DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

AGAM (M) (1 Aug 69) FOR: OT UT 692119

5 August 1969

SUBJECT:Operational Report – Lessons Learned, headquarters, 1st Battalion,
83d Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1- Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluation-s and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2- Information contained in this report is provided co insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM Major General, USA The Adjutant General

I Incl as

DISTRIBUTION: Commanding Generals US Continental Army Command US Army Combat Developments Command Commandants US Army War College US Army Command and General Staff College US Army Command and General Staff College US Army Armor School US Army Combat Surveillance School US Army Field Artillery School US Army Infantry School US Army Missile and Munitions School US Army Ordnance School

Copies furnished: Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chief of Research and Development Assistant Chiefs of Staff DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd) Chief of Engineers OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces Commandant of the Marine Corps Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command Defense Documentation Center Security Officer, Hudson Institute Commanding Officers US Army Limited War Laboratory US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 83d ARTILLERY APO San Francisco 96308

AVGAZ-C

1 May 1969

- SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U).
- THRU: Commanding General XXIV Corps Artillery ATTN: AVII-ATC APO 96308

Commanding General XXIV Corps ATTN: AVII-CCT APO 96308

Commanding General United States Army Vietnam ATTN: AVHGC-DST APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief United States Army Pacific ATTN: OPOP-DT APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of staff for Force Development Department of the Army Washington, D. C. 20310

Operational Report – Lessons Learned for quarter ending 30 April 1969, is submitted in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15 and AR 525-15.

- 1. (C) . Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities
 - a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) During the entire reporting period this Headquarters remained assigned to XXIV Corps. The battalion was attached to XXIV Corps Artillery as of 282000H(xx) Feb 69 by XXIV Corps OPORD 11-69 (Spring Offensive) and further attached on 16 April by XXIV Corps General Orders 373 dated 23 April 1969.

FOR OT UT 692119 Inclosure

AVGAZ-C		1 May 1969
SUBJECT:		ort of Headquarter, 1 st Battalion, 83d Artillery g 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)
	(2) Base Camp	Locations:
	(a) Hea	adquarters Battery:
at Gia Le Comba	t Base (YD 83515	1. During the entire reporting period, Headquarters Battery was located 51 – Reference Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50.000).
	(b) Ser	vice Battery
located at Gia Le	Combat Base (Y	 During the entire reporting period, Service Battery was D 835151 – Reference Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50.000).
	(c) Bat	tery A:
Map Sheet 64411	, 1:50000).	1. 1 Feb 69 to 8 Feb 69 – FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref
Map Sheet 64411	, 1:50000).	2. 6 Feb 69 to 11 Mar 69 – Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151; Ref
Map Sheet 64411	, 1:50000).	3. 11 Mar 69 to 15 Apr 69 - FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref
Map Sheet 64411	, 1:50000).	4. 15 Apr 69 ti=o 29 Apr 69 - FSB Blaze (YD 529021; Ref
Map Sheet 64411	, 1:50000).	5. 29 Apr 69 to 30 Apr 69 – FSB Arrow (YD-47750290 ; Ref (corrected to read FSB Cannon)
	(d) Bat	tery B:
Sheet 6541I, 1:50	0000).	1. 1 Feb 69 to 5 Feb 69 – FSB Anzio (YD 934072; Ref Map
Sheet 6541I, 1:50	0000).	2. 5 Feb 69 to 12 Apr 69 – FSB Roy (ZD 058029; Ref Map
Sheet 6541I, 1:50	0000).	3. 12 Apr 69 to 12 Apr 69 – FSB Quick II (YC 984994; Ref Map
Sheet 6541I, 1:50	0000).	4. 12 Apr 69 to 25 Apr 69 – FSB Roy (ZD 058029; Ref Map
Sheet 6541I, 1:50	0000).	5. 26 Apr 69 to 27 Apr 69 – FSB Quick II (YC 984994; Ref Map
Sheet 6541I, 1:50	0000).	6. 27 Apr 69 to 30 Apr 69 – FSB Roy (ZD 058029; Ref Map
	(e) Bat	tery C:
Sheet 64411, 1:50)000).	1. 1 Feb 69 to 19 Mar 69 – FSB Jack (YD 495287; Ref Map

