


# Field Artillery Journal



September-October 1983

## SPECIAL DELIVERY



# Incoming

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

### Speak Out

The *Journal* welcomes and encourages letters from our readers. Of particular interest are opinions, ideas, and innovations pertinent to the betterment of the Field Artillery and the total force. Also welcomed are thoughts on how to improve the magazine.—Ed.

### Flexibility for survivability

The author of "Your Right to Survive" (*FA Journal*, May-June 1983) has not approached this subject in a completely scientific manner. He has analyzed but one method of survival; and, as such, the article demonstrates a biased and too simplistic approach to this important subject.

Let me say at the outset that I agree in essence with the major thrust of the content, especially the author's statement that "unless we get survivability-oriented tactics we will be a non-factor after the first day of the next war." The major fault I find in the article is that it pays little or no attention to the maneuver needs. There will be times when the techniques recommended by the author are not applicable because we need all of our guns in action for extended periods of time to support the scheme of maneuver. Also, the scheme of maneuver may dictate the ground dumping of ammunition for support of operations; and the author's recommended method of operation does not address that problem.

I also have reservations about the author's statement that "we require six hours of accumulated sleep." This is true only for short periods of time. Anyone who has participated in operations for extended periods of time will know that there is a severe degradation of efficiency if men cannot receive rest periods of adequate length and frequency — in my estimation, at least one *unbroken* block of six hours in any 24-hour period.

In regard to the ARTEP, the quantity of ammunition handled by the battalion was totally unrealistic. With each 8-inch projectile weighing at least 200 pounds, a major proportion of available manhours would be used handling ammunition. Ammo rates of fire for an 8-inch battalion are available in a number of studies:

	FM101-10-1	DIV '86	FSMAA	CSSMAA
Light combat	62	115	135	81
Intense combat	177	395	340	366
Midpoint	120	255	238	224

These figures all represent rounds per tube per day. Could it be that the author would have drawn different conclusions on the manpower fatigue level if these quantities had been handled?

In essence, the author is correct to take an aggressive stance on survivability. Lip service is being paid to it in the field. This is, however, a function of command responsibility, not of doctrine. Doctrine developed by the Field Artillery School gives commanders options in survivability techniques ranging from fully dug-in positions to movement. To force any particular commander to adopt one of these techniques would take away his flexibility and severely restrict his ability to command.

The author should be protectionist of the system that allowed him to develop and work a method which suited his unit's needs.

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### The Combat Artillery Badge

In late 1943 the Combat Infantry Badge (CIB) was introduced, and the Combat Medic Badge made its appearance shortly thereafter. Ever since, there have been strong feelings among many members of the other combat arms for an equivalent award. There have likewise been strong feelings among many infantrymen to retain the uniqueness of their award. Discussion on the subject has continued over the years, but it probably reached its climax during the Korean War.

In 1950 and 1951 a war of words over a proposed Combat Artillery Badge (CAB) took place in the pages of the *Combat Forces Journal*. The first round in this written battle was fired by First Lieutenant Earl J. Lockhead, 52d Field Artillery, when, in December 1950, he sent the following letter to the editor:

*Since the Combat Forces Journal is a combination of the*

*Infantry and Field Artillery Journals, I would like to use it to present the case of the combination soldier, the forward observer. We live, fight, and some die with the infantry. We are proud of having served with the infantry and would like the Combat Infantryman Badge to show our association with the infantry.*

*The only requirement that need be changed is the one stating that only infantry are eligible. We spend more time with the infantry than with our battery. We make river crossings with radios on our backs. We come under small arms fire for the combat part. We march for the infantry part. Now all that is lacking is the badge part.*

*I would like this badge for my driver who was killed by enemy artillery fire while with the infantry.*

It is clear that a forward observer who has served with an infantry unit in combat might feel he deserved a CIB just as much as any infantryman. Many infantry commanders have agreed; and, hoping to slip the paperwork through in a group of other recommendations, some have even attempted to submit their forward observer for a CIB. Other infantrymen have strongly objected to the idea of giving forward observers a CIB, feeling that it diluted the meaning of the award.

A few months after Lieutenant Lockhead's letter, the *Combat Forces Journal* ran a letter from Captain John D.H. McDonough, 38th FA, which contained the first actual proposal for a Combat Artillery Badge. Captain McDonough suggested that the establishment of a separate CAB would protect the integrity of the CIB while giving just recognition to deserving artillerymen. Captain McDonough had specific requirements in mind:

*Forward observers and members of forward observer sections, artillery liaison officers, and members of liaison sections*

(which serve with the infantry battalions only) should be the only persons eligible. The other requirement should be that the individual must serve a minimum of 30 days, not necessarily consecutively, with a rifle company (in the case of FO sections) or with the infantry battalion committed to the line. Of course, some of the FO or liaison sections are casualties before they can complete the 30-day requirement; therefore, this requirement, in that case, should be waived if the individual has seen duty as a member of an FO or a liaison section during at least one engagement with the enemy. The proof of eligibility should be a certificate signed by the battery commander (for the FO sections) or by the artillery battalion commander (for the liaison sections).

