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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (23 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702217 30 July 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

AD 510561

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. SECTION 1 - Operations: Significant Activities	
a. Command and Organization	1
b. Intelligence and Counterintelligence	2
c. Operations	11
d. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline	18
e. Logistics	18
f. Inspector General	20
g. Information	20
h. Command History	20
i. Army Aviation	20
j. Signal	21
k. Engineers	24
l. PSYOPS, Civil Affairs	28
m. Corps Artillery	31
II. SECTION 2 - Lessons Learned	35
III. Inclosures	
1. Roster of Key Personnel (wd HQ, DA)	
2. Troop List of XXIV Corps Units	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO San Francisco 96349

AVII-GCT

23 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS GSPOR-65 (R2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

i. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) Command and Organization

(1) (U) Command

(a) On 9 March 1970, Headquarters, XXIV Corps displaced from Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), to Camp Horn in Da Nang, RVN, and assumed operational control of the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ).

(b) On 9 March 1970, Major General George S. Bowman, Jr. USMC, assumed the duties of Deputy Corps Commander, XXIV Corps.

(2) (U) Organization

(a) The following units became OPCON to XXIV Corps on 9 March 1970:

212th Avn Bn
Co G, 5th Special Forces Gp
Combined Action Forces (CAF)
7th Psychological Ops Bn
Americal Div
III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)

(b) The 48th Chemical Det was assigned to XXIV Corps on 2 February 1970.

(c) The 108th Artillery Gp was assigned to XXIV Corps on 28 February 1970.

(d) The 29th Civil Affairs Co was assigned to XXIV Corps on 9 March 1970.

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b. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(1) (C) General Enemy Situation

(a) Summary: The most significant development within the reporting period was the increased tactical posture assumed by NVA units in the mountain region of Northern XXIV Corps AO and along the Central DMZ. Although no substantial reinforcement of the DMZ area was noted, the deployment south of the DMZ of two NVA Regt's, the 246th and the 27th, significantly altered the relative combat power in the area north and west of the FSB Fuller - Camp Carroll - Mai Loc area. In addition, the recent infiltration of the 66th NVA Regt from Laos into the upper reaches of the Da Krong Valley posed a threat to this area from the south. In Military Region Tri Thien - Hue, the 802d and 29th NVA Regt's in Western Thua Thien (P) and the 812th Regt to the north advanced steadily eastward toward base areas (BA) 114 and 101 respectively and engaged in developing the western mountains into a fortress from which to launch multiregimental operations into the lowlands, or as an alternative, to provide a base from which to support an expanded guerrilla warfare movement in the lowlands. Rehabilitation of old base areas and construction of new ones were also evident in the western part of Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai (P) but to a lesser degree. In those provinces, the VC local forces and guerrilla units remained sufficiently strong to prosecute the war at a level suitable to the enemy, while NVA units remained relatively inactive in base areas to the west.

(b) Quang Tri (P)

1 In February, enemy activity in Quang Tri (P) was characterized by harassment of Allied installations and operations south of the DMZ and the deployment of enemy forces throughout the western areas of Quang Tri (P). In the eastern DMZ area, enemy activity took the form of numerous attacks-by-fire and mining, probably involving elements of the 84th NVA Arty Regt and 31st Local Force Gp. No major ground contacts were reported.

2 Along the central DMZ there were numerous attacks-by-fire and several major ground contacts with elements of the 27th NVA Regt supported by elements of the 84th Arty Regt.

3 Enemy propaganda, proselyting and terrorism surged throughout the Quang Tri (P) lowlands just prior to Tet. The 31st Local Force Gp (LFGP) supported local force VC operating around Gio Linh, Cam Lo, and Mai Loc. The 126th Naval Sapper Regt continued mining activities on the Cua Viet LOC.

4 Contacts in the former BA #101 uncovered the forward CP of the 7th Front and several caches. PW's reported elements of the 7th Front as well as the 6th Bn/812th NVA Regt located in the Da Krong Valley.

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5 In Western Quang Tri (P), enemy activity was detected west of the Rockpile and FSB Sarge. PW's reported that elements of the 246th Regt, 84th Rkt Arty Regt, and 75th (AA) Bn/B5 Front were to attack Camp Carroll, FSB Fuller, FSB Pike and the Rockpile in the near future.

6 Enemy logistical activity during February and March, was heavy along Rte 616 with indications of road extensions north of the Laotian salient. The 812th Regt secured supply lines from this LOC toward the 7th Front and 6th NVA Regt to the east. In March, ground reconnaissance around Khe Sanh sighted several enemy elements and captured documents identifying support units and possibly the 66th Regt of the 304th NVA Div.

7 Contacts and attacks-by-fire continued during March, in the central DMZ with elements of the 27th NVA Regt. On 12 March, 1st ARVN Div was attacked by enemy sappers near the Khe Gio bridge (YD 026562). A contact on 14 March, north of this attack (YD 015586) resulted in 55 NVA KIA and probably involved the 27th or 246th NVA Regt's supported by sapper elements.

8 During March, the enemy continued to harass Allied forces in the eastern DMZ area with attacks-by-fire and mining. On 27 and 28 March, contacts southwest of Gio Linh identified the K12 Sapper Co and 6th Co/27th Bn of 31st Local Force Gp.

9 The level of enemy-initiated activity remained low in the Quang Tri lowlands and the 7th Front AO throughout March, although the La Vang area received 8x122mm rkt's on 23 March, probably from the K34 Rkt Arty Bn/7th Front.

10 The apparent first phase of a long awaited enemy offensive began in late March, with the deployment of all 3 battalions of the 27th NVA Regt into the central DMZ area. On 29 March, 3d Bn, 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div engaged an estimated 2 enemy companies northeast of FSB Fuller (YD 040610) resulting in 81 NVA KIA. On 1 April the enemy began heavy attacks-by-fire along the DMZ. On 3-4 April, 1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech) was in contact with an unknown size enemy force southeast of LZ Sparrow (YD 0563) resulting in 51 NVA KIA. On 6 April, the enemy began shelling FSB Fuller with 120mm mortar, with a peak of 70 rds of 120mm reported received on 13 April. Arty elements of the B5 Front probably supported the 27th Regt in these attacks.

11 In the eastern DMZ area, Allied installations also received a considerable number of mortar and rocket attacks-by-fire beginning on 1 April. Terrorism, mining and harassing attacks around Gio Linh, Dong Ha and the Cua Viet increased during the second week in April, representing a surge of activity by the 31st Gp and 12th Naval Sapper Regt.

12 On 9 April, elements of 3d Sqdn, 5th Armed Cav received an enemy attack southwest of Quang Tri City (YD 193456) resulting in 33 NVA KIA and 1 PW. The enemy unit was tentatively identified as an element of the 8th Bn/66th Regt/304th NVA Div, confirming the deployment of elements of the 304th

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NVA Div into the Ba Long Valley.

13 On 10 April, Mai Loc CIDG Camp received a sapper attack resulting in 19 enemy KIA. Enemy elements involved in this attack possibly included the 6th Co/33d Sapper Bn and elements of the 9th Bn and 24th Sapper Co/ 66th Regt.

14 In the 7th Front AO, a sapper attack by elements of the K10 Sapper Bn, K8 and K14 Inf Bn's/7th Front was launched against FSB Nancy on 13 April resulting in 71 enemy KIA and 9 PW's.

15 A rallier from the H 99 Local Force Co of Hai Lang (D) indicated that enemy activity in the Quang Tri lowlands involving both VC and NVA Front units may increase in conjunction with the Spring rice harvest.

16 Allied air and ground reconnaissance of the Khe Sanh plateau and Da Krong Valley noted increased enemy security of his bases and LOC's. Route 616 continued to carry moderate to heavy vehicular traffic across the Vietnamese salient. Signs of preliminary road work east to the Da Krong River (vic YD 096290) indicated further extension of Rte 616 towards the 7th Front.

17 In summary, during the last quarter year the enemy has harassed and engaged Allied forces south of the DMZ with elements of the 27th, 31st and 246th Regt's using artillery and sapper support from other B5 Front units. The enemy has infiltrated the 66th and 812th Regt's into the Da Krong and Ba Long Valleys to reinforce the 7th Front and establish a divisional equivalent threat in central Quang Tri (P). The enemy's April highpoint is probably a prelude to further enemy offensives in the near future.

(c) Thua Thien (P)

1 During this reporting period enemy activity continued at its previously reported low level of the last period. However, activity rose to a relatively high level in late March and early April.

