DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

ACDA (M) (14 Nov 69) FOR: OT-UT-693124 24 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, headquarters, 1st Battalion,

83d Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

- 1- Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluation-s and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
- 2- Information contained in this report is provided co insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 83d FIELD ARTILLERY APO San Francisco 96308

AVIIB-C 1 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery

for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

THRU: Commanding General

XXIV Corps Artillery ATTN: AVII-ATC APO 96308

Commanding General

XXIV Corps ATTN: AVII-CCT APO 96308

Commanding General United States Army Vietnam ATTN: AVEGC-DST APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief United States Army Pacific ATTN: OPOP-DT

APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of staff for

Force Development Department of the Army Washington, D. C. 20310

Operational Report – Lessons Learned for quarter ending 31 July 1969, is submitted in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15 and AR 525-15.

- 1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.
 - a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) During the entire reporting period this Headquarters remained assigned to XXIV Corps and attached to XXIV Corps Artillery.

FOR OT UT 693124 Inclosure 1

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- (2) Base Camp Locations:
 - (a) Headquarters Battery:

During the entire reporting period, Headquarters Battery was located at Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151 – Reference Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50.000).

- (b) During the entire reporting period, Service Battery was located at Gia Le Combat Base (YD 835151 Reference Map Sheet 6541IV, 1:50.000).
 - (c) Battery A:
 - 1. 1 May 69 to 21 Jun 69 FSB Cannon (YD 4750290; Ref Map

Sheet 6441I, 1:50,000).

2. 21 Jun 69 to 31 Jul – FSB Blaze (YD 529021; Ref Map

Sheet 64441I, 1:50,000).

- (d) Battery B:
- 1 May 69 to 31 Jul 69 FSB Roy (ZD 058029; Ref Map Sheet

6541I, 1:50,000)

- (e) Battery C:
- 1. 1 May 69 to 14 May 69 FSB Bastogne (YD 620095; Ref Map

Sheet 6441I, 1:50,000).

2. 14 May 1969 to 31 July 69 – FSB Blaze (YD 529021; Ref Map

Sheet 6441I, 1:50,000).

- (3) Command Changes:
 - (a) Service Battery

<u>From</u> <u>To</u> <u>Date</u>

CPT William K. Johnson CPT George M. McShea 19 Jun 69

(b) Battery A

<u>From</u> <u>To</u> <u>Date</u>

CPT Virtis A. Savage CPT Charles T. Morris 24 Jun 69

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(c) Battery B

From To Date

CPT James B. Briggs CPT Michael Boydston 28 Jun 69

(d) Battery C

<u>From</u> <u>To</u> <u>Date</u>

CPT James R. Wittkopp CPT Roger D. Manning 12 May 69

(4) Personnel Strength as of July 1969:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
Authorized	37	6	522	565
Assigned	34	5	523	562
Present for Duty	33	4	506	543

(5) Critical MOS Shortages:

MOS	Grade	Auth	Asg	30 Day Losses
05C20	E-4	10	5	1
13A1x	E-4	12	1	1
13B40	E-5	15	8	1
13D40	E-6	16	8	1
13E20	E-5	12	5	2
13E40	E-5	6	1	0
13Z50	E-8	7	4	1
45G20	E-4	6	2	2
52B20	E-4	5	1	0
63A10	E-3	8	0	0
63B40	E-5	1	0	0
64B20	E-4	2	0	0
82C20	E-5	4	0	0
91B20	E-4	6	04	2
91B20	E-5	1	2	2
91C20	E-5	1	1	1
93F20	E-6	1	0	0

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(6) Personnel Changes During Quarter:

Grade	Losses	Gains
0-5	0	0
0-4	1	1
0-3	4	6
0-2	9	3
0-1	0	1
W-2	2	1
W-1	0	0
E-9	0	0
E-8	3	1
E-7	4	4
E-6	11	7
E-5	39	14
E-4	79	40
E-3	19	45
E-2	2	50
E-1	4	10