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT:	Operational Rep for Period Endin						у	1 May 1969
Map Sheet 6441	I, 1:50000).	2. 19 N	Aar 69 to	24 Mar e	59 – FSB	Boyd (Y	D 741132	2; Ref
Map Sheet 6441	I, 1:50000).	3. 24 N	Aar 69 to	30 Apr 6	59 – FSB	Bastogn	e (YD 620	0095; Ref
	(3) Command C	hanges:						
	(a) He	adquarter	s Battery	7				
	From				<u>To</u>			Date
	CPT Jo	hn R. Ma	mia		CPT W	'illiam D	. Burnett	8 Apr 69
(4) Personnel Strength as of 30 April 1969:								
				Officer	<u>'S</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	Total
	Author Assign Present			37 33 32		6 5 4	522 497 473	565 535 509
	(5) Critical MO	S Shortag	ges:					
	MOS	Grade	Auth	Asg	30 Day	Loss		
	13B40 13E40 13E20 13A10 13A1N 36K20 63C20 71H20 76S20 82C20 94A10 94B20 94B40	SGT SP5 PFC SP4 PFC SP5 SP5 SP5 SP6 SP4 SP5 PFC SP4 SP6	16 65 12 144 12 25 6 6 1 5 4 5 9 5 5	9 3 10 84 1 4 3 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 2	$ \begin{array}{c} 3 \\ 0 \\ 6 \\ 2 \\ 0 \\ 2 \\ 1 \\ 3 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 8 \\ 4 \\ 1 \end{array} $			

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT:

Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

(6) Personnel Changes During Quarter:

Grade	Losses	Gains
0-5	0	0
0-4	0	0
0-3	1	3
0-2	8	7
0-1	0	3
W-2	0	1
W-1	1	1
E-9	0	0
E-8	0	1
E-7	3	3
E-6	7	16
E-5	42	43
E-4	110	78
E-3	61	83
E-2	36	33
E-1	2	4

(7) Casualties:

Type	<u>Number</u>
KIA	0
Died of Battle Wounds	1
Missing in Action	0
Wounded in Action	2
Non-Battle Deaths	0

(8) Medical Service Statistics:

<u>Type</u>	Number
Total Patients Visit	405
Admitted to Hospital	25
IRHA	2
Evacuated Out of Country	7
(Non-Hostile)	8
(IRHA)	1
Malaria Cases	1

4

1 May 1969

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

(9) Awards and Decorations:

(11)

Presented	Pending
10	15
39	2
4	4
1	0
	10

(10) Judicial and Non-Judicial Actions:

<u>Type</u>	Number
General Courts-Martial Special Courts-Martial Summary Courts-Martial Article 15	0 4 0 29
Reportable Accidents:	
Type	Number
Vehicle Personnel	5 4

(12) R & R: During this reporting period, this Headquarters has received a sufficient quantity of R&R allocations. Additional allocations to Australia and Hawaii could be utilized by this command.

(a) Out of Country R & R:

Destination	Number
Hawaii	24
Australia	13
Bangkok	14
Taipei	12
Tokyo	4
Hong Kong	9
Singapore	3
Kuala Lumpur	1
Manila	1
Total	81

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

(b) In-Country R & R:	
Destination	Number
China Beach, Da Nang <u>Vung Tau</u> Total	4 <u>33</u> 37

(13) Safety: During this period the battalion conducted a class on General Safety.

b. Operations:

(1) Deployment of the battalion and missions executed during this reporting period:

(a) Headquarters and Service Batteries:

1 During the entire reporting period, this headquarters was assigned to the XXIV Corps Artillery with a tactical mission of GSR 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.

2. Headquarter and Service Batteries continued to provide the administrative and logistical support for this headquarters from their location at Gia Le Combat Base.

(b) Battery A (8inch Howitzer)

1. During this reporting period, Battery A made five (5) separate road marches to fire bases located within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Area of Operations. The battery remained under the fire and administrative control of this headquarters.