2 In February, enemy activity was concentrated in eastern BA 611 and western A Shau and A Loui Valley regions. Visual reconnaissance and photography detected increased truck movement on eastern sections of Rte 922 and 548 as elements of the 803d Regt, 29th Regt, and the 6th Regt continued their logistical buildup and their attempt to secure LOC's into the piedmont. The first incident of anti-aircraft weapons was noted in the A Shau Valley during the month. This substantiated belief that the enemy has serious intentions of protecting his infiltration and logistical activities which would firmly entrench him in the western Tri Thien region. Ground activity remained low in February, with elements of the 5th Regt initiating rocket attacks on FSB Birmingham and Hue. The 4th Regt conducted squad size contacts in the area of the "Bowling Alley" in Phu Loc (D) and was probably

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4

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responsible for the mining of the Hue-Da Nang RR twice during the month.

3 During the first few weeks of March, activity remained at a low level. Enemy activity remained centered on logistical efforts while Allied air strikes increased in an effort to interdict his advance. Sporadic attacks-by-fire were initiated by the enemy as he rocketed FSB Bastogne and Camp Eagle with little damage resulting. During the latter half of March, a captured document, which seemed to be substantiated by the nature of enemy activity at the time, revealed the NVA intentions to build up base areas in Western Thua Thien (P) into an invincible sanctuary from which to conduct operations against GVN and Allied forces as well as the pacification program. It also indicated that perhaps a major offensive would not take place until the US troop withdrawal produced a situation more favorable to the NVA/VC concerned. Until this situation develops, attacks-by-fire and sapper tactics utilizing economy of force will be the rule. The latter part of March witnessed increased Allied force elements moving west into the mountain regions to engage the enemy. By the end of March, the 29th Regt established itself west of FSB Bastogne while the 803d Regt moved into the area just northwest of the 29th Regt.

4 The month of April saw enemy activity hit its highest level yet as Allied forces moving into the western mountain region met stiff resistance. The enemy took the offensive in many contacts as he sought to protect his base areas and fix Allied units in the piedmont in a defensive posture, thus allowing enemy forces greater freedom of movement into the lowlands. The concentration of activity was in the region of FSB Ripcord with elements of the 6th Regt and in the region of FSB Veghel with the 29th Regt. The Chi Thua I and II Sapper Bn/5th Regt were located in the eastern piedmont after they attacked FSB Arsenal and FSB Anzio respectively.

5 Finally, a PW from the 803d Regt revealed that its units were conducting logistical support activity in the movement of supplies east into the piedmont. It is felt, however, that the 803d and the 29th Regt's have the mission to engage Allied units in the western areas thus allowing elements of the 6th and 5th Regt's as well as the 4th Regt to infiltrate into the lowlands.

(d) Quang Nam (P)

1 With the exception of the 1 April highpoint, which witnessed a marked increase in enemy offensive efforts throughout XXIV Corps AO, enemy initiated activity in Quang Nam (P) remained generally light during the reporting period.

2 The first 30 days of 1970 produced a myriad of intelligence in the form of agent reports, documents and PW interrogations which provided strong evidence that the enemy was intent on launching another offensive to coincide with the 1970 Tet Holiday period. However, no such offensive operations materialized.

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3 While major enemy tactical units remained out of contact with friendly forces, the enemy continued to make his presence known in the eastern portion of the province. There were a substantial number of sightings by 1st Marine Division (MARDIV) Reconnaissance units. Also, local force and guerrilla units remained active by launching occasional harassing attacks-by-fire and by continuing propaganda, coercion, proselyting, and acts of terrorism directed particularly against GVN officials as well as refugee and resettlement camps in an attempt to gain popular support and enhance their campaign to disrupt the pacification and Vietnamization operations.

4 The only noteworthy contact during the first part of February was friendly initiated and occurred seven kilometers south of Hoi An City (BT 011501) on 1 February, when a Regional Force Company killed 65 enemy believed to have been from the T-89th Sapper Battalion, the V-25 Main Force Battalion or the Q-80 District Armed Unit.

5 As the month progressed, attention remained focused on the extreme southeastern quarter of the province astride the Quang Nam/Quang Tin province boundary where the ARVN launched the highly successful, combined armor/infantry operation Duong Son 3/70. During the period 15-21 February, ARVN and RF forces participating in this operation succeeded in decimating the T-89th Sapper and the V-25 Infantry Bn's as well as inflicting substantial casualties on the 70th Local Force Bn. Activity within the province during the remainder of the month was extremely light. However, numerous reconnaissance sightings of small enemy forces continued to be reported, particularly in the Arizona area.

6 The entire month of March failed to produce any large-scale ground confrontations as small scale actions dominated the Quang Nam (P) battlefield. The same general pattern of enemy activity which prevailed within the province during the previous month continued to characterize enemy efforts. Attacks against refugee camps and resettlement hamlets continued to be a favorite VC tactic as the enemy pursued efforts to erode the people's confidence in the GVN's ability to provide adequate protection.

7 Toward the latter part of March, an increasing body of intelligence developed within the Corps indicating that the end of March would witness a limited enemy "highpoint" which would signal the first stage of a multi-phased campaign, designated K700, designed to disrupt the GVN pacification program.

8 This intelligence was confirmed during the early morning hours of 1 April when enemy forces, predominately VC local forces and guerrilla units, launched a series of light attacks-by-fire interspersed with a few small ground attacks throughout the eastern portion of the province in conjunction with a limited RVN-wide offensive. With the exception of sporadic rocket

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attacks against the Da Nang vital area (which continued during the course of the following several days) the offensive effort in Quang Nam (P) was short-lived as enemy activity soon returned to the low levels experienced prior to April and remained at those levels throughout the rest of April.

2 Shortly after this offensive subsided, intelligence reports alluding to a second phase of the K700 campaign later in April began to surface. Analysis of intelligence to date indicates the period late April/early May as the most likely time frame to execute the second phase of the offensive.

(a) Quang Tin (P)

1 Enemy activity in Quang Tin (P) during the period 1 February to 31 March was of an extremely low level. Main Force VC and NVA units found their areas of operation increasingly interdicted by the pressure of a successful Allied Pacification Program. Most of these units gradually disengaged themselves and retreated further to the west where the rugged terrain supported few Allied operations and they were safe to train and re-equip. The 70th Local Force Bn as well as the 72d and V-25 Bn's remained on the northeastern coast of the province in an effort to monopolize the forthcoming rice harvest in that area; this was considered vital to future operations. To the great dismay of these units, ARVN forces, specifically the 2/17 and 3/17 ACAT's and the 37th and 39th Ranger Bn's, supported by Regional and Popular Force Units, initiated Operation Duong Son 3-70 in that very region in late February. Enemy losses were the largest seen in the last several months. In a two day contact over 160 enemy casualties were confirmed. Even under this severe pressure the enemy forces in the area remained in place, although captured documents and prisoner of war interrogations revealed that several companies were reformed or consolidated due to their heavy losses.

2 In the meantime trail networks and corridors were strengthened and increased efforts were made by District Units, by direction of the Quang Nam Province Unit, to protect them from Allied interdiction. Local guerrillas were to receive the main burden of this assignment. In addition, it appeared plain that cache sites were moved out of areas subject to Allied operations and back into the mountainous, forested areas of central and western Quang Tin.

3 The enemy surge initiated on 31 March, and usually referred to as a "phase" of the K700 Campaign, followed closely the tactics seen in both Quang Nam and Quang Ngai (P), i.e., a large number of sapper type attacks by local guerrilla units on GVN controlled hamlets, outposts and refugee camps supported in some instances by attacks-by-fire on the part of selected Main Force Units. QL-1 was interdicted in several areas, and some large US installations in the Province received attacks-by-fire followed by sapper attacks.

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4 The surge lasted through 3 April, at which time enemy activity returned to a low level. Enemy forces in the province turned to collection and storage of rice which was being harvested. Political cadre, however, have not missed the opportunity to capitalize on the recent "highpoint" in an effort to re-establish some control in previously pacified areas. Evidence continues to point to another series of enemy surges, perhaps beginning as soon as early May, in which the enemy will continue his attempt to destroy the Allied Pacification Program.

