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(19) OT-RD-670019

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 83D ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96291

AVGAZ-CO

(11) 11 Feb 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for ~~Quarter~~ Period Ending  
31 Jan 67. Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

AD 386076

THRU:

Commanding Officer  
54th Artillery Group  
ATTN: AVGA-C  
APO 96257

⑥ Lessons Learned,  
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83D  
Artillery (U).  
⑧

Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVFB-FAC  
APO 96227

(12) 25 p.

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVC-DH  
APO 96307

Commander-In-Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-MH  
APO 96558

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JAN 2 1967  
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TO:

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

Section I, Significant Organization Activities

Part I: Pre-deployment Phase

This organization received a warning order for deployment by Hqs, Fourth United States Army CONFIDENTIAL Message DA 761826, Subject: Warning Order (U), dated 29 April 1966, through the Commanding General, United States Army Artillery and Missile Center.

Authorized deployment strength was established by CONFIDENTIAL Message 58650, CG USCONARC, Subject: Unit Reorganization, dated 10 May 1966. Formal reorganization authority was established by Hqs USAAMC General Order Number 88, dated 13 May 1966. Authorized deployment strength was as follows:

310ff                      4 WO                      544 Enl

This General Order deleted the TO&E Aviation Section, and augmented this unit with 6 forward observer sections and a Metro section. The augmentation and deletion figures are included in the authorized deployment strength figures.

Readiness dates as indicated below were received in unclassified message EFTO, FOUO 58792, CG CONARC, Subject: Unit Readiness Dates, dated 12 May 1966.

POSD                      3 July 1966  
ERD                        22 September 1966  
PRD                        8 October 1966

In addition, this unit was directed to initiate training under the provisions of ICTP 8-(6-301D) on 5 July 1966.

The chronological development of personnel strengths was as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>% OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH ASSIGNED</u>	<u>% OF AUTHORIZED DEPLOYABLES ASSIGNED</u>
5 July 1966 (initiation of tng)	82%	70% (approx)
31 August 1966 (completion of tng)	102%	87%

The Unit Initial Readiness Report submitted on 7 September 1966 and unit readiness reports submitted during the pre-deployment period did not require non-deployable strengths to be separated from deployable strengths. Thus, while the Initial Readiness Report

3

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AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

reflected that the unit initiated training with 82% of authorized strength, in actuality, only 70% of assigned aggregate strength was deployable. As reflected in the report, much of the shortage included critical MOSs, especially non-commissioned officers. Permission was granted to retain the non-deployable personnel until their replacements were on board. This was a necessary "lesser of evils" plan to enable the battalion to begin its training program on schedule. Even though this was a necessary plan, it did result in some undesirable personnel situations. Many section chiefs arrived during the latter part of or after the training and test period. As a result, some of them did not have adequate opportunity to get to know their men prior to deployment. Also, in some cases, the soldiers tended to look upon their section chiefs as "outsiders" since the chiefs were not present during the period of hard work.

Assignment instructions of personnel were received by this unit indicating substantial personnel fills were to be received on 1, 10, and 25 July. Those dates were not met. Cancellations and refill actions, as a result, were constant throughout the pre-deployment period.

Several individuals were assigned to this unit on a deployable-fill basis who were not, in fact, deployable due to restrictive medical profiles. In two cases individuals were assigned with pending hardship discharge applications. Both individuals were ultimately re-assigned. In one case, a non-commissioned officer who had submitted application for retirement was assigned.

Several individuals were assigned to this unit late in the pre-deployment phase to fill TOE vacancies already filled from other sources. In some cases individuals had moved household goods and families.

Several alien personnel were assigned who had not initiated a request for the required background investigation. As a result during the intensified combat training program S-2 personnel were required to be diverted from training activities to concentrate on processing sometimes very complicated and involved personnel security requests.

Two officers were assigned without SECRET clearances. As a result, both were unable to attend class-

(3)

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AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

ified briefings throughout the pre-deployment training phase.

Several changes to classified special weapons publications were received after the unit had turned over its special weapons equipment and publications to a host unit.

Late arrival of filler personnel complicated assignment to positions requiring security clearances.

This battalion initiated and successfully completed training on schedule. Implementation, however, was complicated by late-arriving officer and non-commissioned officer personnel. Had these key individuals been assigned earlier, more time would have been allowed for class rehearsals, committee instruction and a more cohesive training program in general.