2. On 15 March 1969, Battery A departed FSB Bastogne enroute to the floor of the A Shau valley. Through a series of moves, the battery has moved to within 10 kilometers of the A Shau valley. These moves mark the most forward locations that heavy artillery has occupied toward the A Shau valley.

(c) Battery B (8 inch Howitzer)

1. During this period, Battery B made six (6) road marches to fire support bases within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Area of Operations.

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

2. Several of these moves were in support of short duration operations. The battery remained under fire and administrative control of this headquarters.

(d) Battery C (175mm Gun)

1. From 1 February 1969 until 19 March 1969 the battery continued to support the 3rd Marine Division in Operation Dewey Canyon from FSB Jack.

2. On 24 March 1969, the battery moved to FSB Bastogne to support operations deep in the southern portion of the A Shau Valley. The mission remained unchanged, GSR 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.

(2) Battalion Activities:

(a) Normal operations consistent with the battalion mission were conducted during the reporting period.

(b) The battalion has not had an artillery accident or incident in over seventeen

months.

(c) The Battalion Metro Station deployed to FSB Roy ZD 058031; Ref Map Sheet 6541I, 1:50000) early in the reporting period. On 30 April 1969, the Battalion Metro Station dispatched a four (4) man visual Mountain Metro Team to support operations of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in the Ruong Ruong Valley area vic YC 8784 (ref Map Sheet 6541I, 1:50000).

(c) Operation Nevada Eagle:

1. Operation Nevada Eagle terminated on 28 February 69. All batteries under the control of the battalion fired in support of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) operations.

2. Summary of missions and rounds expended during this period:

	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	884	58
Rounds	2783	172

(d) Operation Dewey Canyon:

AVGAZ-C Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery SUBJECT: for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

1. Operation Dewey Canyon terminated on 19 March 1969. Battery C, 175mm Guns, supported the operation with 645 missions and 3007 rounds.

2. The 3rd Marine Division operation was in effect from 25 January 1969 to 19 March 1969.

(f) Sherman Peak:

1. Operation Sherman Peak terminated on 8 February 1969. Battery A, 8" Howitzer, supported the operation.

2. A total of 160 missions and 492 eight inch rounds were expended.

1 May 1969

(g) Kentucky Jumper:

1. Kentucky Jumper commenced on 1 March 1969 throughout the Area Of Operations of the 101st Airborne Division (AM). All batteries under the control of the battalion fired in support of the operations.

2. Recapitulation of missions fired and rounds expended:

	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	3892	896
Rounds	8151	1969

(h) Massachusetts Striker:

1. This operation commenced on 1 March 1969. Batteries A and C are the participants from this battalion.

2. A summary of missions and rounds expended during this period are

as follows:

	8 inch	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	823	384
Rounds	3723	966

(i) Caisson XIV:

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT:	1 May 1969 Operational Report of Headquarter, 1 st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)				
inch howitzer.	1. Operation Caisson XIV was a one day raid involving Battery B, 8				
	2. The battery fires a total of 34 missions and 96 eight inch rounds.				
(j) Operation Bristol Boots:					
1. Bristol Boots commenced on 25 April 1969. The participants were Batteries B and C. Battery B returned to it's base camp location on 27 March 1969, but the operation continues.					
as follows:	2. A summary of missions and rounds expended during this period are				

 8 inch
 175mm

 Missions
 42
 1

 Rounds
 371
 15

(3) Ammunition Expenditures and Missions Fired:

	<u>8 inch</u>		<u>175mm</u>	
	Missions	Rounds	Missions	Rounds
Battery A	1537	5866		
Battery B	4298	9850		
Battery C			1984	6129
Total	5835	15716	1984	6129

(4) During the reporting period this unit participated in combat operations for 89 days.

c. Training:

(1) On the job training continued in all units of the battalion during this reporting period.

(2) All newly arrived replacement personnel received fourteen hours of instruction as outlined in the Battalion SOP. Replacement training is accomplished within seven (7) days after arrival in country.

(3) This headquarters filled six (6) allocations to the XXIV Corps Arty Fire Direction Officer School.

