GVN authorities and 1st ARVN Div personnel were the principal agencies involved in aiding the citizens in need and assumed the role of primary action agencies. US Military forces assisted by providing some roofing material and in restoring public utilities (water and electricity) in Quang Tri City. The DRCC ceased operations at 051500 Sep 69.

b The DRCC was opened at 050900 Oct 69 for flood conditions caused by extensive rains from 1 to 8 Oct. 57.7 inches of rainfall were measured. Again local GVN personnel took charge and requested minimal assistance from US Military Forces. The 101st Abn Div provided helicopter transportation for some civilians and delivered food to isolated areas. The Hue River Security Group furnished boats to transport civilians and food. The DRCC ceased operations at 080800 Oct 69.

3 3d Marine Division

a The turnover of civic action projects to 1st Bde, 5th Mech was effected in an exemplary manner by the 3d Mar Div. Maximum effort was exerted to complete on-going projects prior to redeployment. Only six major projects, ranging from 40% to 95% in completion, will be turned over to the 1st Bde, 5th Mech. Lists of projects requested by Province, but not yet approved, and civil affairs projects of a continuing nature have also been provided. The disruption of projects, due to redeployment, will be minimal.

b The closure of Vandegrift Combat Base necessitated, for reasons of security, the relocation of 400 Vietnamese and 300 Br. Montagnards with their belongings to the GUA VALLEY. The operation was planned and executed by Province, MACCORDS and ARVN units with US Army and Marine elements providing transportation and engineering assistance. The operation was completed on 27 Sept 1969 in the planned five days and included a "trail drive" of 177 water buffalo.

4 101st Abn Div (AM)

a The division has completed surveys of all orphanages and the location of areas where MEDCAPs are being performed. This action will enable the unit to more effectively allocate civic action and medical resources by

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preventing duplication of effort.

b. All projects on the THUA THIEN Civic Action Project List, that were within the division's capability to complete were either completed or well under way. There were over 250 projects on this list.

5. Miscellaneous accomplishments:

a. "Plowing for Peace" operations were initiated in THUA THIEN Province. This program assisted in refugee resettlement operations by plowing land that has lain fallow for several years. This enabled the refugee to till the soil using only hand tools. The major problem was locating suitable equipment for the job. An old Case tractor was located in Hue and was rebuilt by the 513th Maint Bn, 26th General Support Group. Although hampered by recent rains, over 40 hectares have been plowed. Transportation of the tractor by CH-54, provided by the 101st Abn Div is required due to road non-accessibility.

b. The GVN Village Self Development Fund continued to gather momentum. Checkbooks were issued to 139 of the 151 villages. A total of 67,491,000 \$VN has been expended. Eighty-three projects have been completed with 718 currently underway.

c. The CA/PSYWAR AIK Fund was reduced 50% beginning 1 Oct 69. XXIV Corps and 101st Abn Div now receive 250,000 \$VN and 1st Bde, 5th Mech has been allocated 375,000 \$VN.

d. G5 Conferences were conducted monthly.

(c) Civic Action Effectiveness:

1. The effectiveness of Civic Action continues to be measured in the commitment of the population to the GVN, the improvement of socioeconomic condition, and the population brought under the control of the government as evidenced by the HES rating. The political commitment is increasing steadily and is evidenced by the provision of information concerning VC/NVA activities to the GVN, participation in local elections, involvement in self help projects, and participation in the Peoples Self Defense Force.

2. Due to the loss of significant resources, redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and 50% reduction of AIK funds, military civic action projects will decrease in magnitude and scope in the future.

(2) (U) Psychological Operations

(a) XXIV Corps, G5 PSYOP Division continued to monitor and supervise PSYOP programs/campaigns being conducted by units OPCON to XXIV Corps, and to coordinate activities with the 1st ARVN Division and both provinces.

(b) Major PSYOP Campaigns.

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Period Ending 31 October 1969 RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1 Troop Replacement. The beginning of troop withdrawals stirred a degree of uncertainty and speculation among the South Vietnamese population. It also made the US and GVN a target for communist exploitation which indicated that the US was leaving in defeat, and the GVN forces could not protect their nation. A PSYOP program was developed to dispel these apprehensions and assertions. The objectives of the campaign are:

- a To convince the people that RVN armed forces are much stronger, and worthy of their trust and confidence.
- b To maintain Vietnamese credibility in the US as an ally who is determined to help gain freedom of choice for the RVN.

2 Chieu Hoi. The Chieu Hoi program continued to receive emphasis throughout the period. Primary consideration was on immediate exploitation of ralliers. Immediate exploitation of ralliers with their personal messages and photographs on leaflets, and serial broadcast is one of the most effective methods of inducing additional ralliers. 103 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the GVN this quarter, representing an increase of 22 over last quarter. This increase is attributed to greater tactical pressure on the enemy in the lowlands, exploitation of enemy hardships, and extensive immediate exploitation of ralliers.

3 Rice Denial. The rice denial PSYOP program was closely coordinated with tactical rice denial operations. The PSYOP program has stressed one special theme "The High Price of Rice". The high price of rice has been equated to the loss of enemy lives and their suffering from food shortages. A wide variety of media has been developed to influence both the friendly and enemy audiences. The campaign objectives are:

- a To convince local citizens that rice denial operations are hurting the enemy.
- b To convince the people that their most effective weapon is cooperation and participation with GVN and armed forces.
- c To convince the enemy that they will suffer extensive losses trying to obtain food.