Many letters and other "Lessons Learned" publications were received by the battalion prior to actual initiation of the training program. However, no working tactical SOP from our future in-country higher headquarters was made available throughout the pre-deployment period. It is felt that training would have been enhanced had this battalion been able to practice procedures and tactics currently directed by an in-country higher headquarters. A draft battalion SOP was published and implemented during the training phase. However, this SOP was at best arbitrary, having had only a second-hand experience factor upon which to rely in its writing.

Administrative and logistics personnel of the battalion received a limited amount of field training due to the requirement of receiving and processing personnel and equipment joining the unit throughout the training period.

Training of personnel in the new series tactical radios was non-existent due to their receipt immediately prior to ERD.

Unit Readiness Report suspense dates were too far in advance of the actual "as of" date reported. This resulted in unrealistic and inaccurate reports being submitted.

Although unit readiness reports reflected in detail critical supply shortages, issue of many items was not

(4)

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AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

made until the POM period.

Experienced battalion ammunition personnel were not assigned until after the training phase was completed.

Part II: Movement Phase

On 11 October 1966 this unit began the embarkation of main body troops with an assigned aggregate of 578. Eleven of these personnel did not deploy with the unit, but were attached to Hqs, 214th Artillery Group pending the outcome of various personnel actions effecting deployability. One officer (Medical Doctor) and seven enlisted men were scheduled to join the unit in-country due to late assignment and the requirement for a pre-deployment leave. Thus the unit departed with an actual assigned-and-joined strength of approximately 97%.

The battalion main body personnel consisting of 542 officers and men embarked for RVN on 13 October 1966 at Oakland aboard the MSTC troop carrier USNS General E.D. Patrick. The voyage was completed without incident or accident on 31 October 1966 with arrival of the Patrick at Vung Tau, RVN.

25 officers and men of the battalion advance party departed Tinker AFB, Oklahoma aboard MATS C-141 aircraft on 19 October 1966. Advance party arrived at Tan Son Nhut Air Base at 1735 hours local time on 21 October 1966 without accident or incident. The advance party was met by Commanding Officer II Field Force Vietnam Artillery and escorted by him to II Field Force Vietnam Artillery base camp for billeting. The advance party consisting of the following personnel:

Bn CO	Hq Btry XC	Bn Commo Chief
Bn S3	Liaison Off	Hq Btry Wire Team Chief
Bn S2	Opns Sgt	Hq Btry RTO/Driver
Bn S4	Intel Sgt	2 RTT Operators
Bn Mtr Off	Opns Clerk	Sr Personnel Clerk
3 Firing Btry XOs	S4 Sgt	Survey Chief
Property Book Off	2 Supply Clerks	Sr Radio Repairman

Part III: In-country Activities

On 22 October 1966 the officers and key non-commissioned officers of the advance party were briefed by the CO and Staff of 54th Arty Gp.

(5)

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

On 26 October 1966 the CO and advance party staff received a briefing and tour of the II Field Force Vietnam Artillery TOC.

On 1 November 1966 main body personnel closed into prepared staging area position at Long Binh. Advance party personnel moved from II Field Force Vietnam Artillery base camp to the staging area.

On 6 November 1966 the firing batteries were each assigned one forward observer party consisting of one Lt, one Recon Sgt, and one RTO.

On 9 November 1966 arrangements were completed for a 3 day liaison tour of operational composite 8" and 175mm units by personnel of the battalion. The Bn S3, Assistant S3, and Chief FDC Computer visited the Hqs of the 6th Bn, 27th Arty at Phouc Vinh. The Battery Executive Officer, the Fire Direction Officer, the Chief of firing battery and 2 section chiefs of Btry A visited Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty also located at Phouc Vinh. Personnel of Btry B visited Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty at Bear Cat. Personnel of Btry C visited Btry A, 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty at Xuan Loc.

On 14 November 1966 the battalion began staging Red TAT equipment at Bien Hoa Air Base in preparation for moving a quartering party to the Nui Dat base camp.

On 17 November 1966 the remainder of unit Red TAT equipment arrived at base camp established at Nui Dat. An additional 52 personnel from Hqs Btry closed into the base camp.