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

(4) An examination program for all firing battery officers and key non-commissioned officers has been deployed. This program consists of a series of maintenance examinations on the guns/howitzers and firing battery techniques.

(5) A Battalion Firing Battery Inspection Team was formed to provide detailed assistance in the areas of firing battery and fire direction procedures.

(6) All battalion officers and senior non-commissioned officers attended a class on marihuana given by the XXIV Corps Judge Advocate General Section.

(7) The Battalion Surgeon conducted classes on Heat Injuries and MEDEVAC procedures.

(8) Battery Motor Officers, PLL clerks and key maintenance supervisors received classes on the maintenance of prescribed load lists.

(9) Continued emphasis is being placed on the driver training program. Defensive driving and driver's maintenance procedures are the primary topics.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Daily intelligence reports are received from the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and XXIV Corps Artillery.

(2) PERINTREP 7-69, 8-69 currently provide enemy order of battle information applicable to the battalion.

(3) The battalion frequently performs Visual Reconnaissance over areas previously fired upon to obtain as assessment of battle damage.

e. Logistics:

- (1) Monthly deadline percentages: 25% Vehicles per day.
- (2) Miles traveled by ammunition trains: 66,652 miles.
- (3) Number of air sorties flown: 5 CH-47 sorties.
- (4) Resupply:

(a) Class I - 223 tons

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

(b) Class II - 42 tons

(c) Class III - 8770 gallons

(d) Class V - 1545 tons by road 10 tons by air

f. Communications:

(1) Shortages of repair parts for the AM/GRC-46 radios have caused excessive deadline

1 May 1969

time.

(2) Since many of the firing elements are located in remote areas, a need for continuous communications is essential. Directional parabolic antennas have given this headquarters the continuous communication that is required.

g. Civic Action: During the period 1 Feb 69 through 31 April 69 the battalion conducted a civic action project in the village of Loc Son, Phu Long District, Thua Thion Province. The project consisted of rebuilding Xaun Loc Buddist School and was coordinated with the G-5, 101st Airborne Division (AM). The battalion constructed desks, benches, installed windows, doors, and performed an overall renovation of this school. All material used in this project came from packing crates and other expendable material. Cement, tablets, pencils, soap and candy were furnished from excess material/supplies within the battalion. This civic action project has improved the relationship between the Vietnamese and all US Forces within this area. Within the next reporting period this project should be completed and another project undertaken by the battalion.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel and Administration: None.

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Item: Lesson Learned #1: Use of azimuth indices for Heavy Artillery.

(a) Observation: An additional method for setting up firing charts of heavy artillery units is required.

(b) Evaluation: In this battalion, the maximum traverse limits established prohibit traversing 533 mils left and right from center of

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

the gun/howitzer. As a result, large changes in the azimuth of fire require the weapon to be relaid on a different azimuth. Since the M107/M110 does not have a 6400 m traverse capability, deflection indices are unsuitable on the firing chart. A solution used by this battalion is to lay the firing chart with eight azimuth indices spread 800 mils apart, starting with the 0/6400 mil index. The azimuth to the target or azimuth of lay is recorded to the closest 100, ils. Azimuth will be determined by placing the left edge the Range Deflection Protractor on the nearest index to the target. Placing a pin at the base deflection, move on the RDP to the nearest 100 mil increment on the arc of the RDP to the target. The azimuth of lay will be determined by adding or subtracting the number of 100 mil increments moved to the initial azimuth. Without moving the RDP, a pin is placed at the base deflection. The pin is now the deflection index. Deflection index. For targets outside the on-carriage traverse limits (200 mils left and right of the center of traverse for the 175mm gun and 300 mils left and right for the eight inch howitzer) (See ORLL dtd 1 Nov 68) the weapon will be relaid and a new temporary deflection index constructed.

(c) Recommendations: That Section II of Chapter 16, FM 6-40, be expanded to include a solution similar to the one utilized in this battalion.

(2) Item: Lessons Learned #2: Validity of Ballistic Meteorological Messages.