(f) Quang Ngai (P)

1 Until 31 March, enemy contact in the province was very low as if the VC or NVA forces were only fighting in order to protect areas they felt they could not allow to be interdicted by Allied operations, such as caches, base camps, and hospital or dispensary areas. It is now becoming plain that during this time the whole enemy command and control structure throughout Quang Ngai (P) was altered. More and more emphasis was placed on rejuvenation of the hamlet guerrilla recruiting programs. Local force and local front forces were refitted and their manpower replenished, often at the expense of Main Force and District Units. This was a period of consolidation in the face of the ever increasing pressure of the Allied Pacification Program. District and Inter-district Committees were broken up into three man cells and sent to rural hamlet areas on the fringes of GVN control to reinstitute communist doctrine and the VC cause at a local level. Because of this, the amount of enemy military activity was necessarily severely curtailed. As an example, enemy initiated contacts during February decreased sharply from January figures.

2 During this period the last battalion of the 22d NVA Regt and elements of the 3d NVA Div moved south into Binh Dinh (P). The 2d NVA Regt and 3d Div Headquarters and Support elements had previously moved south during late 1969, to support local force elements and the 18th NVA Regt/3d NVA Div which was already operating in the II Corps Area. Reasons for this southward shift of the 3d NVA Div are not clear at this time.

3 Enemy activity during the first three weeks of March generally followed February's example. Captured documents and prisoners of war, however, gave the first admissions of an enemy surge or "highpoint" to commence near the end of the month. The main target of this increase in enemy activity was the Pacification Program.

4 On 31 March, the enemy surge did take place in the form of integrated attacks-by-fire and ground attacks on US and ARVN installations, RF and PF outposts, refugee camps and pacified hamlets throughout Quang Ngai Province, mostly by local guerrilla units with some support by Main force units. These units used sapper type tactics which they had recently been taught by instructors who visited their area under the direction of HQ. MR 5. The

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The highpoint lasted through 3 April, after which enemy activity decreased to a level approaching that which existed prior to the end of March. This decline was attributed in part to the beginning of the rice harvest to which most units turned their immediate attention. Also, enemy ordnance stores were severely depleted and had to be restocked. Enemy targets for the future, however, remain the same. Sapper type economy of force tactics will continue to be employed, and destruction of the Allied Pacification Program will remain the enemy's goal.

(2) (C) Intelligence Collection

(a) General: The collection division (Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Ground Reconnaissance, Ground Surveillance and Technical Intelligence) continued to provide timely, collateral intelligence information to the G2. Shortly after the assumption of command of US Forces in all of ICTZ, collection tasking was formalized to cope with the increased span of control and additional intelligence collection resources made available to XXIV Corps. A new Intelligence Collection Plan with a new Essential Elements of Information (EII) was published, and the Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) program was revitalized. The division evaluated and distributed ten COMUSMACV SICR's and published four XXIV Corps SICR's during the period.

(b) Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW)

1 Extensive liaison was conducted with organizations previously not in the XXIV Corps AO to insure a smooth transition of command throughout the interrogation community in I Corps. These organizations included Sector Headquarters and Chieu Hoi Centers in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai (P's), Combined Interrogation Center, GVN National Police, Military Security Service, USMC Interrogator-Interpreter Teams, Combined Action Groups, Pacification Security Coordination Division, Americal Div, 2nd ARVN Div, 2nd ROK Marine Corps Bde, I ARVN Corps Headquarters, U.S. Navy and Air Force Intelligence Teams and CORDS.

2 To effectively manage the increased amount of information obtained from these additional interrogation assets, procedures were formalized for passing information to the Intelligence Division.

(c) Ground Reconnaissance

1 Aggressive ground reconnaissance in the XXIV Corps AO continued to produce positive results as 565 ground reconnaissance patrols were conducted with intelligence collection missions. Results of these patrols produced 460 sightings totaling over 4460 enemy personnel and 114 contacts. These contacts, plus air and artillery strikes in response to enemy sightings,

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resulted in 436 enemy KIA in addition to providing intelligence data on numerous personnel movements and locations of enemy concentrations.

2 This quarter witnessed an increasingly effective counter-reconnaissance screen by the enemy to deny access to specific areas by targeting insertion and extraction aircraft, placing LZ watches, tracking and ambush-ing patrols and emplacing mines and booby traps to destroy reconnaissance assets. Ground reconnaissance also observed an increase of security along enemy logistic corridors and at cache sites and storage areas.

3 This quarter also witnessed the initiation of training programs to provide ARVN units within the XXIV Corps AO with a long range reconnaissance capability, to include classroom as well as field training. US units worked closely with ARVN units to provide aircraft support for the ARVN long range reconnaissance program.

(d) Ground Surveillance: The Ground Surveillance Branch assumed responsibility for the Duel Blade, Duffel Bag and Tight Jaw sensor programs for entire ICTZ upon the change of command with III MAF. Total sensors employed within I Corps increased from 900 to 1650 during the period.

(e) Technical Intelligence

1 During the period the only significant items captured were one Chicom G5 generator, one Chicom 102E radio, one Chicom receiver 139 and some miscellaneous spare parts. These items were captured when a 14th Coastal Gp element detected two sampans attempting to evade apprehension for curfew violation. Only one sampan was captured.

2 A modification of an East German plastic mine P-60 was detected in the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) AO. The top of the plastic mine was cut all the way through around the detonator, so only nine pounds of pressure was required for detonation instead of the normal 400 pounds.

3 During this reporting period a total of 177 war trophy items were registered by the Technical Intelligence Branch. These included 89 rifles, 38 pistols and 50 miscellaneous items such as knives and crossbows.

(3) (C) Counterintelligence

(a) During this reporting period the G2 Security Division primarily worked with the transferring of local counterintelligence (CI) assets pertaining to the Phu Bai area and Thua Thien (P) to the 101st MID, CI Section, and picking up CI assets from the III MAF Staff CI. Assets turned over to the 101st CI dealt specifically with area files for Thua Thien (P) and pertained primarily to the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and local informants

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of the early warning network for Phu Bai Combat Base. The CI assets obtained by the Security Division from the III MAF Staff CI concerned primarily the VCI in I Corps. Also during this reporting period, Security Division held its first monthly CI conference for CI agencies operating in the Da Nang area. The topics discussed pertained to the Da Nang area and included problems encountered and lessons learned.

(b) Liaison was established with all intelligence collection agencies of all services in the Da Nang area. Liaison contact is on a daily basis and a distribution drop is maintained in the office of the Security Division to facilitate the flow of information among CI agencies in the Da Nang area.

(c) Security: A great deal of emphasis was placed on destruction of official waste in order to deny the enemy classified and unclassified but useful information, i.e. personal letters, official rosters and maps. Daily checks of classified destruction areas revealed that more emphasis and rigid control of classified document destruction is needed.

(4) (U) Weather

(a) Det 37, 5th Weather Squadron is subdivided into three main units, each supporting a specific portion of Allied operations in the I Corps AO. HQ Det 37 is responsible for the weather support given to the Commanding General of XXIV Corps. Operating locations 6 and 7 are responsible for providing support for all subordinate US Army units (101st Abn Div (AMBL); 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); and the Americal Div) and ARVN and NOK units in the Corps AO.

(b) Army operations for which weather support was provided by units of Det 37 for the three month period were: Randolph Glen, Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Iron Mountain and Nantucket Beach. Indirect support was furnished to Army units by giving bombing data to 7th Air Force aircraft for tactical operations in the I Corps AO.

(c) Several combat assaults were postponed for short periods of time due to weather. Of particular importance was the weather hold on a combat assault (Operation Pears) in the area of FSB Ripcord. This operation was scheduled for 17 March 1970, but was postponed for 21 days due to low ceilings and poor visibility. When the weather broke the operation was brought to a successful conclusion.

c. (C) Plans, Operations and Training

(1) (C) Boundary Changes

(a) The 1st MARDIV and 101st Abn Div (AMBL) permanent boundary was realigned effective 151200H February 1970. The realignment extended the 101st Abn Div (AMBL), TAOI further south and east into the 1st MARDIV TAOI. In the south the change started at the province boundary between Thua Thien and

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Quang Nam (P) ZC076910, then east to ZC896912 and due north to the South China Sea.

(b) The 1st MARDIV Recon Zone, until 28 February 1970, extended to the west only as far as an approximate trace north and south along the YC AC 00 Line through Quang Nam (P). As of 1 February 1970, the Recon Zone for the 1st MARDIV, was extended to include all the territory to the Laotian border in Quang Nam (P), less CIDG TAOR's.

(c) At 160600H April 1970, the 101st Abn Div (AMBL), and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) permanent boundary was realigned as follows: from its previous boundary at YD441345, southwest to YD425326, southwest to YD340290, northwest to the south bank of the Quang Tri River at YD254431, southwest along the south bank of the river to YD203403, southwest to YD190394, west to YD180395, northwest to YD100407, northwest to YD090410, northwest to YD070420, south to YD070400, west to YD900400 and north to southern DMZ boundary at YD900641. This realignment increased the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) TAOI by approximately one third of its original size.