On 21 November the remainder of Hq, Sv, and Btry A personnel closed into the base camp area at Nui Dat. Batteries B and C and the Bn Executive Officer remained in the Long Binh staging area position.

On 25 November 1966 information was received that the battalion WABTOC equipment had arrived in Saigon and was to be barged to Baria and thence trucked to the Nui Dat base camp.

On 26 November 1966 sporadic small arms fire was received in and near the Bn's Nui Dat position between the hours of 2200 and 2400. No casualties were sustained. Fire was not returned by this unit due to the close proximity of a friendly popular force outpost in the general

(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

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7  
AVGAZ-00

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

direction of the fire and at an estimated distance of 800 meters.

On 30 November 1966 the Bn AM radio station became operational within the 54th Arty Gp net.

On 3 December 1966 the Bn general cargo and weapons arrived at Vung Tau Fort. Unloading operations were begun. The 805th Transportation Company trucked the equipment from Vung Tau to the Nui Dat base camp.

On 4 December 1966 ICUs with the general cargo and weapons of Batteries B and C were dispatched from Vung Tau to New Port Docks near the Long Binh staging area.

On 6 December 1966 the 4 howitzers of Btry A were off-loaded at Vung Tau and dispatched to the 148th Maintenance Company for maintenance checks and adjustments.

On 9 December 1966 at 1750 hours Btry B received its first converted 175mm gun at the Long Binh staging area. Conversion was effected by the 185th Ord Co. at Long Binh. Btry A received its four 8" howitzers at the Nui Dat base camp. The howitzers arrived by barge at the Baria jetty and thence proceeded by road convoy into position. The move was supported by armed helicopters and armored personnel carriers of the 1 ATF. Btry A fired 3 check rounds per tube at 1820 hours. Btry A was formally assigned the mission of General Support of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, Reinforcing the 1st Fld Regt BAA. The battery was called upon that night to fire on suspected escape routes of a VC force which attacked the Van Diep training range. No surveillance was reported.

On 11 December 1966 Btry B received its second 175mm gun at the Long Binh staging area. Two 175mm gun tubes were trucked from the 185th Ord Co. to Btry A's position at Nui Dat.

On 12 December 1966 Hq and Btry A were declared operational. Btry B departed the Long Binh staging area and became operational in its base camp at Bear Cat. Btry C received its first operational 175mm gun at the Long Binh staging area.

On 13 December 1966 Btry C received its second operational 175mm gun at the Long Binh staging area.

(7)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

On 16 December 1966 Btry C departed the Long Binh staging area and arrived at the base camp of the 2nd Bn, 35th Arty Headquarters. All battalion elements cleared the Long Binh staging area. Enroute to Xuan Loc a C Btry M-110 developed mechanical difficulty, causing a delay in the road march. The disabled vehicle was ultimately towed into position by another M-110. A two hour delay was experienced by the battery closing into position at Xuan Loc indicating the need for an organic VTR to be assigned to the battery. Btry C became operational on the day of arrival at Xuan Loc.

On 19 December 1966 the 8" platoon of Btry B participated in operation Duck supporting the 173rd Abn Bde in clearing Highway 15. The platoon was attached to Hq, 3rd Bn, 349th Arty and occupied a position at YS 226815.

On 23 December 1966 Btry C moved into its permanent base camp position at Xuan Loc.

On 5 January 1967 Btry B returned to its base camp having completed participation in operation Duck.

On 18 January 1967 Btry C displaced its 8" platoon to the base camp of the 11 ACR. The battalion fired a TOT mission on coordinates YS 418859. The 175mm guns of Btries A, B and C and the 8" howitzers of Btry C were employed in the mission. The mission was observed by the 54th Arty Gp Commander. The target was a suspected VC base camp location. The mission also served as a training exercise.

On 21 January 1967 Btry A participated in operation Harvey. The target for operation Harvey was the highly probable location of the 5th VC Division VIC YS 7685. Aerial observation flown during the operation totaled 9 hours. Two convoy coverage missions also were conducted. 1 ATF patrolled the area of the artillery base with 1 infantry platoon and provided further perimeter security with 4 APCs and an infantry company. 2 mortars were in position to deliver counter-mortar fire. An H-13 aircraft (1ATF) observed the area surrounding the Arty firing base intermittently. An APC troop (-) conducted continuous patrolling of the return route. No enemy contact was made in or near the Artillery firing position or its access route (TL2). 93 missions were fired during the operation, 76 of these missions were observed. Approximately 50% of the delay fuses fired resulted in low air burst. The remaining 50% resulted in mine action. The tree canopy in the target area was approximately

(8)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

9  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

40 feet high. Approximately 90% of the fuze quick resulted in tree bursts with good results on the ground. Coverage of the area was good. Total rounds fired: 182. Total fuze quick fired: 91. Total fuze delay fired: 91. No secondary explosions were observed. No enemy activity was noted.