(a) Observation: A change is required in the frequency of transmitting meteorological messages and the effective ranges of the meteorological messages in Vietnam's I Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) Evaluation: In I CTZ the recognized time frame that a meteorological message is considered valid is six (6) hours. Applying the MET to firing data from a MET that was six (^) hours old caused rounds to land an average of 500 meters over the target. In a similar manner, five hour old METs were used from two different stations to fire on targets. In both cases the first rounds impacted 400 meters over the desired target. The inaccuracies produced were a direct result of the invalid METs. According to EM 6-15, Artillery Meteorology, when the weather pattern is variable, the valid time should not exceed a two (2) hour period. When the weather pattern is stable, the valid time may be extended to four (4) hours during the middle of the day or night. Many of the firing elements located in northern I CTZ are emplaced on or near large mountain ranges. The vast majority of the firing elements in this area are fire predominately into very mountainous regions. As a result, wind plays an important role in all firing, causing large variations over short distances. In mountainous terrain, the distance that the MET is valid should be reduced by approximately 50 percent. Basically, this means that a MET station collocated with an eight inch howitzer battery would be able to provide MET data at the battery's maximum range. This maximum valid distance of approximately 16 Km cannot be overlooked because of the effect the

AVGAZ-C SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

1 May 1969

wind, in the mountainous areas, has on the accuracy of artillery fire. There are many tendencies to overlook space validity, as a requirement, for a valid meteorological message.

(c) Recommendations: That the meteorological stations within I CTZ initiate an electronic meteorological flight to be broadcast every four hours. Also, that meteorological sites be located in areas, so as to insure, that the recommended valid distances in mountainous areas are observed.

- c. (U) Training and Organizational: None
- d. (U) Intelligence: None.
- e. (U) Logistics: None.

(1) Item: Lesson Learned #3: Artillery Mechanic.

(a) Observation: There are several periodic adjustments and checks required on M107/M110 in order to prevent failures. Presently, all organizational adjustments and/or checks must be made at the battery level.

(b) Evaluation: Since many adjustments and checks are required on the weapons, the battery is often unable to perform all of the required maintenance. The problem is compounded even further by climate conditions and heavy firing. In many cases, weekly visits by the DS unit are not sufficient to accomplish these checks. As of yet, the personnel from the DS unit have not been able to make the rounds of all batteries to be of any real assistance. Many long hours spent waiting for answers ot work orders and parts could be eliminated of trained personnel were located at the battalion maintenance.

(c) Recommendation: That three (3) Turret Artillery Mechanics be authorized at the battalion maintenance of each heavy artillery battalion.

- f. (U) Organization: None.
- g. (U) Civil Affairs: None.
- h. (C) Survival, Escape and Evasion: None.

CECIL R. SYKES LTC, FA Commanding AVII-ATC (1 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, ACS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

Headquarter, XXIV Corps Artillery, ATTN: AVII-ATC, APO San Francisco 96308, 15 May 1969

17 May 1969

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO San Francisco 96308

1. (U) The ORLL of the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery has been reviewed by this headquarter and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (U) Reference item concerning use of azimuth indices for heavy artillery, page 11, paragraph 2b(1). This headquarter concurs that Section II of Chapter 16, FM 6-40 should be expanded to include a system of indexing firing charts for weapons which must relay when firing outside of traverse limits. This headquarters does not concur with the method used, as it is unnecessarily complicated. Other heavy units use a system which gives a graphic readout from the RDP. The chart is indexed for polar plotting of azimuth by placing indices every 1000 mils. Deflection indices are not placed on the chart. The RDP is prepared with two sets of numbers. One set for azimuth and one set for deflection. The target is plotted and the battery is laid on an azimuth to the nearest 100 mils. The Executive Officer has a card prepared which is included in the initial fire commands and howitzers reoriented using as a guide, azimuth markers placed around the position every 400 mils. Without moving the RDP from the azimuth of lay, another pin is placed at the base deflection and serves as a temporary deflection index. The left edge of the RDP is placed against the target pin and deflection is read from the temporary deflection index pin.