(2) The following operations terminated during the report period:

(a) RANDOLPH GLEN

This operation was designated to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches and base camps within the 101st Abn Div (AMBL) AO, and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. This operation commenced 7 December 1969, and terminated 31 March 1970, with the following results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IMC</u>	<u>CSNG</u>
17	373	1	253	480	73	18

(b) The 2d ROK Marine Corps Bde, conducted numerous search and clear, and ambush operations within their AO to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and base camp areas. The following are the results of the Brigade's operations:

1 VICTORY DRAGON XIX

Initiated: 1 January 1970

Terminated: 28 February 1970

Center of mass: BT 1757

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Units: 1st, 2d, 3d and 5th Bn's

Results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>RETURNEES</u>	<u>IWC</u>
2	13	20	9	5	11

2 VICTORY DRAGON XIX-2

Initiated: 25 January 1970

Terminated: 8 February 1970

Center of mass: BT 0662

Units: 1st Bn

Results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>WIA</u>		<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSMC</u>
8		40	23	24	5

3 VICTORY DRAGON XIX-21

Initiated: 31 January 1970

Terminated: 10 February 1970

Center of mass: BT 0151

Unit: 2d Bn

Results:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>
1	3	1

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4 VICTORY DRAGON 20-31

Initiated: 4 February 1970

Terminated: 11 February 1970

Center of mass: BT 1154

Unit: 3d Bn

Results:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

WIA

KIA

3

1

5 GOLDEN DRAGON

Initiated: 1 April 1970

Terminated: 15 April 1970

Center of mass: BT 0360

Units: 1st, 2d, 3d and 5th Bn's

Results:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

WIA

KIA

DET

IWC

CSWC

5

67

100

50

4

(3) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph (g) below.

(a) TEXAS STAR

This operation is designed to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, caches and base camps and interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. The 101st Abn Div (AMBL) continues its active participation in support of the accelerated pacification program in Thua Thien (P). Operations are conducted in close coordination with Sector forces to include RF, PF, PSDF, NPFF and PRU to deny the enemy access to their sources of supply. This operation commenced on 1 April 1970.

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(b) NANTUCKET BEACH

This operational nickname is given to the current search and clear operations conducted jointly by the 198th Inf Bde, Americal Div and the 6th Regt, 1st AVN Div, in the area between the Batangan Peninsula and Quang Ngai City, to destroy VC units, eliminate the VCI and political apparatus and to restore GVN control. This operation commenced on 20 July 1969.

(c) FREDERICK HILL

Commenced on 18 March 1969, in Quang Tin (P) by elements of the 196th Inf Bde, Americal Div. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with GVN forces. The Americal Div is the controlling headquarters.

(d) GENEVA PARK

Commenced on 18 March 1969, in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai (P) by elements of the 198th Inf Bde, Americal Div. This operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with GVN forces. Americal Div is the controlling headquarters.

(e) IRON MOUNTAIN

Commenced on 18 March 1969, in Quang Ngai (P) by elements of the 11th Bde, Americal Div. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with GVN forces. Americal Div is the controlling headquarters.

(f) GREEN RIVER

Commenced on 20 January 1970, within the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) AO. The operation was initiated to conduct search and clear, reconnaissance in force and ambush operations. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) is the controlling headquarters.

(g) Statistical data of current operations:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>STARTING DATE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
TEXAS STAR	1 April 1970	80	443
NANTUCKET BEACH	20 July 1969	35	377

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>STARTING DATE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
FREDERICK HILL	18 March 1969	450	2683
GENEVA PARK	18 March 1969	143	1009
IRON MOUNTAIN	18 March 1969	336	1965
GREEN RIVER	20 January 1970	19	416

ENEMY

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>STARTING DATE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>RET</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSHC</u>
TEXAS STAR	1 April 1970	344	3	8	127	19
NANTUCKET BEACH	20 July 1969	341	13	289	103	4
FREDERICK HILL	18 March 1969	5223	64	1340	855	115
GENEVA PARK	18 March 1969	1461	36	922	267	33
IRON MOUNTAIN	18 March 1969	3027	17	1634	730	69
GREEN RIVER	20 January 1970	270	-	482	74	19

(4) TASK FORCE CLEARWATER

(a) Task Force Clearwater patrol units detected 57,958 vessels on the inland waterways of NICFZ during this reporting period. They boarded and searched 18,515 and inspected 38,620 without boarding; 69,173 persons were checked for proper identification, and 362 were detained.

(b) During this reporting period several functional and organizational changes took place within Clearwater, including:

- 1 Task Force Clearwater headquarters was moved to Tan My.
- 2 Task Force Clearwater Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) was established at Cua Viet.
- 3 The Cua Viet LOC was closed to logistic traffic.
- 4 The Dong Ha River Security Group was reorganized to use the same craft scheduled for turn-over to the Vietnamese Navy.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 All Clearwater PBR's were moved to Tan My.

6 Responsibility for Harbor Security of the Tan My Port was assumed, and the necessary craft and personnel were provided.

7 A mine warfare on the job training program was established at Cua Viet for the Vietnamese Navy.

(c) A major effort has been the preparation of patrol and minesweeping craft for turnover to the Vietnamese Navy, training of the crews to man the craft and coordinating the construction of permanent facilities to house and maintain the enlarged Vietnamese Navy in NICTZ. The Coastal Group 11 base at Cua Viet is being enlarged to support the additional 100 men and 19 boats of MID-92. The Coastal Group 12 base at Thuan An is being enlarged to support the 20 PBR's of RPC-60, and maintenance facilities are being built to support all VNN craft in the Hue area. It is planned to turn over all patrol craft in the Hue area on 30 May 1970, and the patrol craft at Cua Viet and minesweeping craft for both areas will be turned over on 30 June 1970.

(d) Despite the closing of the Cua Viet IOC, the enemy continues to mine the river. During this reporting period 16 water mines were detonated, and 3 craft were damaged. On 7 February 1970, 3 men were killed and 5 wounded when an LCM-6 hit a mine. On 7 March 1970, a Vietnamese Navy Junk from CG-11 was destroyed by a mine killing 3 of the crew and seriously wounding the other 1 crew member. An ARVN LCM-8 was mined on 4 April 1970, wounding 8 persons, but the craft was beached and later salvaged. Eight mines or mine parts were recovered on land sweeps following enemy contact, were turned in by Vietnamese civilians or dragged from the river with mine sweeping gear. Mining activity appears to be increasing on the Cua Viet River. A record 13 mines have been found so far in April 1970.

(e) The remains of the YFU-62, which was mined and sunk in the Cua Viet River in early 1969, was cut up by explosives and driven down enough to remove any hazard to navigation on the river. The YOG-76 which was mined and sunk in the Cua Viet Harbor in November 1969, was re-floated and towed to Da Nang.

(f) Continued emphasis is placed on Civic Action programs, and Medcaps are conducted regularly throughout the Clearwater Area of Operations. Patrol units conducted a total of 68 Medcaps in villages along the inland waterways of NICTZ this quarter. Broadcasts of distributed PSYOPS tapes and music tapes were made regularly during daylight hours at villages along the patrol routes.

(5) (C) Phase III Redeployment

During this reporting period, Phase III was initiated on 1 February 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

and terminated on 15 April 1970. Elements of the 1st MARDIV, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) and Force Logistic Command (FLC) were redeployed with a total personnel strength of 12,900 spaces. Primary units redeployed included Marine RLT-26 from Quang Nam (P) and Marine Air Group-12 from Chu Lai Air Base.

d. (U) Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline

(1) Civilian Personnel Management

Due to the increase in workload the command is authorized 103 local national direct hire spaces.

(2) Maintenance of Unit Strength

The number of assigned units to XXIV Corps increased over the reporting period. Authorized strength is now 795 with 873 assigned.

(3) Medical

(a) The Naval Hospital Ship, USS Repose, was withdrawn from I Corps and Vietnam and returned to the US for decommissioning. The hospital ship USS Sanctuary remains in support of ICTZ.

(b) As a result of the planned drawdown of the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Hospital in Da Nang, units of the 67th Medical Group and USAFV Medical Command have begun to take over many of the responsibilities formerly performed by the NSA hospital.