(7) Casualties:

Type	<u>Number</u>
KIA	0
Died of Battle Wounds	1
Missing in Action	0
Wounded in Action	26
Non-Battle Deaths	0

(8) Medical Service Statistics:

<u>Type</u>	Number
Total Patients Visit	476
Admitted to Hospital	5
Evacuated Out of Countr	y
(Non-Hostile)	4
(IRHA)	12
Malaria Cases	2

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(9) Awards and Decorations:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Presented</u>	Pending
Silver Star	3	0
Legion of Merit	0	2
Bronze Star – "V"	2	2
Bronze Star	14	20
Air Medal	6	3
Army Commendation Medal	28	55
Purple Heart	27	0

(10) Judicial and Non-Judicial Actions:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
General Courts-Martial	0
Special Courts-Martial	4
Summary Courts-Martial	1
Article 15	
AR 635-212 Actions	
Unfitness	0
Unsuitability	1

(11) Reportable Accidents:

Type	Number
Vehicle	3
Personnel	2

(12) R & R:

(a) Out of Country R & R:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Number</u>
Hawaii	24
Australia	20
Bangkok	17
Taipei	5
Tokyo	9
Hong Kong	14
Singapore	3
Kuala Lumpur	2
Manila	2
Total	96

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(b) In-Country R & R:

<u>Destination</u>	Number
China Beach	
Da Nang	26
Vung Tau	31
Total	57

(13) Safety: Small arms safety was stresses to both new arrivals and all personnel already in the unit, in accordance with US/ARV emphasis in this area of safety.

b. Operations:

- (1) Deployment of the battalion and missions executed during this reporting period.
 - (a) Headquarters and Service Batteries:
- 1. During the entire reporting period, this headquarters was attached to the XXIV Corp Artillery with a tactical mission of GSR 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.
- 2. Headquarter and Service Batteries continued to provide the administrative and logistical support for this headquarters from their location at Gia Le Combat Base.
 - (b) Battery A (8inch Howitzer)
- 1. During this reporting period, Battery A made six (6) separate road marches to fire bases located within the 101^{st} Airborne Division (AM) Area of Operations. The battery remained under the fire and administrative control of this headquarters.
- 2. On 21 June 1969, the battery moved from FSB Cannon to FSB Blaze; on 3 July 1969, the battery moved one (1) howitzer to FSB Cannon for one (1) day artillery raid; on 16 July 1969, two (2) howitzers moved to FSB Cannon on a one (1) day raid to support operations in the A Shau Valley, and on 25 July 1969 A Btry moved one (1) howitzer to FSB Currahee to become the first heavy artillery in the A Shau Valley/
 - (c) Battery B (8 inch Howitzer)

B Battery remained at FSB Roy throughout the period and fired in support of operations along QL 1 and adjacent areas.

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(d) Battery C (175mm Gun)

- 1. During this period Battery C made 3 road marches to support operations within the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Area of Operations.
- 2. On 14 May 1969, the battery moved its base camp from FSB Bastogne to FSB Blaze and on 13 June 1969, the battery moved one (1) gun from FSB Blaze to FSB Cannon to conduct a four (4) day raid in support of operations in the A Shau Valley.

(2) Battalion Activities:

- $\hbox{(a) Normal operations consistent with the battalion mission were conducted during the reporting period.}$
- (b) The battalion has not had an artillery accident or incident in over twenty months.
 - (c) Operation Massachusetts Striker:
 - 1. This operation terminated 1200 hrs 9 May 69. Batteries A and C $\,$

fired in support of it.