3. (U) Reference item concerning validity of ballistic meteorological messages, page 12, paragraph 2b(2). This headquarters concurs that meteorological messages should be provided more frequently and met stations located so that valid distances are observed. However, within current assets, the size and topography of the Corps' area of operation, it is impractical. At present, there are seven electronic metro stations in the Corps AO. There are 12 firing batteries located in mountainous terrain which are an excessive distance from the nearest metro station. Four additional metro stations would be required to service these batteries. Visual met teams are used to produce "mountain mets". Personnel to operate these stations come from the aforementioned seven metro sections. As sections are already understrength, loss of personnel to provide visual teams at another location seriously affects the efficiency of already understrength sections. In addition, a four hour flight schedule would not provide enough time for

AVII-GTC (1 May 69) 1st Ind (con't)

17 May 1969

SUBJECT:Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, ACS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

metro equipment maintenance. XXIV Corps Artillery Metro Quality Control is currently studying the deterioration of met data throughout a 24 hour period. It is felt that this study will suggest a flight schedule that will minimize effects of the met deterioration. From experience, The Corps Artillery Metro Officer stated that Vietnam has more stable weather conditions than any area in the world where U. S. artillery is currently operated. Met data begins to deteriorate as soon as it is determined. Technicians presently used are the best available for the state of the art. Results of the deterioration study will be sent to the Target Acquisition Department at Fort Sill.

4, (C) Reference item concerning artillery mechanic, page 13, paragraph 2c(1). The headquarters nonconcers with unit recommendation that three Turret Artillery Mechanics be authorized at the battalion maintenance section of each heavy artillery battalion. The basic problem is that the DSU is understrength. Even if the unit had artillery mechanics, they would not be permitted to perform direct support level maintenance.

5. (U) Reference para 1a (2) (c)5. FSB Arrow should read FSB Cannon.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HERBERT SIEGEL Major, ADA Adjutant

AVII-GCT (1 May 69) 2nd Ind.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for period ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RC) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96308

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO SF 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report Lessons Learned of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery, has been review at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Reference: Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities, Para 1, f(2), page 11. Further coordination with 1/83d Arty has determined that para 1, f (2) of the attached ORLL was erroneously reported. The directional antennas discussed are in fact log periodic antenna, AS-2236/GRC, and were obtained on loan from local USMC units. This antenna is presently not available in Army supply channels, however, it has proven invaluable in special situations requiring long-range FM communications. Unit has been instructed to review their requirements and submit MTOE changes.

3. (U) Comments on Section 2: Commander's Observations, evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Concur with ORLL as indorsed by HQ, XXIV Corps Artillery.

b. Reference paragraph 2e (1) (c), Page 13. Unit has been instructed to coordinate with supporting DSU to have frequent contact team visits or have contact teams co-located where required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. R. Taylor CPT, AGC Asst AG AVHGC-DST (1 May 69) 3rd Ind.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for period ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTNL GPOP-DT

1. This headquarter has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 1st battalion, 83d Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning Use of Azimuth Indices for Heavy Artillery, section II, page 11, paragraph 2b(1), and 1st Indorsement paragraph 2. Concur that section II Chapter 16, FM 6-40, be expanded to include a system of indexing the 6400 mil firing charts for weapons which must relay for a direction that allows for safe firing within traverse limits. The system described in the ORLL and 1st Indorsement is considered to be valid. The unit will be requested to submit DA Form 2083 to US Army Field Artillery School, ATTN: AKPSIAS-PL-FM, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73502, recommending a change to FM 6-40 to establish a system of indexing charts for heavy artillery,

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON 1LT, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-DT(1 May 69) 4th Ind.SUBJECT:Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER CPT, AGC Asst AG

AVIIB-DST (1 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Field Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTER, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarter has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning "Deployment of heavy artillery by platoon:, section IIO, page 11, paragraph 2b(2); concur. Short term augmentations to the unit MTOE for the conduct of long distance or long duration raids can be accomplished by the temporary loan of equipment and by the temporary assignment of additional personnel, preferably from within resources of the next higher headquarters. Action to change the MTOE is not considered to be appropriate because MTOE changes are intended for more permanent type requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson 1LT, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: 1/83 Srty XXIV Corps

GPOP-DT (1 Aug 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT:Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 83d Field Artillery for
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER CPT, AGC Asst AG