(c) During this quarter there were 4 004 requests for leaflets and 3,322 requests for aerial loudspeaker missions processed. In response to these requests approximately 147 166,000 leaflets were disseminated and 291 hours were broadcasted over aerial and ground loudspeakers.

(3) (C) Pacification.

(a) During the reporting period, statistics indicating pacification progress became available for the period 1 July to 30 September 1969. (All statistics include HUE CITY).

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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (R2)

1 The number of hamlets covered by GVN security increased from 692 to 815 while the number of contested hamlets decreased from 126 to 49. The number of VC controlled hamlets dropped from 9 to 0. One abandoned hamlet was resettled during the period.

2 The percentage of population within the Corps AO under GVN security rose from 93.2% to 96.7%. The percent of population in contested areas dropped from 6.8% to 3.3%.

(b) Effectiveness of the pacification effort.

1 The elimination of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) through the Phoenix program resulted in 248 reportable VCI during the period of 1 July to 15 October 1969.

2 Elections were held in 6 villages and 49 hamlets within the Corps AO bringing the total village elections to 100% and hamlet elections to 96%.

3 The goals for recruiting and arming the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) have been met, however the goal for training is short some 6,000 personnel. This goal will be met by 31 October 1969.

4 The tactical LOC program continues to aid the pacification program by providing rapid surface LOC to market areas for fishermen, farmers and merchants. The capability of rapid resupply and reinforcement has aided immeasurably the ability of GVN to secure the population.

2. Lessons Learned, Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel.

NONE

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) (C) Aerial Observers

(a) Observation: The 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (RAC) flies visual reconnaissance missions for Corps units; the units provide observers for those missions. Until mid September, all observers were stationed with their units. They were picked up at unit airstrips or reported to PHU BAI Airport for takeoff. In some units, observer duty was rotated among unit personnel who lacked proper training for the assignment and sometimes did not have proper equipment. During a one month period, 15 missions were cancelled because unit observers of one unit failed to report. Since September, the unit has corrected observer deficiencies by selection of officers and non-commissioned officers from Artillery and Cavalry units for assignment as observers on a long-term basis. Those observers are stationed at the 220th RAC. This measure has insured that observers are available for all missions

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and has permitted intensive training of observer-pilot teams. Pre-mission/post-mission briefing and debriefing has improved and observers now have adequate equipment.

(b) Evaluation. Assignment of permanent aerial observers and stationing them at the flying unit resulted in more efficient use of aircraft and observers. Particular attention must be paid to maintaining contact between observers and their parent units so that observers continue to be responsive to unit tasking.

(c) Recommendation. That unit observers be assigned the duty on a long-term basis and stationed with the supporting reconnaissance airplane company.

c. (C) Operations

(1) (C) Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector (PSID).

(a) Observation. All XXIV Corps units received the Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector (PSID) during the reporting period. They are used extensively in conjunction with small unit ambushes and with Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRP).

(b) Evaluation. The PSID is a convenient, suitable and extremely effective personnel sensor. It provided early warning to numerous patrols on different occasions. One patrol engaged and killed at least 6 NVA. The only reported shortcoming is the relatively short battery life of the PSID (20 hours).

(c) Recommendation. The PSID should be a PSE item to all maneuver battalions and company companies. Also, effort should be made to extend the battery life.

(2) (C) XM-63 Remote Firing Device

(a) Observation. The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) has used an Acoubuoy in conjunction with the XM-63 remote firing device in order to verify the target and determine the results if the XM-63 is fired.

(b) Evaluation. An Acoubuoy used along with other sensors (miniside) enabled the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) to confirm that a VC patrol was within the kill zone of claymore mines placed along a trail. The claymores were attached to a XM-63 receiver. The remote operator fired the claymores and heard screams and yelling that was translated in part as "It's hit.... help me!"

(c) Recommendation. That an Acoubuoy be used in conjunction with other sensors to verify and monitor targets engaged with the XM-63.

(3) (C) Supporting Units and Control Measures. See enclosure 3

d. (C) Conclusion

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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(1) (U) Personnel Staffing.

(a) Observation: MTOE 52-001T staffing of two officers and two enlisted men for a Corps Information Office is insufficient for an active information program. Collocated with and under the operational control of the Corps IO is a Team AE (Press Camp Headquarters) TOE 45-500D.

(b) Evaluation: To allow an active information program, personnel of the Press Camp Team have been integrated into the Corps Information function. This has allowed the formation of a Public Information Section for researching and writing of news/feature releases, and for initiation of an active home town news program. Using of personnel of the Press Camp Headquarters team for these purposes has not resulted in any diminution of its capability to manage and operate a press camp.

(c) Recommendation: That where possible in other locations personnel of established Press Camps be utilized in active roles in the information function. Not only does this provide the means for pursuing a better information program but at the same time gives those personnel a better understanding and appreciation in their contacts with members of the news media in the regular press camp functions.

(2) (U) XXIV Corps Redeployment Planning Group

(a) Observation: The initial high classification of Phase II Redeployment was restricted to a very few personnel. Therefore, no one staff section was totally cognizant of all actions.