Btry B displaced its 8" platoon to a field location in the VIC YS 226814 to support the 9th Infantry Division's operation Colby in a search and clearing operation near Highway 15.

On 23 January 1967 Btry B's 175mm gun platoon joined the Btry at its operation Colby position.

On 25 January 1967 a forward observer party was directed to join the 1st Bn, 43rd ARVN Infantry Regiment in a 3 day operation with a mission of sweeping north along Highway 2. The operation was to be supported by Btry A from its base camp position and Btry C from its base camp and forward positions. Radio communications were intermittent during the operation. The poor communications were attributable to dense vegetation and rubber trees in the area of the operation. It was partially alleviated by relaying communications through an Air Force forward air controller (FAC) flying overhead in support of the operation. This arrangement was unsatisfactory, however, due to the FAC's need for calling in air support if needed on a different radio frequency. The Arty forward observer was equipped with an AN/PRC-25 radio.

On 26 January 1967 Btry C's 8" platoon displaced to the 11 ACR base camp in support of the 1/43 ARVN Infantry Regiment's operation. The operation terminated one day early on 26 January 1967. No rounds were fired in support of this operation.

On 30 January 1967 Btry B was alerted to move its 8" platoon from its operation Colby position to Bien Hoa Air Base, the base camp position of the 3/319 Arty in preparation for support of the 173rd Abn Bde in operation Big Springs. The 8" platoon arrived in the evening of 30 January 1967

On 31 January 1967 the 8" platoon of Btry B occupied a position in support of operation Big Springs VIC XT 998 230. The Btry was attached to the 3rd Bn, 319th Arty. Ammunition resupply was accomplished by road convey from the Long Binh Ammunition Dump.

9

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AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65Ammunition Expenditure: Total rounds fired during  
the reported period are as follows:

8 inch rounds fired:	5,746
175mm rounds fired:	<u>4,105</u>
total rounds fired:	9,851

Total rounds fired in H&I missions during the  
reported period are as follows:

8 inch howitzer rounds fired:	3,658
175mm gun rounds fired:	2,617

Total rounds fired in other missions (Reg, adj  
fire, check rounds, on call, etc.) during the reported  
period are as follows:

8 inch howitzer rounds fired:	2,088
175mm gun rounds fired:	1,488

## Section II, Commanders Observations and Recommendations

## Part I: Observations

## A. Personnel

Unit Readiness ReportsItem: Unit Readiness Reports do not reflect actual per-  
sonnel deployment readiness of units.Discussion: Formats of unit readiness reports submitted  
during the battalion pre-deployable period did not dif-  
ferentiate between assigned and assigned/deployable  
strengths.Observations: Initial, interim and final unit readiness  
reports should include within their directed formats  
provisions for a realistic reporting of deployable stren-  
gths as opposed to assigned strengths.Dental WorkItem: Unfinished Dental WorkDiscussion: Several troops suffered unnecessary dis-  
comfort during the voyage due to incomplete dental work  
that should have been accomplished prior to leaving  
Fort Sill.



17  
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AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

Observation: The dentists at Fort Sill were apparently under the impression that the Class II dental work not completed at home station would be done at port prior to the patients boarding ship or by a ship's dentist. This is not the case. Troops are not at Port of embarkation long enough for such work to be done and there are no ship's dentist aboard MSTC ships.

#### FDC Personnel

Item: Insufficient authorized FDC personnel.

Discussion: In as much as a continued 24 hour operation, to include check personnel, is required in each battery FDC, the five authorized 13E20 slots are insufficient. A minimum of four men are required on duty at all times, therefore requiring a commander to pull personnel from other TOE positions. Compounded difficulties arise when the battery is deployed by separate platoon and continuous 24 hour operations are required in more than one position.