(c) The Corps Surgeon, upon the recommendation of the MACV and USAFV Surgeons, was given the additional responsibility of serving as the USAAG, ICTZ, Senior Medical Advisor. This is a pilot program to determine the feasibility of having all Corps/Field Force surgeons serve in the same capacity.

(4) Provost Marshal

(a) With the assumption of Provost Marshal functions throughout I Corps on 9 March 1970, immediate steps were taken to extend the combined police highway patrol system on QL-1 through the 3 southern provinces of I Corps.

(b) The combined police stations in Dong Ha became operational during the month of March.

e. Logistics

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) (C) General

During the reporting period the plans and procedures for logistical support in the XXIV Corps area of operations underwent extensive change as the result of XXIV Corps assuming command of ICTZ from III MAF on 9 March 1970. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 assumed the additional responsibilities for the monitoring of all logistic facilities and procedures in ICTZ and for the coordination of transfer of real estate and associated real property throughout ICTZ.

(2) (C) Operations

(a) POL

1 On 15 February 1970, the POL Operations at the Cua Viet holding area/transfer point and at the Dong Ha Ramp were terminated due to a drastic reduction in US Naval spaces in connection with Phase III redeployment. The closing of these facilities has resulted in a significant change in the distribution of bulk POL products in the northern portion of NICTZ. Prior to the closing of these facilities all bulk Mogas and diesel fuels required to support the northern portion of NICTZ were delivered by Navy barges from the port of Cua Viet down the Cua Viet river to the Dong Ha Ramp where the fuel was pumped into 5,000 gallon tank trucks and further distributed to all POL points in NICTZ. After the close of this facility all bulk POL products for the northern portion of NICTZ are distributed through the port of Tan My and are line hauled via 5,000 gallon tank trucks, with the exception of JP4 which is distributed through the Tan My-Quang Tri pipeline.

2 On 20 February 1970, the residual detachment of MAG-16 which was operating the Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) at the Phu Bai Airfield was transferred to Da Nang. In order to insure continuity of POL operations at the airfield, the 101st Abn Div (AMBL) was tasked with the operation of this POL facility.

3 The US Army Support Command (USASUPCOM), Da Nang, on 26 March 1970, assumed responsibility from NSA for common service support of the wholesale bulk and package POL distribution in ICTZ, to include operation of the POL tank farms at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Duc Pho.

(b) Ammunition

1 During the period 1 February - 1 March 1970, expenditure rates for light, medium, and heavy artillery in NICTZ were equivalent to and in the case of 155mm HE higher than the intensified combat rates established by USARPAC Reg 710-15. Such high expenditure rates necessitated XXIV Corps allocation increases from USARV in 105mm, 155mm and 8 inch ammunition and the borrowing of an additional 5,500 Rds of 155mm HE from the 24 February-24 March 1970 allocation period.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. These high expenditure rates during the month of February not only created the requirement for ammunition allocation increases but also the necessity to maintain ASP stocks above the stock objectives. In order to accomplish the 1st LOG CMD, through USASURCOM Da Nang, diverted Deep Draft Ammunition carrying vessels to the ports of Tan My and Cua Viet. Additionally, chartered LST and YFU boats were provided for ammunition shipments to Tan My and Cua Viet.

3. On 19 March 1970, COMUSMACV approved the clearing operation for the Army position of the Dong Ha ASP which had been hit by enemy fire on 29 June 1968. Clearance operations commenced on 24 March 1970, and should be completed within 90 days.

(c) Transportation

1. With the assumption of I Corps senior headquarters responsibilities by GVN Corps, all convoy movements came under USARV Reg 55-10. Representatives of the USAFV Highway Traffic Center are now located at the 101st Abn Div (AMBL) MCC, the Americal Div MCC and the XXIV Corps G4 Trans P.

2. Cavalier Beach was the operational name given to the move of XXIV Corps from Camp Hochmuth, Phu Bai, RVN, to Camp Horn, Da Nang, RVN. Highway was the primary mode of movement, and formal convoys were run during the period 5-13 March 1970, using three light truck squads from the 515th Trans Co, 39th Trans Bn. Totals moved were 840 S/T and 710 PAX. Air support was provided by 101st Abn Div (AMBL).

(d) Real Estate: During the reporting period the following bases were transferred to GVN: Island of Sa Huynh, Camp Sally, LZ Max, FSB Gator, FSB Fat City and LZ Bayonet. The total number of structures involved was 640 which included 516 Southeast Asia (SEA) huts.

f. (U) Inspector General

None.

g. (U) Information

None.

h. (U) Command History

None.

i. (U) Army Aviation

None.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Signal

(1) (C) AUTOSEVOCOM

(a) During the period 1-9 March 1970, four USMC wide-band subscriber terminals served off SECORD 61/71 at Da Nang were activated at Camp Haskins due to the relocation of Headquarters, III MAF from Camp Horn to Camp Haskins. Three of these terminals were obtained from USAFV assets, and one was relocated from Camp Horn.

(b) During the period 1-9 March 1970, five XXIV Corps wide-band subscriber terminals served off SECORD 61/71 at Da Nang were activated at Camp Horn due to the relocation of Headquarters, XXIV Corps from Phu Bai Combat Base to Camp Horn. Four of these terminals were in place at Camp Horn and were simply redesignated/recertified as XXIV Corps subscriber terminals. The fifth terminal was relocated from Phu Bai Combat Base to Camp Horn. Simultaneously, the four remaining XXIV Corps wide-band subscriber terminals served off SECORD 35 at Phu Bai Combat Base were deactivated and returned to USAFV assets.

(c) During the reporting period, a narrow-band subscriber terminal homed off SECORD 27 at Chu Lai was installed at the 2d ARVN Div TOC in Quang Ngai. However, the terminal has not been activated due to power and air conditioning problems encountered at Quang Ngai.

(d) During the reporting period, realignment of AUTOSEVOCOM assets within ICTZ due to the relocation of two major tactical headquarters resulted in a decrease of five wide-band subscriber terminals served off SECORD 35 in Phu Bai, an increase of four wide-band subscriber terminals served off SECORD 61/71 in Da Nang and an increase of one narrow-band subscriber terminal served off SECORD 27 in Chu Lai.

(2) (U) Improvement of Camp Eagle Telephone Service

(a) During the period 1-22 February 1970, the rehabilitation program on the Camp Eagle and Gia Le Cable Distribution Systems, started during the last reporting period, was completed.

(b) On 22 February 1970, the AN/TTC-28 Dial Telephone Exchange at Camp Eagle was activated affording all telephone subscribers at Camp Eagle and Gia Le dial telephone service. Simultaneously, the AN/MTC-9 Manual Telephone Exchange, previously serving the Camp Eagle area, was deactivated and returned to USAFV assets.

(3) (C) Communications in Support of Task Force Clearwater

(a) On 13 February 1970, Task Force Clearwater relocated its headquarters

CONFIDENTIAL

from Cua Viet to the Tan My Island complex. In support of the relocation, the 12th Signal Group provided the following communications facilities at the Tan My Island complex:

1. A twelve channel system between Tan My Island and Phu Bai.
2. A manual switchboard with a sixty line capacity.
3. One Radio Teletypewriter Set, AN/GRC-142.
4. A combined Communications/Message Center with one teletype circuit to the Da Nang Army Relay Station.
5. A cable distribution system to support all tenant units in the Tan My Island complex.

(b) Upon relocation of TF Clearwater to the Tan My Island complex the communications facilities at Cua Viet were phased out and returned to USARV assets. These facilities were identical to those installed at the Tan My Island complex.

(4) (C) XXIV Corps Radio Nets

(a) On 9 March 1970, the XXIV Corps FM Secure TAC #1 Net and the XXIV Corps FM Secure TAC #2 Net were activated at Camp Horn. The TAC #1 Net included all major tactical units in NICTZ and the TAC #2 Net included all major tactical units in SICTZ. The terrain and the distances between stations precluded direct communications with all stations in either net. Consequently, two automatic retransmission stations were positioned in the Hai Van Pass enabling Headquarters, XXIV Corps to maintain FM Secure voice communications with all major tactical units within ICTZ. Simultaneously, the XXIV Corps FM Secure Command Net in Phu Bai Combat Base was deactivated and the equipment returned to USARV assets.

(b) On 9 March 1970, the XXIV Corps RATT-SSB TAC #3 Net was activated at Camp Horn. This net linked all major tactical units within ICTZ to Headquarters, XXIV Corps with secure radio teletype. Simultaneously, the XXIV Corps Secure RATT-SSB Command Net in Phu Bai Combat Base was deactivated and the equipment returned to USARV assets.