(b) Evaluation: On 22 Sep 69, the Chief of Staff organized the XXIV Corps Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) and placed it under the staff supervision of the ACofS, G3. The group consisted of the following representatives: Corps Engineer (LTC, Chief of BPG), G2, G3, G4, Signal, and the 101st Abn Div (AM). The following agencies provided one officer on an on call basis: Corps Artillery, G1, Aviation Section, Provost Marshal, and the Engineer Section (in addition to the Chief of the RPG). A full time administrative NCO and a clerk typist were also included in the group. The purpose of forming the RPG was to provide a single point of reference within the Corps headquarters for planning and coordinating the many facets of Phase II Redeployment. The group served to identify problem areas and to insure that the appropriate staff sections were advised of these problems. Upon forming the RPG, the Chief of Staff made it clear that by doing so the primary and special staff sections were in no way relieved of their inherent responsibilities in connection with the redeployment of units from and within RVN.

(c) Recommendation: The redeployment planning group served a useful purpose by assisting in the rapid coordination of staff actions. However, when the regular staff sections are cognizant of the situation, such a group should not be formed as the same planning and actions associated with redeployment can be accomplished by appropriate staff sections.

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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Logistics and Support Operations, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

- e. (U) Training. None
- f. (U) Logistics. None
- g. (U) Communications. None
- h. (U) Material. None
- i. (U) Other.
- (1) (U) Road Improvement Program.

(a) Observations: The road improvement program in the XXIV Corps AO has produced both favorable and undesirable results. On the positive side, the improvement of the roads has enabled traffic, both civilian and military, to move with increased ease from point to point. This has had a favorable effect on military operations, pacification and growth of the civilian economy. On the other hand the flow of traffic moves at a higher rate of speed which has led to an increase in the number of injuries/fatalities from vehicle accidents.

(b) Evaluation: The overall impact of the road improvement program is good, but it has pointed out a need for increased traffic control and emphasis on the proper operation of civilian as well as military vehicles.

(c) Recommendations: United States Military Police and Combined (ARVN/National Police/US) patrols be increased and a Public Safety and Law Enforcement Council formed to facilitate coordination between Vietnamese and US authorities. As the road improvement continues, added emphasis be required by units on the training of vehicle operators. These actions have been accomplished with success in the Corps AO.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. D. PECOR
MAJ, AGC
ASST AG

3 Incl

- ~~1. Roster of Key Personnel~~
 - 2. Troop List of XXIV Corps Units
 - 3. Sapper Tactics and Counter Measures
- Incl 1 wd HQ, DA

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AVEGCDST (14 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, X.IV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RNS USFCR-69 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APC San Fran 150 0017 29 DEC 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CGCI-11,
APO 96550

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters,
X.IV Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Aerial Observers", page 29,
paragraph 2b(1); concur. If facilities are available, personnel should
be assigned aerial observer duty on a long term basis. This conforms
with established Army doctrine outlined in paragraph 122, FM 30-20
(Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Field Army. No action by higher
headquarters required.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Patrol Siesmic Intrusion Detector
(PSID)", page 29, paragraph 2c(1): The objective of the USAADC STARC
Evaluation Plan is to determine a basis of issue for ground sensors. A
Defense Communication Planning Group publication (Systems Implementation
Program (U)) indicates that PSID batteries "can be expected to last 48 hours
under maximum activation and up to 150 hours under normal conditions." The
DCPC Technical Liaison Team in RVN is presently retesting the PSID battery
life and will initiate necessary follow-up action upon completion of the test.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "M-68 Remote firing Device", page 29,
paragraph 2c(2); concur. Use of an acoubuoy in consonance with other sensors
complements the detection capability necessary for effective use of the M-68.
However, consideration must be given to the cumbersome weight and size of an
Acoubuoy when planning to transport and implant it by hand. This item will be
considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence
Lessons. No action by higher headquarters is required.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "X.IV Corps Planning Group", page 30,
paragraph 2d(2); concur. The 9th Infantry Division formed a similar group
when it was designated for redeployment as a part of Keystone Eagle. The con-
cept was found to be very effective, providing that the primary purpose of the
group remained that of identifying or isolating problem areas and that the group
in no way relieved the primary and special staff of their responsibilities. No
action by higher headquarters is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Cy furn:
X.IV Corps

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GPOP-DT (14 Nov 69) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending
31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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HHC, XXIV Corps

MI Det (Prov)

24th PI Det

108th Trans Co. (Car)

2d Plat, Co A, 504th MP Bn (OPCON)

31st Mil Hist Det

62d Avn Co (OPCON, XXIV Corps)

220th Recon Acft Co (OPCON, XXIV Corps)

Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached from 25th Div to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div)

31st Chaplains Det

274th FA Radar Det (AN/TPS-25) (Attached to 108th Arty Gp)

XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY

HHB, XXIV Corps Arty

1st Bn 83d Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

1st Bn, 39th Arty (155mm) (SP)

108th Arty Gp

HHB, 108th Arty Gp

8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm) (T) (-)

1st Bn, 40th Arty (105mm) (SP)

1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)

Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 Cal Mg)

Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

Btry F, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)

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235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

238th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

1st 8" How Btry (FMP Pacific - OPCON 108th Arty Gp)