2. A summary of missions and rounds expended during this reporting

period are as follows:

	8 inch	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	41	113
Rounds	417	545

- (d) Operation Kentucky Jumper:
- 1. This operation continued throughout this reporting period. Batteries B and C fired in support of this operation.
- 2. A summary of missions and rounds expended during this reporting period are as follows:

	8 inch	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	3909	32
Rounds	7756	57

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- (e) Operation Apache Snow:
- $1 \ \ \, \text{This operation began 1200 hours 9 May 69, and ended 2400 hrs 7} \\ \text{Jun 69. Batteries A and C were the participating batteries from this battalion.}$
 - 2 A summary of missions and rounds expended on this operation are

as follows:

	8 inch	<u>175mm</u>	
Missions	218	772	
Rounds	2270	2178	

- (f) Operation Montgomery Rendezvous:
- 1. This operation commenced 2400 hrs 7 Jun 69, and is still continuing. Batteries A and C are firing in support of it.
 - 2. A summary of missions and rounds expended on this operation are

as follows:

	8 inch	<u>175mm</u>	
Missions	1211	1589	
Rounds	2814	4127	

- (g) Operation Campbell Streamer:
- $1. \ \, \text{This operation commenced 0600 hrs 13 Jul 69, and continues} \\ \text{through the end of the period. B Battery provides heavy artillery support on this operation.}$
- 2. A summary of missions and rounds expended on this operation are as follows:

	8 inch	<u>175mm</u>
Missions	41	0
Rounds	310	0

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(3) Artillery Expenditures and Missions Fired:

	8 inch		<u>175mm</u>	
	<u>Missions</u>	Rounds	Missions	Rounds
Battery A	1470	5501		
Battery B	3950	8866		
Battery C			2506	6907
Total	5420	13567	2506	6907

(4) During the reporting period this unit participated in combat operations for 92 days.

c. Training:

- (1) On the job training continued in all units of the battalion during this reporting period.
- (2) All newly arrived replacement personnel received fourteen hours of instruction as outlined in the Battalion SOP.
- (3) This headquarters filled one (1) allocation to the XXIV Corps Artillery Fire Direction Officer School.
- (4) On 17 and 18 July 1969, XXIV Corps Judge Advocate General proxxxxed a two hour class to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the battalion on the Uniform Code of Military Justice Act of 1969, The Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention. A make up class is scheduled for 2 August 1969.
- (5) The Battery Commanders, Motor Sergeants, PLL Clerks, and TAERS (xxxx??) Clerks received two hours on instruction on DA Form 2406 and DA Form 2407 on 18 July 1969. The instruction was given by a maintenance technician from USARV.
- (6) Classes on organizational maintenance were conducted in the xxxxx(??) firing batteries during this reporting period. These classes dealt only with organizational maintenance of the guns/howitzers.

5. Intelligence:

(1) Daily intelligence reports are received from the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and XXIV Corps Artillery.

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- (2) HQ, XXIV Corps PERIINTREP 13-69, 14-69 and 15-69 currently provide enemy order of battle information applicable to the battalion.
- (3) The battalion frequently performs Visual Reconnaissance over areas previously fired upon to obtain as assessment of battle damage.
 - c. Logistics:
 - (1) Monthly deadline percentages: 26.8% Vehicles per day.
 - (2) Miles traveled by ammunition trains: 21, 169.
 - (3) Number of air sorties flown: Class I resupply 210 Class V resupply - 4
 - (4) Resupply:
 - (a) Class I 200 tons
 - (b) Class II and IV 150 tons
 - (c) Class III 15,727 gallons
 - (d) Class V 1957 tons by road 12 tons by air
- f. Communications: Shortages of repair parts at DS Maintenance level for the PRC/77 radios have caused excessive deadline time and has limited the use of secure FM transmissions in the battalion.
- g. Civic Action: During this reporting period B Battery donated some scrap lumber to a village nearby FSB Roy. This lumber was used by the people to repair their huts.
- 2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, evaluations and Recommendations.
 - a. (U) Personnel and Administration: None.
 - b. (C) Operations:
- (1) Item: Lesson Learned #1: Self Propelled Artillery Section Chief's Maintenance Course.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

(a) Observation: The increase requirements for maintenance on self propelled heavy artillery in RVN has necessitated a requirement for more knowledgeable section chiefs, gunners and assistant gunners to be assigned to heavy artillery units. This unit has received few personnel who have attended the Self Propelled Artillery Section Chief's Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma prior to arrival in RVN. Their knowledge of organizational maintenance is far superior to that of any of the other section chiefs in the battalion.