(c) On 9 March 1970, the XXIV Corps FM and SSB Radio Wire Integration (RWI) stations were activated at Camp Horn. These stations afford any FM and/or SSB station within range a telephone patch capability. Simultaneously, the XXIV Corps FM RWI station in Phu Bai Combat Base was deactivated and the equipment returned to USARV assets.

(5) (C) Telephone Service at Camp Horn

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) On 9 March 1970, the XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center Switchboard (Dynamic), AN/TTC-7, was activated at Camp Horn. Simultaneously, the XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center Switchboard, AN/MTC-1, at Phu Bai Combat Base was deactivated and returned to USAFV assets.

(b) During the period 1-15 March 1970, Headquarters, XXIV Corps relocated from Phu Bai Combat Base to Camp Horn. Interim administrative telephone service was provided by a USMC AN/TTC-28 Dial Telephone Exchange located at Camp Horn; it had previously served Headquarters, III MAF.

(c) On 12 April 1970, the USMC AN/TTC-28 Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) was deactivated and returned to USMC assets. Simultaneously, telephones previously served off the AN/TTC-28 were transferred to either the U.S. Army Da Nang East or the U.S. Air Force Da Nang DTE. The number of subscribers served by the Da Nang East DTE at the time of the transfer precluded serving all subscribers located at Camp Horn off one DTE.

(d) On 15 April 1970 and continuing through the reporting period, an extensive rehabilitation program was instituted at Camp Horn to upgrade the quality of telephone service provided Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

(6) (C) XXIV Corps Communications Center Support

(a) During the period 1-10 March 1970, an interim XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Communications Center, composed of 4 AN/MSQ-29 teletypewriter vans and 1 AN/GSQ-80 message center van, was installed and activated at Camp Horn. Immediately upon activation, dedicated teletype circuits terminated in the XXIV Corps TOC Communications Center in Phu Bai Combat Base and the USMC Command Operations Center (COC) Communications Center were transferred to the new TOC Communications Center. Upon completion of the transfer both the XXIV Corps TOC Communications Center in Phu Bai and the USMC COC Communications Center in Camp Horn were deactivated and the equipment returned to USAFV and USMC assets, respectively. At present, a permanent XXIV Corps TOC Communications Center, capable of terminating 20 full duplex secure teletype circuits, is being constructed at Camp Horn with a projected activation date of 10 May 1970.

(b) During the period 1 March to 15 April 1970, an Army Communications Center was phased into Camp Horn; and simultaneously, the III MAF Main Communications Center at Camp Horn was phased out. As the USMC equipment was released, it was returned to USMC assets. On 15 April 1970, the XXIV Corps Army Communications Center at Camp Horn consisted of 4 full duplex secure teletype circuits to the Da Nang Army Relay Station. On 20 April 1970, a mobile DSTE was activated and homed off the Nha Trang ASC.

(7) (C) Communications in Support of the 2d ROK Marine Corps Bde

CONFIDENTIAL

During the period 9 March to 16 April 1970, USMC communications equipment and personnel in support of the 2d ROK Marine Corps Bde were gradually replaced by U.S. Army equipment and personnel. Included in this transfer was the necessary equipment and personnel to operate a station in the XXIV Corps FM Secure TAC #2 Net, to operate a station in the XXIV Corps RATT-SSB TAC #3 Net, and to operate communications center terminating 1 secure teletype circuit from the XXIV Corps TOC Communications Center and 1 secure teletype circuit from the Da Nang Army Relay Station. In addition, circuitry previously routed from Camp Horn to the 2d ROK Marine Corps Bde over USMC multi-channel systems were rerouted over existing U.S. Army systems permitting deactivation of the USMC systems.

(8) (C) Multi-Channel Communications

During the reporting period, the activation, deactivation, reroute and/or retermination of numerous circuits/systems were necessitated by the relocation of Headquarters, III MAF, the relocation of Headquarters, XXIV Corps and the subsequent reconfiguration within ICTZ.

(a) A total of 94 circuits were activated, 89 circuits were deactivated, and 52 circuits were rerouted and/or reterminated.

(b) Two Corps Area Communication Systems were deactivated.

1 12 channel system from Quang Tri to Cua Viet.

2 12 channel system from Camp Eagle to Camp Sally.

(c) One Corps Area Communications System was activated, a 12 channel system from Phu Bai to Tan My Island.

(9) (U) Improvement of Message Handling

The XXIV Corps Message Review Board met three times during the quarter to review message preparation and processing procedures of XXIV Corps Staff Sections and OPCON units. Results of the review indicate that majority of the discrepancies were minor format errors made by newly arrived personnel.

k. Engineers

(1) (U) Command and Staff relationships

(a) Effective 9 March 1970, XXIV Corps was assigned as senior headquarters in ICTZ, vice III MAF which became a major subordinate command. This brought more engineer units under control or coordination of XXIV Corps Engineer. Assigned to III MAF were two PMF Marine Engineer Bn's (the 7th, and the 9th minus one line company), the 1st Bridge Co, and the 1st Marine

CONFIDENTIAL

Engineer Bn (organic to 1st MARDIV).

(b) Under administrative control of 9th Engineer Bn, the Provisional Land Clearing Co was organized and operated under control of III MAF. The 3d Bn of the 45th Engineer Gp (the 39th Combat Bn) operated in SICTZ and has attached the 137th Light Equipment Co and the 511th Panel Bridge Co. It also provided personnel and equipment to the Provisional Land Clearing Co. The Americal Div was supported by its organic Bn, the 26th. The 2d RCK Marine Corps Bde was supported by its organic engineer company.

(c) ARVN engineer forces in the added AO included the organic Bn of 2d ARVN Div, the remaining two of three Bn's of the 10th ARVN Gp (plus separate companies) and the 8th ARVN Construction Gp.

(d) Tasking arrangements remained similar to those previously in effect. CG, XXIV Corps tasks assigned and OPCON commands (1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); 101st Abn Div (AMBL); III MAF; and Americal Div) and requests tasking of supporting Army and Navy engineer units by CG, 18th Engineer Bde and COMNAVFORV REP, DNG respectively. By effective prior coordination with 45th Engineer Gp and 32d Naval Construction Regt, no difficulties were encountered.

(e) Tasking of ARVN engineer units was accomplished by request or recommendation to CG, I Corps, but ARVN JGS and/or Central Logistic Command may place limitations on tasks to be assigned to 8th Construction Gp.

(2) (C) During the reporting period, 2d Platoon (Rein) of 3rd Marine Bridge Co and one platoon of 1st Bridge Co were redeployed under Phase III Redeployment. Extra bridging material (the equivalent of 2 Marine bridge companies' TE) was left with the remaining 2 platoons of 1st Bridge Co.

(3) (U) Specific engineer projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) A 222 meter bridge on QL-1 over the Song Cau Do was completed by MCB-74.

(b) An 80 foot timber bridge on QL-1, 7 km north of Quang Ngai and a 255 foot timber bridge over the Song Go Ma south of Quang Ngai were completed by 39th Engineer Bn.

(c) Repairs of enemy damage were completed to bridges on QL-1 at Than Quit, Song Ba Rin, Song Vinh An, Song An Tan and at Tu My. Except for the repair at Than Quit, these were combined efforts of Army, Navy, Marine and ARVN units.

(d) MCB-7 completed the remainder of 33 aircraft shelters and 25,000 feet of perimeter lighting at Chu Lai Air Base.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) (C) Continuing engineer projects/programs

(a) Land Clearing: 59th Land Clearing Co completed a major land clearing project (5,565 acres) in 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) AO on 2 February 1970. Later, 3,000 acres were cleared around Quang Tri Combat Base. At the end of the quarter, the company was engaged in another major land clearing project, east of Mai Loc, also in 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) AO.

The Provisional Land Clearing Co initiated a major land clearing operation on Barmour Island and vicinity; approximately 6,000 acres were cleared by the end of the reporting period.

(b) Primary LOC construction

1 MCB 74 completed paving the Dong Ha City route and completed repairs and shoulder work on QL-1 between Dong Ha and Quang Tri. MCB-121 completed 2d lift paving of QL-1 between Than Quit and Song Cau Lau. The 39th Engr Bn completed repaving of QL-1 between Duc Pho and LZ Debbie. The construction of the Song Ve bridge on QL-1 (276 meters) was 20% complete at the end of the reporting period.

2 During the quarter, 41.8 kilometers of QL-1 were turned over to the Director General of Highways (DGOH), for a total of 290.3 km of CENCOM roads transferred. The remaining 47.4 km of QL-1 programmed for 1970 (between Than Quit and Tam Ky) are under construction by MCB-7 and 121, and the 7th and 9th Marine Engineer Bn's.