5th 175 Gun Battery (175mm gun - 8" How) (FMP Pacific - OPCON 108th Arty Gp)

101st Airborne Division (AM)

HHC, 101st Abn Div

1st Brigade

HHC, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

1st Bn, 327th Inf

2d Bn, 327th Inf

2d Bn, 502d Inf

2d Brigade

HHC, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div

1st Bn, 501st Inf

2d Bn, 501st Inf

1st Bn, 502d Inf

3d Brigade

HHC, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div

3d Bn, 187th Inf

1st Bn, 506th Inf

2d Bn, 506th Inf

Division Artillery

HHB 101st Abn Div Arty

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2d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm) (T)

2d Bn, 320th Arty (105mm) (T)

1st Bn, 321st Arty (105mm) (T)

2nd Bn, 11th Arty (105mm) (T)

Btry A, (AVN) 377th Arty

4th Bn, 77th Arty (ARA)

268th, 331st, 388th, 650th Trans Det

101st Avn Gp

HHC, 101st Avn Gp

101st Aslt Hel Bn

499th, 510th, 516th, 527th Trans Det

158th Aslt Hel Bn

159th, 168th, 169th, 273d Trans Det

159th Aslt Spt Hel Bn

327th, 625th, 649th Trans Det

163d Avn Co (GS)

530th Trans Det

478th Avn Co (-) (Atch from 1st Cav Div)

38th Trans Det

Division Troops

3d Bn, 506th Inf (OPCON I FORCEV)

2d Sqdn, 17th Cav

L Co (Ranger) 75 Inf

326th Engr Bn

501st Sig Bn

101st MP Co

265th ARC

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42d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

47th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

58th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

577th Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)

Det 16, 1st ANGLICO (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

10th Cml Plat

20th Cml Det

Det 4, 7th PSYOP Bn (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

7th AA Plt, 29th CA Co (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

22d Mil Hist Det

25th PI Det

34th PI Det

101st MI Det (Prov)

181st MI Det

TASS ZO (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

359th Av SP Det (Evans Air Ops)

Division Support Command

MHC & Band

5th Trans Bn

326th Med Bn

426th S&S Bn

801st Maint Bn

101st Admin

3d Marine Division

HQ. Bn. 3d Marine Div (-)

Hq Co

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Serv Co

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MP Co

Commo Co

7th Intelligence Translation Team

15th Counterintelligence Team

7th Counterintelligence Team

1st AA Plt, 29th CA Co (DS) (OPCON, 3d Mar Div)

2d Det, 7th PSYOP Bn (DS) (OPCON, 3d Mar Div)

4th Marines

HQ Co, 4th Marines Regt (-)

2d Bn, 4th Mar (-)

3d Bn, 4th Mar (-)

12th Marines

HQ Btry, 12th Marine Regt (-)

3d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T) (-)

4th Bn, 12th Mar (155mm) (T) (-)

5th 175 Gun Btry

1st 8 inch How Btry (moved to 1st Mar Div)

Co B, 3rd Tank Bn

3d Recon Bn (-)

3d Shore Party Bn (-)

9th Motor Transport Bn (-)

3d Med Bn (-)

3d Dental Co (FMF Pacific) (-)

11th Engr Bn (FMF Pacific) (-)

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Force Recon Co (FMF Pacific)

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div

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1st Bn, 11th Inf

1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)

5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)

Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav

Co P, (Ranger) 75th Inf

Co A, 7th Engr Bn

3d Sqdn, 5th Armd Cav (D Troop) (Attached from 9 Div)

43d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

75th CS Spt Bn

HHC, CS Spt Bn

Co A (Admin)

Co B (Med)

Co C (S&T)

Co D (Maint)

48th PI Det

86th Cml Det

298th Sig Co

517th MI Det

407th RR Det

Task Force Clearwater

River Div 543

River Div 521

Coastal Div 17

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CONFIDENTIAL SAPPER TACTICS AND COUNTER MEASURES

1. (U) References:

a. Dept of Defense Intelligence Information Report No 6 028 2650 69, dtd 21 May 1969, Subj: History and Tradition of the Sapper Corps In South Vietnam and Laos (C).

b. USARV Reg 350-5.

c. Hqs, USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons (Confidential), dtd 1 July 1969, "Sapper Tactics", pages 14-20.

d. Hqs, XXIV Corps Confidential Memorandum, dtd 14 March 1969, Subj: Lessons Learned - Defense Against Sapper Attacks (U).

e. Hqs, 101st Abn Div Confidential msg, 03045A from AVDG-GC ZAIS SENDS, DTG 290115Z March 1969, Subj: Operational Guidance on Sapper Attacks (U).

f. Hqs, 101st Abn Div Secret msg, 040168A from AVDG-GC-P, DTG 110433Z April 1969, Subj: Defense Against Sapper Attacks (U).

g. Letter, Commanding General, 101st Abn Div, dtd 29 June 1969, Subj: Base Defense.

2. (U) Purpose. To establish procedures to be followed in the conduct of defense against sapper attacks.