Captain McDonough also proposed a design for the new award. Starting with the basic design of the CIB, he suggested changing the color of the bar from blue to red and superimposing the artillery's crossed field pieces over the wreath (figure 1).




**Figure 1. CPT McDonough's proposed design.**

In a follow-up editorial, the editors of the *Combat Forces Journal* committed themselves to the cause: ". . . we are going to get into this matter right away and thoroughly and come up with a plan and fight for it." The editors then went on to point out that other groups were deserving of combat recognition too: armor crewmen, combat engineers, and anyone forced by tactical circumstances to fight as infantry.

Thus, Captain McDonough's letter sparked a storm of controversy. Artillerymen wrote to support the proposal; infantrymen wrote to deride it; combat engineers wrote demanding just recognition; and Marine Sergeant Edward J. Hertinch wrote to say that he thought the whole idea of special badges was nonsense: "Why anyone needs special badges and special pay for his services I have no idea." Captain A.D. Cowan wrote suggesting that the field artillery follow the lead of the medics and adopt a unique, artillery design with "no infantry touch." Captain Cowan suggested using the basic red bar and wreath, and replacing the musket with a

single field piece (figure 2).



**Figure 2. CPT Cowan's proposed design.**

The most vehement protest to Captain McDonough's proposal was registered by First Lieutenant Ricardo Cardenas, 7th Infantry. He wrote:

*I have just read your article on the so-called Combat Artilleryman Badge.*

*I don't like it. Don't muscle in on the coveted pride of the infantryman. I wear mine with a star on it. Make one similar to ours; and, as much pride as I have in mine, I will throw it in the first Korean river on my next patrol.*

*For all who would like so much to have a Combat Infantryman Badge, let me suggest that it doesn't take too much effort to find yourself in a foxhole as an infantryman.*

As the controversy raged, some commanders in Korea took the matter into their own hands. Unofficial Combat Artillery Badges were manufactured in Japan and awarded by local commanders. The most common design consisted of a red bar, wreath, and crossed field pieces (figure 3), similar



**Figure 3. Japanese-made Combat Artillery Badge awarded by some commanders during the Korean War.**

to McDonough's design but without the musket. An embroidered version for the dress blue uniform was also put out by enterprising Japanese manufacturers (figure 4).



**Figure 4. Japanese-made Combat Artillery Badge for dress blues.**

Following the lead of the artillery, local armor commanders also began awarding unofficial Combat Armor Badges. The Combat Armor Badge consisted of the bar and wreath design with the armor crossed

sabers and a tank superimposed on the wreath. Versions with yellow bars (cavalry) and green bars (armor) were both used.

As the Korean war dragged on, the issue of special combat badges got mixed into the controversy over combat pay. And as the war wound down, the issue slowly disappeared from the pages of the *Combat Forces Journal* without ever being resolved.

During the Vietnam conflict the issue never really resurfaced with quite the same intensity — a particularly strange phenomenon considering the plethora of other unauthorized badges that emerged during the Vietnam War. Armor's quest for recognition was partially satisfied by the Vietnamese Army's Combat Armor Badge, which was awarded to many US tankers. Many forward observers still felt they were unfairly excluded from the CIB, and some infantry commanders still tried to slip their forward observers in for CIBs. But unofficial badges never appeared, and the question was never seriously discussed in the professional publications.

The questions remain. Is there a need for such an award? Should it only be restricted to fire support teams attached to infantry battalions? What about the fire support teams attached to armor and cavalry units? And what about firing battery troops who may become involved in highly lethal artillery duels in the modern counterfire environment? Or is there, as Marine Sergeant Hertinch wrote more than 30 years ago, no need for "extra advertisements?"

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## Lance brigade

"REFORGER Reflections" *FA Journal*, May-June 1983) by Major (P) Langston and Major Gaddis prompts these reflections on our part. We agree, for example, that austere communication systems are a real problem in Lance. We also agree that the concept of "the Lance Brigade" has distinct advantages in training and logistics and could have tactical advantages if we can afford the manpower and equipment of an additional brigade headquarters with no other mission. However, if the allegedly inadequate nonnuclear range of Lance — 75 to 80 kilometers — is not adequate to engage second echelon targets, we wonder a bit about the tactical siting of Lance units or the extraordinarily deep location of the second echelon. Since the Lance nonnuclear warhead was not intended