- (b) Evaluation: This course emphasizes the need for maintenance and shows the student how to perform the required maintenance. It makes the individual more aware of the maintenance required in the Southeast Asia Environment.
- (c) Recommendation: That all potential self propelled section chiefs, gunners and assistant gunners should be required to attend the above mentioned course before coming to RVN.
 - (2) Item: Lesson Learned #2: Deployment of heavy artillery by platoon.
- (a) Observation: The heavy artillery battalion dies not possess the capability to deploy by platoon for an extended period of time at a great distance. A separate platoon may operate effectively for a short period of time, but current TOE's do not provide sufficient equipment or personnel to sustain operations for an extended period.
- (b) Evaluation: In order to employ heavy artillery in platoon size units over great distances for an extended period of time the TOE would have to be augmented with additional fire direction equipment and personnel, radios, aiming circles, and officers. The current TOE provides the battery with the equipment and personnel to operate in one location on a twenty four hour basis. If a gun or platoon is deployed away from the battery location for an extended period the battery would require two (2) more aiming circles to provide sufficient checks on the lay of the gun, another fire direction set and radios for the FDC and sufficient personnel to operate another FDC on a twenty fours hour basis.
- (c) Recommendation: That if the Battalion TOE is not augmented with the personnel and equipment to conduct long distance / long duration raids that only short duration / shirt distance raids be conducted. This battalion has had success in conducting short duration / short distance raids of one (1) or two (2) guns lasting from one (1) to three (3) days. The battery FDC remains intact in the battery (-) position area and fire commands are transmitted by AM/VRC 46 radio to the guns. The weapons are accompanied to a forward >>

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

location by the battery XO, section personnel for the weapon(s), ammunition handlers and a security element large enough to secure the battery position. This solution would not be adequate over long distances or for an extended period of time.

c. (U) Training and Organizational: None.

d. (U) Intelligence: None.

e. (U) Logistics: None.

f. (C) Organization:

(1) Item: Lesson Learned #3: Reorganization of the Battalion Train.

(a) Observation: Due to the widespread battery locations and the poor trafficability of roads leading to these locations it is often impossible to transport ammunition in any vehicle other than the M548 Cargo Carrier.

(b) Evaluation: The battalion is authorized twelve (12) M548 Cargo Carriers by TOE. These vehicles are authorized in the firing batteries ona basis of one per gun/howitzer section. Although this gives the battalion the vehicles it needs, there is no centralized control over them. To remedy this situation this battalion placed six (6) of those M548 Cargo Carriers under the control of the Battalion Ammunition Section, leaving two (2) per firing battery. The drivers of those vehicles were attached to Service Battery. This gives the Battalion Ammunition Section the capability of resupplying the batteries under other than ideal conditions. It also allows the vehicles to be made available to the battery that has the greatest need for them for moves or resupply. This solution has proved very satisfactory.

(c) Recommendation: In a situation where poor road conditions exist and the battalion ammunition section is required to make all resupplies by road, that the battery relocate several M 548'd at the battalion ammunition section to achieve centralized control and efficient resupply for all batteries.

g. (U) Civil Affairs: None.

h. (C) Signal:

(1) Item: Lesson Learned #4: Relocation of AM/GRC 142 radios.

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(a) Observation: The AM/GRC 142 radio is issued on the TOE as one (1) per firing battery and two (2) for the Battalion Headquarters. The basis of issue of these radios is the secure transmission of nuclear fire mission. In this unit it has been found that these radios are of little use to an artillery battery in Vietnam. The roads that these radios must travel are extremely rough and jar the components severely enroute to the fire bases. Also the cramped areas on the fire bases cause the radios to be parked in close proximity to the 8 inch or 175mm guns firing in a 6400 mil environment. As a result, the blast effect from the firing of these guns causes severe damage to both the radio set and teletype equipment within the van.