3. (C) Discussion: The successful sapper attack is dependent upon detailed reconnaissance, detailed planning and rehearsals, movement under the cover of darkness and the achievement of tactical surprise. Surprise is critical since the enemy is confronting a superior force, having superior fire power, and fighting from fortified positions. A sapper attack is divided into two distinct phases - the reconnaissance phase and the assault phase. There are inherent weaknesses in both, which when aggressively exploited, can prevent the attack from ever being initiated, or by the early detection of the enemy's presence, lead to his destruction when he is most vulnerable.

a. Reconnaissance Phase:

(1) The sapper's reconnaissance must be detailed in respect to the objective area and routes to and from the objective area. In addition to the layout of the objective, the structure and depth of wire barriers, and the location of key installations, the sapper meticulously notes the activities of the defender, i.e., time of departure of patrols, routes used, locations of LP's, points of entry into the wire, fields of fire achieved by bunker locations, etc. This is done to detect patterns of weaknesses which can be exploited, or strengths to be neutralized or avoided. The sapper recon party may even risk detection and engagement to acquire a close-up view of the objective area, relying on subsequent time lapses of inactivity and boredom to lull the defenders into a false sense of security, after an initial period of alertness.

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(2) Counter-Reconnaissance Techniques: It should be recognized that it is nearly impossible to prevent a fire base or fixed installation from being observed by a well-trained and determined recon team. The acquisition of information, however, can be made more difficult and the results of the reconnaissance can be frustrated or negated. The following techniques can be employed in this regard:

(a) Daylight patrols should habitually be given the additional tasks of noting all locations from which some portion of the fire base can be observed. The trees in certain areas must not be overlooked as potential observation platforms. The patrols should seed these areas cleverly and profusely with trip flares, and "tell-tales". Areas within 400 meters of the base, from which RPG fires can be effectively directed, should be noted and the approaches to these locations seeded with trip flares. The same applies to possible mortar positions. Such locations that are seeded must be plotted as firing data so the detected movement can be immediately fired upon. Unlikely and difficult approaches to the objective areas should be considered the most likely avenues of approach, and likewise seeded with trip flares well out from the fire base, as well as close-in. Trip flares should be employed with pressure pull wire, and pressure pull-pressure release wire to frustrate the enemy's attempts at disarming as much as possible. The periodic checks of these areas by patrols should provide timely information on the enemy's presence. It may be necessary to reseed the area and do it with increased cleverness. If nothing else, the pattern and triggering method should be altered.

(b) Screening Parties. Fire team to squad size screening parties (the enemy situation may dictate the strength) should check the area around the fire base out 300-500m between dusk and darkness to check for signs of enemy presence, and to possibly flush sapper teams occupying objective rally points/attack positions. Special attention must be given to the avoidance of setting patterns as to routes, times of departure, and times of return. Screening parties can be used to leave stay-behind ambushes and/or listening posts during their return to the fire base. The return route to the fire base should be zig-zagged and irregular to cover the maximum area and to make more difficult the detection of stay-behind LP's/ambushes. These patrols must be made to thoroughly understand the importance of their task, i.e., the early detection of the enemy is the best possible way to disrupt the attack.

(c) Debriefing of Patrols. Commanders should thoroughly debrief returning patrols to determine signs of enemy presence in the area and take advantage of the knowledge gained on the surrounding terrain. If the debriefing is not treated with the proper professional gravity, then the patrols will soon become routine and unproductive because of lack of interest.

(d) Actions at the base. Any indication from the debriefing of enemy presence should automatically dictate modifications in the layout of the defense. A good technique would be the construction of portable wire barriers that can be emplaced after darkness to supplement existing wire, block approaches to key internal positions, and assist in the channeling of sappers, who may breach the wire, into prearranged killing zones.

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(e) Other counter-reconnaissance measures: One additional measure to be considered is "mad minutes". Variations to "mad minutes" should be considered to reduce the possibility of patterns and achieve greater frequency. If automatic weapons are fired, consideration must be given to the periodic changing of their locations. Claymore mines can be hidden and well camouflaged outside the wire in the "unlikely" avenues of approach which the enemy is likely to use. Another technique would be to utilize sniper/recon teams. Dummy bunkers with fake activity around these bunkers during daylight is another deceptive measure to consider.

(f) The above mentioned are intended as guidance to thwart and frustrate the sapper's reconnaissance. Any measure that can be taken to slow him, create confusion, and shatter his confidence in his well-rehearsed and inflexible plan, can set the stage for his destruction. The techniques available are limited only by the imagination and resourcefulness of the leader.

b. Assault phases:

(1) This phase has several distinctive stages, which are:

(a) The movement to the objective.

(b) The attack by indirect fires.

(c) The penetration of the perimeter.

(d) The transition from mortar to RPG fires and thrown satchel charges or grenades.

(e) The violent and rapid attack to assigned objectives by sapper teams.

(f) Mass infantry assault through penetrations; which may or may not be planned.

(g) The withdrawal.

(2) The sapper will preferably go under, or through the wire barrier, resorting to destruction only if necessary. It appears that the enemy will penetrate the wire first, and only use indirect fire if he is discovered. If he can move through the wire without any covering fire, he will do so; if not, the final move through the wire barrier is done under the cover of indirect fires, usually 60 and/or 82mm mortars. These fires are initiated on a prearranged signal, often a flare, and have as their primary purpose the forcing of the defenders to take cover in bunkers, so that the breach can be made undetected. These fires are augmented or supplanted by RPG fires and thrown satchel charges to compel the defenders to stay under cover, by giving the impression that the enemy action is only an attack by fire.