Observation: Additional FDC personnel should be requested under the general provisions of USARV Reg 310-31 prior to initiating pre-deployment training. This battalion has initiated a request for 1 E-6 MOS 13E40 and 6 EM MOS 13E20.

#### Unit Air Section

Item: Heavy artillery battalions are handicapped by the lack of an organic Aviation section.

Discussion: The firing batteries of this battalion are in three widely-separated locations. These batteries are frequently called upon to further dispatch firing platoons to areas away from the battery base camp in order to support tactical operations. Command and control of the firing batteries is difficult in this situation because most roads can not be traveled without a road clearing operation. Further, the battalion is assigned a large area of visual reconnaissance responsibility. Aircraft to effect command, control, coordination, air reconnaissance and artillery adjustment must be requested through higher headquarters. Although the requests are frequently honored, all essential requests cannot be filled since the group Hq does not have organic aircraft either. Timely tactical operations requiring unexpected air observation cannot always be effected when desired due to the requirement of going through other headquarters to request support.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

Observation: As a minimum, the Aviation section authorized in TOE 6-445E should be re-assigned to the battalion.

#### Battalion Surgeon

Item: Battalion Surgeon was not assigned to the unit in CONUS.

Discussion: The Surgeon should be assigned prior to deployment in order to allow sufficient time to check out the TOE and replace worn or missing items. This permits requisitioning enough basic drugs so that the aid station can be set up and functional when the unit arrives in-country.

Observation: The Battalion Surgeon should be assigned to the unit prior to the time the unit leaves CONUS.

#### Medical Supplies

Item: Some medical supplies are not available at all times in RVN.

Discussion: The priority assigned to this unit for medical supplies is 12. It takes up to two months before many of the basic requests are filled. Therefore it is not feasible to replenish supplies on a monthly basis.

Observation: The battalion aid station should requisition supplies on a 3 month replacement basis, rather than on a 3 week basis current medical supply facility policy calls for.

### B. Operations

#### Close Support of Infantry Ground Operations

Item: Coordination between maneuvering ground troops and supporting heavy artillery poses a difficult problem.

Discussion: Forward observer communications arrangements with each supporting heavy artillery battery requires close and detailed coordination. It was found on one operation that an FO party equipped with a PRC-25 radio was limited to a 3,500 meter range when operating in rubber plantations and other heavily foliated areas. Pre-planned routes of advance, of necessity, are frequently abandoned. Often vague



AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

and inaccurate locations of friendly forward elements are reported.

Observation: The use of observer aircraft during ground operations acting as spotters and artillery communications relay stations between ground observer and the supporting heavy artillery batteries facilitated coordination and communications problems when ground elements were on the move. A ground FO should always carry both the long and short antenna for the AN/PRC-25 radio in order to attain maximum communication range.

Corrosion of M-107 and M-110 Elevating and Traversing Mechanisms

Item: A common cause for failure in the 175mm gun and the 8 inch howitzer elevating and traversing mechanisms is corrosion within the manual elevating and traversing drive assembly housings.

Discussion: A visit during the period 27 Dec through 30 Dec by the Army Weapons Command Maintenance team to the firing batteries indicated that severe corrosion, apparently developed during sea-shipment of the weapons and in-country high humidity had formed on the elevation and traversing drive assembly clutch discs of most of the battalions weapons. The corrosion caused the discs to resist slipping and thereby resulted in damage to the elevating mechanism. Disassembly and assembly of the mechanisms are a third echelon responsibility. However, the unit can take action to preclude corrosion within the mechanism by engaging the tube travel lock and by rotating the weapon's elevating and traversing hand cranks until the clutch discs slip.

Observation: The clutch discs of the 175mm gun and the 8 inch howitzer should be exercised daily by the unit.

C. Training and Organization

Firing Battery Officer Personnel

Item: The number of officers authorized by TOE for composite heavy artillery batteries is insufficient.

Discussion: The composite heavy artillery batteries are frequently assigned missions in widely-separated areas of tactical operations. Assigned missions often cause the batteries to be separated by platoon. The stringent safety requirements of checking firing data

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Reports for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

and procedures on a 24 hour basis however, are not lessened. Assigned officer strength of 3 officers is not sufficient to insure continuous alert officers on duty in a base camp area and 2 field firing positions. It was necessary to augment each firing battery with two officers.