3 Restoration of QL-1 to MACV Standard F from Dong Ha north to Gio Linh has been deferred to post-1970, but the road may be regraded to a lesser standard this year.

4 During the previous quarter, all of QL-1 (41 kilometers) was turned over to DGOH.

5 Route 540 between Cobb Bridge (AT 945706) and Liberty Bridge (AT 925534) was 95% complete to MACV Standard C, less paving; the portion from Liberty Bridge to An Hoa (AT 875460) was 55% complete to "single-lane all-weather" standards.

(c) Dual Blade Bunkers: The joint US/ARVN construction of living/fighting bunkers (multi-plate arch culver type) continued during the quarter. ARVN has been allocated 191 bunkers; 45th Engineer Gp is supporting construction of 114:

35 at A-2 (completed previous quarter)

56 at C-1 (49 completed previous quarter, 7 completed this quarter)

CONFIDENTIAL

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22 at A-1 (11 completed this quarter, 5 under construction)

1 at Dong Ha (previously completed)

(d) Force Structure Increase (FSI) Cantonments. The 32d NCR is constructing eleven regional force cantonments for ARVN units. At the end of the quarter, 5 cantonments were completed (Nam Hoa, An Lo, Phuong Dien, Phu Bang, and Phu Thu).

(e) Tactical roads

1 During the quarter improved weather conditions permitted considerable progress in construction/upgrading of tactical roads, particularly in NICTZ. An "in-process review" was conducted for the NICTZ road program, which resulted in additional standards. Arrangements were made to permit joint tasking of US/ARVN units and US/Provincial forces. This permits US material support of ARVN construction which is presently unfunded and US material and equipment support to Province and District in construction of light tactical roads (LTR).

2 The following roads were completed during the reporting period:

<u>Road</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Standard*</u>	<u>MI</u>
Access to FSB Barbara from LZ Nancy	45th Gp	SLFW	12
Phu Thu - Thuy Tu Estuary (less rock cap)	45th Gp	SLAW	11
Access to A-1 from QL-1	45th Gp	SLFW	6

3 The following roads were under construction at the end of the reporting period:

<u>Road</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Standard*</u>	<u>MI</u>
Access to T-Bone and connection to Geronimo	45th Gp	SLFW	90
Access to Barbara (upgrade)	45th Gp	MAW	10
Route 555 A	45th Gp	SLAW	60
Xam Pho Road	45th Gp	MAW	25
Access to Rakassan	45th Gp	MAW	55
Access to Arsenal	45th Gp	MAW	20

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<u>Road</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Standard*</u>	<u>%</u>
Song Bo to T-Bone	45th Gp	SLFW	20
LTL 5B	45th Gp	SLAW	15
HL 518	45th Gp	SLAW	45
LTL 4	7th Engr/MCB-62	SLAW	10
HI 535	10th ARVN Gp	SLAW	0
HL 529	10th ARVN Gp	SLAW	0
HL 533	45th Gp	SLAW	0

* Standards of construction are:

LTR: Light Tactical Road

SLFW: Single-Lane, Fair Weather

MAW: Minimum All Weather

SLAW: Single-Lane, All Weather

(f) Major projects started during the reporting period were:

1 MCB-10 began paving of Phu Bai Airfield on 19 February 1970, and were approximately 70% complete at the end of the reporting period. Estimated completion date is 28 June 1970.

2 MCB-10 started construction of a Class 60, 900-foot, steel bridge with timber decking over the Quang Tri River on 20 February 1970. Completion is planned for 1 September 1970.

3 45th Engineer Gp initiated major upgrading and improvement of A-4 and C-2 during the reporting period.

1. Psychops. Civil Affairs

(1) (C) Civic Action

(a) Military Civic Action: The summary of military Civic Action accomplishments for the reporting period is as follows. A total of 22 projects were completed. A total of 22,169 man days, based on a 10 hour day,

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were expended in support of Civic Action. Total monetary expenditures were 14,558,793 \$VN: 12,469,076 \$VN from military resources and 2,089,717 \$VN from the CA/FSYWAR AIC Fund. The estimated average percentage of each project that was completed using self-help labor was 72% with 24% of the materials furnished by the people. A breakdown of the Civic Action effort is:

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>Man Days</u>	<u>\$VN</u>
Economic development	1016	1,035,280
Education	3891	3,690,951
Social welfare	4404	5,656,458
Transportation	1759	624,101
Refugee support	4690	3,474,464

The number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period were 350 schools, 103 orphanages and 189 hospitals/dispensaries.

(b) Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP): A total of 149,347 persons were treated by MEDCAP personnel; 873 resulted from hostile action. Also 2,465 persons received dental treatment. A total of 2,555 immunizations were administered: 1,086 plague, 387 Cholera, 322 smallpox and 760 miscellaneous injections. Four-hundred and eight Vietnamese Health workers were given training in first aid, pharmacology and nursing techniques in conjunction with the MEDCAPS and in provincial hospitals. One-hundred and forty six personal hygiene/sanitation classes were given with 5,822 persons attending.

(2) (C) Psychological Operations

(a) During the period 1 February to 8 March 1970, the XXIV Corps PSYOP activities continued in NICTZ. Beginning 9 March 1970, XXIV Corps PSYOP activities expanded to planning, monitoring and supervising PSYOP programs throughout I Corps, to include coordination and cooperation with the I Corps Political Warfare Staff.

(b) The 1970 Tet Campaign

1 The 1970 Tet PSYOP Campaign for NICTZ was conducted during the period 20 January to 9 February 1970. The campaign was a combined US and Vietnamese operation emphasizing combined planning, employment of resources and execution based on singleness of purpose and objectives.

2 The campaign was conducted with the following psychological objectives:

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a To convince the VC/VCI that the Tet period is the most appropriate time to return to their family and the GVN.

b To convince the NVA and VC leadership to seek peace, thus returning their fighting troops home.

c To demoralize the NVA and VC during the Tet holiday period.

d To convince the local Vietnamese citizens that substantial progress has been made and is being made toward peace under the GVN.

1 Generally, the technique used throughout the campaign was saturation of target areas with a variety of media from all available sources with themes appropriate for the target audience in the particular area. Tactical targeting was based on current PSYOP intelligence from US, ARVN and GVN sources. A determined effort was made to target enemy base camps, operational areas and routes traveled by enemy units.

2 This campaign represented a consolidated effort by US and Vietnamese units/agencies to plan, organize and conduct a unified Tet campaign in a two province area. The positive results of this campaign are reflected as follows:

a Strengthening of the operational image and activities of the Province PSYOP Coordinating Committees.

b Better communication and cooperation among PSYOP organizations.

c A realization of the PSYOP potential when all assets are consolidated. No significant feedback was received on the impact of this campaign on enemy audiences.

(c) Chieu Hoi Campaign: The national Chieu Hoi Campaign has received continued emphasis. The primary effort was concentrated on quick reaction exploitation of ralliers to gain the maximum psychological impact on their former units. The main exploitation techniques employed were aerial broadcast ("earlyword" from fixed wing and live from helicopters), leaflets with ralliers' pictures and personal handwritten message pleas, and the use of ralliers with tactical units to locate caches and enemy units. Additionally, Chieu Hoi activities that involved follow-up exploitation were increased. Using ralliers 30 to 60 days after their return to deliver a message helps to negate enemy propaganda that ralliers are killed after the initial exploitation by ARVN and US units. The Chieu Hoi program produced 711 Hoi Chanhs during the reporting period.

(d) During the period this headquarters processed and fulfilled

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approximately 6220 leaflet target requests and 2248 aerial broadcast target requests. In response to these reports approximately 238,388,000 leaflets were disseminated and 304 hours of aerial broadcast were conducted. Additionally, XXIV Corps organizations disseminated 31,986,323 leaflets, conducted 1485 hours of ground broadcasts and 536 hours of aerial broadcasts with organic resources.

m. Corps Artillery

(1) (C) Organization

(a) On 3 February 1970, the 1st Bn, 39th Arty received authority to initiate tube conversion from 155mm howitzers to 8 inch howitzers and 175mm guns. Alfa and Bravo Batteries completed conversion on 5 March and 10 March 1970, respectively, with Charlie Battery expected to complete conversion by 30 April 1970.