(3) Counter-Assault Techniques - It is critical that the enemy be detected, delayed and destroyed prior to the breaching of the inner perimeter wire. This is dependent upon the thorough and sound application of defensive fundamentals.

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(a) Listening posts and ambushes are essential means of early warning. The positioning of LPs in trees should not be disregarded. Spider holes should also be considered - with camouflaged covers. They must not move into position prior to darkness, and consideration should be given to the changing of their locations. LPs must be thoroughly briefed on the actions to take if the base is attacked.

(b) The trip flares placed well out and close in to the base may give added early warning. Since the sapper is trained to detect trip flares, imagination and skill must be used to emplace them where he is not likely to expect them, as well as in the conventional manner.

(c) Periodic illumination, fired at irregular intervals is essential.

(d) Anti-intrusion devices and field expedient "noise makers" must be employed not only in the tactical wire, but well out and in random and unexpected locations.

(e) Anything that can shake the enemy's confidence, slow his progress or confuse him, may contribute to a premature attack, or some other mistake on the part of the enemy. He is confident of the night, only because the detailed reconnaissance and meticulous rehearsals have convinced him that he will achieve the critical element of surprise. The success of his efforts hinges on this one point. Take away the night, subject him to the semi-daylight of illumination, and the exposed hunter becomes the vulnerable prey of the defenders who are fighting from foxholes with known and rehearsed fields of fire.

(f) Protective Wire:

1 The sapper can be further delayed at or in the wire, which increases the opportunity for detection and subsequent destruction. If nothing else, his time table can be disrupted, increasing the probability of error.

2 To achieve this, outer and inner fences of concertina should have tanglefoot between them.

3 The concertina must be staked down securely so that the sapper cannot lift it and crawl under. If the wire is stretched too much, and is not in sufficient depth, the sapper may be able to easily crawl through. C-rations cans with rocks and other noise-making devices in the wire will assist in the detection of his presence.

4 Defensive wire should be emplaced so as to force the enemy to cut or blow the wire, thereby delaying him and increasing the possibilities of detection, or at least the early identification of the point of penetration. Defensive wire emplaced along the FPL will delay the enemy in the killing zone as long as possible. Key installations must have internal wire barriers, forming islands of defense, to channel the enemy into killing zones and delay his movement to assigned objectives.

5 Immediately upon detection of the enemy, illumination should be fired continuously to facilitate destruction of the attackers. An 81mm with adequate illumination on position should be constantly ready to fire his sustained illumination until augmented by artillery illumination and flareships. In

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fact, a gunner should be on alert in the gun pit to insure immediate response.

(h) Claymores employed in depth and parallel to the perimeter should be fired. The immediate firing of some feugasse will, even if the penetration has been made, at least provide additional illumination and have a psychological effect on the enemy.

(i) When indirect fires begin impacting, personnel on alert should already be in the external fighting positions. Sleeping personnel must move immediately via the trench to the fighting positions. If the terrain will not allow connecting trenches, at least slit trenches of sufficient depth to allow a man to crawl unexposed should be dug.

(j) If the attack succeeds in penetrating the base, a designated and rehearsed reaction force must be employed to destroy or eject the attackers. This reaction force must be centrally located, and must sleep in their combat gear in order to respond instantly. Prearranged pyrotechnic signals should be used to mark areas of penetration.

(k) Guards must be in fighting positions outside key installations, such as TOCs, Commo Centers, and FDCs, tasked specifically to protect these locations from sappers.

(l) Indirect fires plotted on suspected RPG and mortar positions should be fired immediately and shifted when precise locations have been determined. Probable routes of withdrawal must be interdicted by preplanned artillery.

(m) Pursuit under continuous illumination must be initiated to complete the destruction of the attacking force.

4. (C) Summary: Of all the previously mentioned considerations, there are three salient points which must be emphasized in summary. Should the sapper penetration occur, these are the core essentials to minimizing destruction to ourselves and maximizing the destruction to the enemy. These are: Instant and continuous illumination, reliable communications, and immediate and violent reaction by all available support.

a. Instant and continuous illumination. Take away the concealment of the night from the sapper, and he loses his relative freedom of movement. The leaders can then assess the situation and our troopers can effectively engage them. The following guidance will be adhered to in order to provide instant and continuous illumination.

(1) Hand held flares will be located at each fighting position, and are to be ignited on the signal or command of the squad leader in sector.

(2) An 81mm mortar, with gunner on alert and adequate illumination ammunition at the gun pit, will be prepared to fire at all times. The gunner will immediately fire controlled illumination to supplement any hand-held flares fired. When the sapper attack signal is given, or if directed by his squad, section, or platoon leader, he will provide continuous illumination. There should be an alternate position in case enemy fires neutralize the primary position.

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(3) Designated personnel will be directed to fire fougasse for supplementary illumination and shock effect once the attack signal is given.

(4) Artillery illumination must be prepared to fire once the 81mm mortar begins firing, unless directed otherwise.

NOTE: (1) through (4) must occur within the first 10-15 minutes time frame, by which time leaders should be able to assess the situation and determine what further support is required. Additional illumination support will be requested in the following order:

(5) All available artillery illumination within range.