Observation: Each firing battery should be authorized a total of 7 officers. These would include the BC, XO, AXO, FDO, AFDO, 2 FOM.

#### D. Intelligence

##### Security Clearances

Item: Security clearances are difficult to obtain once in-country.

Discussion: All clearances should be obtained prior to leaving CONUS. Special thought should be given to crypto clearances keeping in mind that 24 hour operations will at least double the number of cleared radio teletype operator personnel required.

Observation: Deploying units should review requirements for cleared personnel prior to leaving CONUS.

##### Forms

Item: Blank forms are difficult to obtain in-country.

Discussion: The Bn has experienced difficulty in obtaining blank forms since arriving in-country.

Observation: A 3 month supply of blank forms should be brought with the unit.

##### Aerial Observation

Item: Most observation in a GS or GS-R type of unit is done from the air.

Discussion: Observer training should be primarily oriented toward air observation. Special emphasis should be placed on the gathering of intelligence.

Observation: Future deploying units should emphasize air observer training during pre-deployment phase.

15  
CONFIDENTIAL

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

Maps

Item: A new series of maps is available.

Discussion: The new series of maps being used is 7014. The new series of maps are much more accurate than these received by this unit prior to leaving CONUS.

Observation: Units should try to obtain this series prior to leaving CONUS.

E. Logistics

S-4 Support of Separated Batteries

Item: S-4 support to separated batteries upon arrival in-country was inadequate.

Discussion: The unit did not anticipate separate accounts for displaced units, and the necessity of detaching S-4 personnel to these units.

Observation: While in CONUS units should train at least one (1) officer and NCO per battery in the setting up and maintenance of property books and supply records. The Service battery should be prepared to attach at least two 5-ton ammunition vehicles and drivers to separated batteries.

High Voltage Dynamotor

Item: This unit has had seven high-voltage dynamotor elements of the T-195 (the AN/GRC-46 Transmitter) fail during the past three months.

Discussion: As yet, no satisfactory explanation for these failures has been advanced. The four transmitters which have been returned averaged eight (8) days down time; the three transmitters still in the shop have been down an average of thirty-eight (38) days, the longest down now having ninety-one (91) days down time.

Observation: Units departing for Vietnam should provide themselves with extra high-voltage dynamotors, since the mortality here is considerably higher than in CONUS, and replacements are very scarce.

CONFIDENTIAL

15

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

AN/GRC-46 Modification

Item: On one occasion, the C-4 capacitor component of junction box, J-2491/GRC, was destroyed by application of improperly polarized power.

Discussion: This failure was traced to an improperly installed external power connector. The positive and negative leads had been reversed.

Observation: When MWO 11-5815-204-35/4 is applied, particular attention should be given to the check-out operation, with special regard for checking polarity in all vital areas.

Field Operation of a Composite Heavy  
Artillery Battery

Item: Field operation of a composite heavy artillery battery (8"/175mm)

Discussion: If a separate battery is to operate effectively, its TOE must be modified to include an additional water trailer (for split operation), a wrecker, and an additional VRC-46 radio (for FDC purposes when the battery is split).

Observation: If a separate composite heavy artillery battery is augmented, with the necessary additional equipment, it can more effectively perform its mission even though the mission calls for split operation.

F. Pre-deployment Planning

Advance Party Composition

Item: The in-country experience of the Bn advance party indicated that many enlisted quartering party personnel are needed.

Discussion: The maximum authorized advance party strength was 25 personnel. The composition of this unit's advance party was as shown on page 5. In-country experience proved that the advance party should have contained fewer officer and senior NCOs and more duty soldiers.

Observation: It is felt that the advance party would have been more effective if it had been composed as follows: Bn CO, S3, S4, S2, Wheeled vehicle mechanic,

17  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

PBO, 10 enlisted wiremen, RTOs or cannoneers, Asst communication officer, Opns Sgt, Intel Sgt, Opns Clerk, S4 Sgt, 2 Subrly Clerks, Hq Btry Wire Team Chief, and a Sr Pers Clerk.

Part II: Recommendations

Personnel Readiness Reports

It is recommended that initial, interim and final unit readiness reports required by higher headquarters include within its directed format provisions for a realistic reporting of deployable strength as opposed to assigned strength.

Personnel-on-station Date

It is recommended that a firm CONUS personnel-on-station date be established far enough in advance of the initiation of an ICTP to insure availability of administrative personnel as well as other filler personnel in order to accomplish uninterrupted training.