(b) Evaluation: In view of all of the facts, the battalion had pulled all of the AM/GRC 142 radios into the battalion headquarters area. Attempts were made to use this equipment for an Administrative/Logistics duty (??), however, the down time, caused by the facts discussed above, was found to be excessive.

- (c) Recommendations: That nuclear capable battalions located in Vietnam be authorized to turn in their AM/GRC 142 radios.
 - i. (U) Survival, Escape and Evasion: None.

CECIL R. SYKES LTC, FA COMMANDING AVIIB-ATC (2 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

Headquarter, XXIV Corps Artillery, ATTN: AVII-ATC, APO San Francisco 96308 21 August 1969.

- TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO San Francisco 96308
- 1. (U) The ORLL of the 1^{st} Battalion, 83d Artillery is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.
- 2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs except as indicated below, and subject to comment provided.
- a. Reference item concerning Communications, page 10, paragraph 1f. DS and GS maintenance units have initiated action to obtain float PRC-77 radios to alleviate this situation.
- b. Reference item concerning Self-Propelled Artillery Section Chief's Maintenance Course, page 10, paragraph 2b(1). Concur in part. Attendance at this course is desirable for all key personnel of self-propelled artillery sections; however it is realized that attendance of all personnel is impractical. Maintenance training at unit level should be fully exploited to train all section members. IN addition, support commanders are responsible to requests for training assistance e.g., two DA representatives are presently assisting the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery with their maintenance program. Recommend that as many 13B40s (E6 and E7) be sent to this course as practical.
- c. Reference item concerning Employment of Heavy Artillery by Platoon, page 11, paragraph 2b(2). Concur. This item will be disseminated to units within Corps Artillery via information letter. Recommend dissemination in a similar matter throughout Vietnam by HQs USARV.
- d. Reference item concerning Reorganization of the Battalion Ammunition Train, page 12, paragraph 2f(1). Concur. Paragraph 40 of FM 6-40 provides guidelines on this item. No further action is recommended.
- e. Reference item concerning Relocation of AN/GRC 142 Radios, page 12 and 13, paragraph 2h(1). Concur in part. USARV Reg 310-32 and USARV message 52278, 210224 Mar 69, outlines procedures required for turn-in of unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment. A minimum of 2 AN/GRC 142 radios must be maintained at battalion headquarters, so that the battalion had capability >>>

AVIIB-GCT (1 Aug 69) 2nd Ind

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO SF 96308 31 August 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO SF 96375

- 1. The ORLL of the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery had been review at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.
- 2. Except for the comment below, Concur with the report as indorsed bt XXIV Corps Artillery.

Reference item concerning Relocation of AN/GRC 142 Radios, page 12 and 13, paragraph 2h(1). Equipment of this type is susceptible to damage from blast effect if placed in close proximity of the guns without additional protection. Proper revetment would preclude much of the damage. Any specific deficiencies noted in Radio Teletypewriter Set, AN/GRC-142 should be reported on an EIR (Equipment Improvement Request).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. D. PECCO MAJ, AGC Asst AG AVIIB-DST (1 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report Headquarter, 1st Battalion, 83d Field Artillery for

Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTER, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

- 1. This headquarter has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery.
- 2. Reference item concerning "Deployment of heavy artillery by platoon:, section IIO, page 11, paragraph 2b(2); concur. Short term augmentations to the unit MTOE for the conduct of long distance or long duration raids can be accomplished by the temporary loan of equipment and by the temporary assignment of additional personnel, preferably from within resources of the next higher headquarters. Action to change the MTOE is not considered to be appropriate because MTOE changes are intended for more permanent type requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson 1LT, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: 1st Bn, 83d FA HQ, XXIV Corps GPOP-DT (1 Aug 69) 4th Ind

Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion, 83d Field Artillery for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR 65 (RI) (U) SUBJECT:

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. TUCKER CPT, AGC Asst AG