(6) Army helicopter flareships on forward ground alert at FB Blaze, Camp Evans and Camp Eagle will be requested as soon as it is ascertained that there is a sapper attack (should respond within 15-30 minutes).

(7) "Basketball" - Air Force flareship will be requested to assume the illumination task of the Army flareship. (May require an hour to arrive on station.)

b. Reliable system of communications: Failure in communication contributes to loss of command and control during the most critical time (first 15 min) and causes disastrous delays in reaction. To facilitate communications, all means of signal will be employed.

(1) There will be wire communications for the bunker/fighting positions, with the wire being buried, as time permits, to prevent cutting or destruction by indirect fires. An emergency hotloop will be established between all key persons to augment the former.

(2) A radio net will also be established with each sector of the perimeter. The squad radio should function satisfactorily on fire bases to augment PRC 25's.

(3) Each sector of the perimeter will also designate a messenger to be used as necessary.

(4) Sound and/or visual signals will be prescribed as final alternate means of communication. As a minimum, signals will be prescribed for the following:

(a) Sapper Attack - move to fighting positions, employ all organic illumination and fires in sector.

(b) Mark points of penetration to guide Reaction Force.

(c) Take cover - Artillery will fire direct fire.

(d) Sapper Withdrawal - Detonate additional fougasse and claymore mines and employ all firepower on the fleeing enemy.

c. Immediate and violent reaction by all available support: At the confirmation of a sapper attack on a fire base, ARA, TAC Air, Spooky and Flareships should be requested, and all tube and mortar illumination within range must fire battlefield illumination. The following essential support must be

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readied to react as soon as the situation allows: Medevacs, a combat tracker team to exploit fresh trails, an IPW team to interrogate POW's, and a fresh ready reaction force to be airlifted to the scene to exploit intelligence gathered and pursue the enemy until he is destroyed. Above the RRF should be a "pink team" scouting in advance. Blocking forces must be maneuvered in advance of the fleeing enemy to close escape routes. When this is done in a professional and timely coordinated manner, there is no escape for the sapper. As the pursuit is being carried out, resupply ships must bring in ammo, barrier material, and Class I to restore the fire base defense and defenders to full combat effectiveness. As soon as it is ascertained that some or all of the above is not required, the request must be cancelled to conserve the assets. The key to success is immediate response so that a full range of combat power can be rapidly and violently thrown against the enemy to neutralize him, and make the price of sapper tactics too costly.

COUNTER - SAPPER CHECKLIST

1. (C) Counter - Reconnaissance Measures
 - a. Active
 - (1) Aggressive and extensive patrol planning that avoids setting patterns.
 - (a) Daylight reconnaissance patrols.
 - (b) Short Range Reconnaissance Patrols.
 - (c) Dusk to dark screening parties.
 - (d) Night combat patrols.
 - (e) Sniper/Recon teams.
 - (2) LP's/OP's
 - (a) Cover likely and unlikely avenues of approach.
 - (b) Make maximum use of trees and spider holes for observation and concealment.
 - (3) Daylight Visual Reconnaissance when possible.
 - (4) Construction of "tell-tales" along suspected routes, and on vantage points offering good observation of the fire bases.
 - (5) Emplacement of trip flares well out from the fire base in random patterns and on likely and "unlikely" avenues of approach.
 - b. Passive: Deception and Counter - Intelligence.
 - (1) Construction of false bunkers and gun positions.
 - (2) Fake activity vicinity of the above during daylight.

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- (3) Variations in patrol time of departure and time of return.
- (4) Locating dummy LP's.
- (5) Replacing dummy anti-intrusion devices.
- (6) Construction of portable wire barriers to supplement internal and external wire (emplace only after dark).
- (7) Make maximum use of natural growth to facilitate the camouflage of bunkers and fighting positions.
- (8) Make maximum use of night observation devices.

2. (C) Counter-Attack Measures

a. LP's/Ambushes

- (1) Do not move into position prior to darkness.
- (2) Consider changing their locations once in position.
- (3) Avoid establishing LP's and OP's in the same general areas or along the same terrain features.
- (4) Avoid patterns in time of departure and time of return, and routes from and to the fire base.
- (5) Cover both likely and "unlikely" avenues of approach.
- (6) Establish positive communications.
- (7) Thoroughly brief on actions to take if perimeter is attacked.

b. Illumination

- (1) Periodic and varied and at irregular intervals.
- (2) At least one (1) 81mm mortar with gunner and adequate illumination ammo on position at all times.
- (3) Fire constant illumination once the indirect fire attack begins.

c. H & I Program

- (1) Use DS arty to interdict probable approaches between 1000 to 1500 meters between 1500H and dusk.
- (2) Conduct "mad minutes" at varied and irregular intervals.
- (3) Vary "mad minutes" by using small arms, M79, hand grenades, claymores, mortars, or a combination of some or all of these, to increase the frequency of fires, while providing greater flexibility and irregularity.

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d. Weapons systems

(1) Claymores

- (a) Emplace claymores in depth, with some parallel to the perimeter (these should be fired when penetration is apparent).
- (b) Emplace claymores in "dead spaces" and in difficult and unlikely approaches, where the sapper may not expect them.
- (c) Camouflage or hide claymores as much as possible to impede detection, "turn around", or disarming.
- (d) Secure claymores to rocks, stumps, trees, on poles, and in other unlikely places.