Clearance of Personnel

It is recommended that higher headquarters concerned take necessary steps to assign the highest priority to obtaining security clearances for commissioned officers or to take timely action to replace commissioned officers when complicated clearance problems arise which delay timely granting of clearances to deploying personnel.

Special Weapons Publications

It is recommended that future deploying units be provided early advice as to a firm date for re-routing of pin-point distribution of publications pertaining to Special weapons.

Deploying Unit Cadre Personnel

It is recommended that critical cadre personnel be assigned with a reporting date at least three weeks prior to other filler personnel in order to fashion a completely staffed training schedule and tactical SOP.

Tactical SOP Files

It is recommended that USARV forward Field Force Vietnam Artillery and Group SOPs for review and use by deploying units in training.

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18

AVGAZ-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 Jan 67, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

Equipment Delivery Dates

It is recommended that all authorized unit equipment delivery dates be programmed for receipt prior to commencement of training, and in time for instructor personnel to completely familiarize themselves with new equipment prior to involvement in field training and POM requirements.

Fire Direction Personnel

It is recommended that the heavy artillery firing battery TOE 6-446E be augmented to include 4 officers in the grade of lieutenant; 1 E-6, MOS 13E40; and 6 EM, MOS 13E20.

Authorization of Wrecker Vehicles

It is recommended that each firing battery of a heavy artillery battalion be augmented with an M-578 VTR to aid widely-separated unit tactical operations.

TOE Aviation Section

It is recommended that the TOE Aviation section authorized the battalion in TOE 6-445E and withdrawn by GO 88, Hq USAAMC, be reassigned.

AN/VRC Radio

It is recommended that the firing batteries of this battalion be authorized an additional AN/VRC-46 radio.

*David W. McNeely*  
DAVID W MCNEELY  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

18

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19  
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AVGA-C (11 Feb 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 54TH ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96376 27 February 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 1st Bn, 83d Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph A, FDC Personnel. The requirements to maintain 24 hour operation with a system of dual checks for safety is greatly hampered by the austere allocation of FDC personnel. The problem is temporarily being alleviated however, with the cross training of survey personnel for the battalion FDC and special weapons personnel for battery FDC's.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph A, Unit Air Section. The operations of artillery battalions in this group are frequently handicapped by the scarcity of aircraft. Effective ground observation is impossible over much of the terrain. The best and most reliable means of acquiring targets is visual air reconnaissance.

4. (U) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph A, Medical Supplies. Experience of the other aid stations of this group indicates that replenishment of medical supplies is not controlled by a mandatory requisitioning basis or cycle. Isolated aid stations have been permitted to requisition these supplies as required by their needs.

5. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph D, Maps. When this battalion departed CONUS the new series maps (7014) were not available. The maps are now available in Vietnam and have been issued to each unit in this group.

6. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Tactical SOP Files. This headquarters has established a policy of forwarding copies of its tactical SOP to units scheduled to be assigned to 54th Artillery Group.

7. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Fire Direction Personnel. If each firing battery is augmented with a Fire Direction Officer, assistant FDO, and two forward observers then the present augmentation of six forward observers to battalions is not necessary.

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20

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

8. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Fire Direction Personnel, Authorization of Wrecker Vehicles, TOE Aviation Section, AN/VRC Radio. The recommended changes and/or augmentation to the TOE are being submitted as an MTOE change for this battalion during March 1967.

*Charles M. Mizell*  
CHARLES M. MIZELL  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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20

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AVFB-FAC (11 Feb 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, APO 96266

21 MAR 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266  
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH  
APO 96307  
Commander In Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army (ACSFOR, DA) Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery is considered adequate.
2. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Personnel Readiness Reports, Personnel-On-Station Date, Clearance of Personnel, Special Weapon Publication and the Deploying Unit Cadre Personnel. Concur. These recommendations should be considered by CONARC in the preparation of units for overseas deployment.
3. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Tactical SOP Files. It is now the policy of both artillery groups to forward copies of their tactical SOPs to units being assigned to them.
4. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Equipment Delivery Dates. Concur.
5. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, Fire Direction Personnel and Authorization of Wrecker Vehicles. Concur in the need for additional personnel and equipment as dictated by the type warfare being conducted in RVN. This headquarters will make specific comments on each of these items upon receipt of the MTOE being prepared by the 1/83d Artillery Battalion.
6. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, TO&E Aviation Section. As previously noted in Operational Reports of this headquarters, organic aviation support is essential to the effective operations of the units within this command.
7. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, AN/VRC Radio. See comment in paragraph 5 above.