(2) Fougasse

- (a) Upon attack, immediately fire some for the added illumination and psychological effect.
- (b) Based upon availability, consider using periodically in "mad minutes".

(3) Automatic Weapons

- (a) Use in "mad minutes" should dictate periodic movement to alternate positions.
- (b) Should not be employed in response to enemy probes; M79's and grenades are better to prevent revealing the weapons' location.
- (c) Remove from gun ports and hide in bunker to prevent enemy recon of positions during daylight.

(4) Portable flame throwers should be employed to direct flame into portions of the wire once the attack signal is given, especially in "dead space" areas.

(5) 90mm recoilless rifles with cannister ammunition should be employed to cover avenues of approach to supplement the "firecracker" capability of the artillery.

(a) On fire bases where the terrain does not allow the artillery to effectively fire in the direct fire roles, 90mm recoilless rifles must be consolidated from the maneuver elements employed in the canopy and employed on the fire base. These weapons must be emplaced to assume the direct fire role of the artillery.

(b) Special care must be taken to provide for back blast when selecting the weapon's positions.

(c) 90mm's should not be left exposed in positions during daylight hours.

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e. Wire

(1) External

(a) Inner and outer fences of concertina must be securely staked to the ground and in sufficient depth to prevent lifting, crawling under, or through the wire. The wire should be tied at the top to firmly driven stakes.

(b) Single and double apron fences should be employed to augment concertina fences and provide variations in our protective wire, and further delay the sapper.

(c) Inner and outer fences should have tanglefoot wire between them to delay the sapper as much as possible.

(d) Wire must complement final protective fires.

(e) Portable wire barriers should be constructed to augment existing wire and emplaced only after darkness.

(2) Internal

(a) Key installations such as TOCs, FDCs, Commo Centers, CPs and firing batteries must have internal wire forming "islands of defense".

(b) Portable wire barriers should be emplaced after darkness to channel attackers into prearranged killing zones.

(c) Access routes on the fire base should be blocked by portable wire barriers; emplaced after darkness.

(d) Place concertina over the tops of bunkers to predetonate enemy indirect fire and hinder sappers.

f. Early Warning Devices.

(1) Trip Flares.

(a) Must be employed in interlocking belts, both well out and close in to the wire.

(b) Must be emplaced cleverly and in unsuspected areas.

(c) Should be armed by varying triggering methods to frustrate disarming.

(2) Noise making devices.

(a) Should be employed profusely in the wire and in brush close in to the fire base, both patterned and randomly.

(b) Should be randomly employed by patrols leaving stay-behind ambushes or LP's.

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(3) Anti-intrusion devices should be employed when available.

g. Obstacles

(1) Any obstacles or object in close proximity to the fire base which has not yet been removed, or can not be in terms of practicality, which can provide cover and concealment to the enemy, should be marked on the fire base side so as to be visible to the appropriate weapons systems during "mad minutes".

(2) Obstacles can be constructed to augment natural obstacles along avenues of approach.

h. Positions. Must have all-around, interlocking, grazing fire.

(1) Bunkers

(a) Must be used for sleeping personnel only.

(b) Must have connecting trenches to fighting positions.

(c) Strobe lights or flame pots should be provided for bunkers to mark the perimeter trace for air support, i.e., Specky, ARA, Gunships, TAC Air, etc.

(2) Fighting positions on the perimeter.

(a) A standard foxhole without overhead cover, which provides the lowest possible silhouette and all-around protection against fragments, and which permits the soldier to fight in a standing position.

(b) Must be mutually supporting, with interlocking fields of fire.

(c) An adequate mixture of ammunition must be at the positions in covered containers.

(d) Fougasse and claymores should be rigged for dual-initiation from either the bunkers or fighting positions.

(e) Positions must be located to adequately observe and cover "unlikely avenues" of approach.

(f) Positions must provide all-around observation, at ground level to a distance of a least 50 meters forward of the fighting positions.

(3) Fighting positions within the perimeter, with the characteristics of (2)(a), above, to block and destroy the enemy if the perimeter is penetrated.

i. Personnel

(1) Must understand sapper techniques and know how to counter them.

(2) Must understand the phasing of the sapper attack and the "why" of the actions they are directed to take.

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(3) Should be allowed maximum sleep during daylight to increase alertness at night.

(4) Designated individuals should be directed to engage targets within the base.

j. Reaction forces

(1) Must conduct daylight and night rehearsals.

(2) Should be centrally located.

(3) Sleeping personnel must be in combat gear prepared for immediate response.

(4) There must be pre-planned and rehearsed internal fires to destroy enemy who have penetrated the perimeter.

k. Command and Control

(1) Combat CP's should be established and occupied only at night. They should be no more elaborate than any other position.

(2) All key positions must be linked by wire communications in addition to radios. Alternate means of signals must be arranged.

(3) There must be a system for periodic checks of personnel for troop alertness, especially in the early morning hours.

(4) Ambushes and LP's must clearly understand their actions once an attack is initiated.

l. Signal. There must be a visual signal and alternate to indicate the initiation of an attack, to mark the point(s) of penetration; to mark route of withdrawal; to indicate "take cover, arty will fire direct fires".

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