W.D. Crittenger Jr.  
W. D. CRITTENBERGER Jr.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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22

AVFBC-H (11 Feb 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January  
1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 26 MAR 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for  
Period Ending 31 January 1967 submitted by the 1st Battalion, 83d  
Artillery and considers the report to be adequate.

2. Concur in the comments and/or recommendations contained in  
the basic document and the 1st and 2d indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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no

  
JAMES A. ULVENES  
T, AGC  
Asst AC

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AVHGC-DH (11 Feb 67) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 24 APR 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments as follows:

a. Reference Item concerning corrosion of elevating and traversing mechanisms, Page 13: Concur in the practice of exercising the slip clutches daily. This procedure has been published in field letters for these weapons. The major cause of the clutch failure has been determined to be humidity, not necessarily salt air.

b. Reference Item on security clearances, Page 14; and Recommendation, Page 17: Closer attention to personnel security requirements while the unit is in CONUS will alleviate the problems cited in the report. Personnel requiring security clearances because of MOS or position should not be considered POR qualified until such clearances have been granted or at a minimum, investigation has been initiated. The procedures established in-country for validating or granting clearances are adequate. The major subordinate commands have the authority to validate current security clearances and issue interim clearances. Prior to validating a TOP SECRET clearance commanders are required to request a check of the US Army Investigative Records Repository (USAIRR) through this headquarters. If there is a current DA Form 873 in the individual's Military Personnel Records Jacket the command can authorize access to classified information to the degree indicated for a period of sixty days pending receipt of the results of the USAIRR check.

c. Reference Item concerning difficulty in obtaining blank forms, Page 14: Commanders of organizations alerted for permanent change of station must ensure that a 30-day stock of required blank forms are taken to the new station. Unit should have established an account with Printing and Publications Center, Japan, immediately upon arrival in RVN in accordance with instructions contained in USARV Regulation 310-3. Records at this headquarters indicate that unit still has not established an account with PPC, Japan. Follow-up action will be taken by this headquarters to ensure that unit establishes a blank forms account.

23

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24

AVHGC-DH (11 Feb 67)

24 APR 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

d. Reference Item on high voltage dynamotors, Page 15: Unit will be advised to submit an equipment improvement recommendation concerning the dynamotor.

e. Reference Recommendation on tactical SOP files, Page 17: Current procedures indicated by indorsing headquarters in Paragraph 6, 1st Indorsement, and Paragraph 3, 2d Indorsement are considered appropriate.

f. Reference Recommendations concerning modifications of TOE to include additional fire direction personnel, M-578 wrecker, and AN/VRC-46 radio, Page 18; Paragraphs 7 and 8, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraphs 5 and 7, 2d Indorsement: Requests for modifications to TOE should be submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 310-31 and USARV message (U) AVHGC-OT 19073, DTG 251132Z March 1967, subject: Changes in Equipment Authorizations. If increases in personnel authorizations are requested, each level of command should be screened for less essential trade-off spaces. Identification of such spaces and recommendations for their trade off should be included in the MTOE submission.

g. Reference Item on TOE aviation section, Pages 11 and 12; Recommendation, Page 18, and Paragraph 6, 2d Indorsement: In the RVN environment where target acquisition is primarily by air, the advantages of reinstating the battalion's TOE aviation section are recognized. The action taken by DA resulted from a shortage of aviation assets. When assets become available, reinstatement will be made. Until this occurs, however, aviation support must continue on a mission basis from present resources.

h. Reference Recommendations concerning personnel readiness reports, personnel on-station dates, special weapons publications, unit cadre personnel, and equipment delivery dates, Pages 17 and 18: These items refer specifically to problem areas arising in CONUS prior to deployment and should be of interest to CONARC.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JERRY VAN HORN  
2LT/AGC  
Act. AG

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GPOP-OT (11 Feb 67)

5th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jan 67,  
RCS CSFOR-65, HQ 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 26 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
G. R. KOBALY  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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