(b) On 23 February 1970, the 5th 175 Gun Battery (FMF) and the 1st Platoon, 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery (FMF) stood down at Dong Ha Combat Base as part of the Phase III Redeployment and OPCON was passed to CG, 1st MARDIV. Howitzer and gun assets were turned over to the 1st Bn, 39th Arty. This marked the removal of the last USMC artillery from NICTZ and terminated a long and profitable relationship with these two units which dated back to the formation of PCV Artillery.

(c) Redeployment of the 6th Bn, 33d Arty, under the Phase III Redeployment was completed on 28 February 1970. Organizational equipment, except for colors, was turned in at Dong Ha and Quang Tri. The colors, along with a color guard detachment from the unit, returned to CONUS where the unit was deactivated at Fort Lewis, Washington.

(d) On 24 February 1970, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Bn, 94th Arty moved from Camp Evans to Dong Ha Combat Base.

(e) On 28 February 1970, the 108th Arty Gp was assigned to XXIV Corps and further attached to XXIV Corps Arty.

(f) On 1 March 1970, the 1st Bn, 39th Arty and the 1st Bn, 83d Arty were attached to the 108th Arty Gp.

(g) On 9 March 1970, XXIV Corps Arty Headquarters moved from Phu Bai Combat Base to Camp Horn, Da Nang, RVN.

(h) On 4 April 1970, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Bn, 39th Arty moved from Phu Bai Combat Base to LZ Nancy.

(i) On 25 April 1970, at the direction of COMUSMACV, DMAC assumed OPCON of the 274th Radar Detachment.

(j) Personnel Changes

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- 1 On 1 February 1970, COL Milton E. Key assumed command of 108th Arty Gp.
- 2 On 1 February 1970, LTC George A. Pollin replaced COL Key as XXIV Corps Arty Executive Officer.
- 3 On 8 February 1970, LTC George P. Hanley replaced LTC William H. Lockhart as the XXIV Corps Arty S-2.
- 4 On 17 February 1970, Major Lawrence B. H. Young replaced Major Rex Barker as the XXIV Corps Arty Communications Officer.
- 5 On 28 February 1970, Major Leroy C. Bell assumed duties as the Assistant ASG.
- 6 On 12 March 1970, Major Charles S. Heverley assumed duties as the XXIV Corps Arty S-1.
- 7 On 12 March 1970, LTC John A. Campbell assumed duties as the XXIV Corps Arty S-4.
- 8 On 1 April 1970, CPT John T. Emig assumed command of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XXIV Corps Arty.

(c) Significant Activities

1 Support for Operations Randolph Glen and Texas Star

Corps Arty units supported operations of the 101st Abn Div (AMBL) and the 1st ARVN Div from FSB's Tomahawk (ZD 118013), FSB Birmingham (YD638274), FSB Bastogne (YD620095), Phu Bai (YD880140), Gia Le (YD829151), LZ Sally (YD638274), Camp Evans (YD535314), West of Jack (YD474260), LZ Nancy (YD442394), FSB Anne (YD290402), Elliott CB (XD1984542), FSB Beghel (YD550035), Ca Lu (YD012455) and FSB Barbara (YD327337).

2 Support for Operation Green River

Corps Arty units supported operations of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and the 1st ARVN Div from FSB Sharon (YD340493), Dong Ha CB (YD205605), SP A-2 (YD213743), SP A-4 (YD118701), SP C-2 (YD135645), SP C-1 (YD212675), Camp Carroll (YD063544) and FSB Fuller (YD019593).

3 Artillery Raids

Corps Arty conducted several heavy artillery raids during the reporting period. The primary purpose of these raids was to engage targets in the western portion of NICTZ which could not be fired upon from permanent fire support bases. Artillery raids were conducted from the following locations during the periods indicated:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TUBES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>
A/8-4	2/8" SP 2/175 SP	Carroll	Elliott	25 - 26 February 1970
B/8-4	2/175 SP	C-2		
B/1-83	2/175 SP	Birmingham	2km W of Jack	9 - 11 February 1970
C/1-83	2/175 SP	Sally		
A/2-94	2/175 SP	Sharon	Anne	12 - 14 February 1970
C/2-94	2/175 SP	Nancy		
B/1-83	2/8" SP	Birmingham	Vehgel	7 - 9 March 1970

4 Battle Damage Assessment

BDA for XXIV Corps Arty units during the reporting period was as follows:

<u>TARGET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Bunkers destroyed	314
Bunkers damaged	106
Structures destroyed	88
Structures damaged	39
AA weapons destroyed	2
AW weapons	1
KB artillery	75
Sampan destroyed	6
Sampan damaged	5
Vehicles destroyed	3
Vehicles damaged	2
Bridges destroyed	3
Bridges damaged	1
Secondary explosions	117
Trenchline destroyed, meters	235
Mortars destroyed	1

5 Naval Gunfire

The emphasis of Naval Gunfire was in NICTZ, primarily the southeastern DMZ. Over 65% of the rounds expended were in support of 1st ARVN Div units in that area. In central and southern I Corps, Naval Gunfire units supported units of the 1st MARDIV, Americal Div and 2d ARVN Div. The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and 101st Abn Div (AMBL) also received naval gunfire

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support. A total of 17 ships fired over 28,000 rounds of 5" ammunition. On 9 March 1970, Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO became Naval Gunfire Controlling Authority for I Corps. The unit provides an I Corps NGLO at the XXIV Corps FOC and Liaison/Spot teams located at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, C-1, A-1, A-2, Chu Lai and Quang Ngai.

<u>TOTAL FIRE MISSIONS</u>	<u>ROUNDS EXPENDED</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA'S</u>
2784	28,560	confirmed - 119 probable - 108
<u>BUNKERS DESTROYED</u>	<u>SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS</u>	<u>STRUCTURES DESTROYED</u>
116	20	193

6 Friendly Fire Incidents

The following friendly fire incidents occurred in the Corps during the period 1 February through 30 April 1970.

a Number of Incidents:

	<u>Arty</u>	<u>Mortar</u>	<u>ARA</u>	<u>NGF</u>
February	1	0	0	0
March	13	1	2	0
April	9	1	2	0

b Casualties

	<u>US</u>		<u>OTHER</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
February	0	0	0	2	0	2
March	0	53	7	16	16	69
April	0	15	24	26	24	41

7 Firing Battery Inspection Team

During the reporting period, the primary emphasis of the Firing Battery Inspection Team was placed on technical assistance to ARVN Arty units. With the full concurrence and cooperation of the Commanding Officer, 1st ARVN Div Arty, 14 ARVN Firing Batteries were evaluated by the team. Significant improvements in unit operations were noted as the inspections progressed. Although the team also made 5 inspections of US units, the primary responsibility for evaluation of US units was given to the subordinate Arty commanders. Corps Arty inspections of US units will continue on a spot check basis.

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8 Meteorological Quality Control Team (MQCT)

During the month of March 1970, MQCT acquired the quality control responsibility for 5 additional sections not formerly under a quality control system. To maintain the quality ballistic meteorological data in the XXIV Corps area of operations, the XXIV Corps Arty MQCT made a 100% check of the following number of soundings during the reporting period with the results indicated.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMER OF SOUNDINGS CHECKED</u>	<u>NUMER UNSATISFACTORY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE UNSATISFACTORY</u>
February 1970	71	0	0
March 1970	61	3	4.9
April 1970	96	7	7.3

9 GMMI Team

During the reporting period, the Corps GMMI Team (organized and controlled by Corps Arty) continued the cycle of inspections begun in January 1970. The team inspects all batteries assigned to or under the operational control of Corps Arty as well as the 108th Transportation Company (CAR) and Headquarters Company, XXIV Corps. Twenty-one inspections were conducted during the period 1 February to 30 April 1970. Results were quite favorable and considerable improvement was noted since the last inspection cycle.

10 ARVN Artillery Training

Two officers from the XXIV Corps Arty staff provided full-time assistance in the instructor training phase of a refresher training program in the 1st ARVN Div. Representatives of all artillery battalions in the 1st ARVN Div and the Quang Da Special Zone underwent three weeks of instruction to prepare them to conduct training in their own organizations. Separate courses were presented in Fire Direction procedures, Firing Battery operations and maintenance, communications, and vehicle maintenance. At the completion of the instructor training phase of the program, a mobile training team was formed in each battalion, to conduct training at firing battery positions. An officer and an NCO are provided to each of the teams by US units located in the same general area as the ARVN battalion. This firing battery training phase of the program is still in progress.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. (U) Personnel

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(b) Evaluation: A survey of incidents involving narcotic violators indicates that many so involved have extended their tour once and sometimes twice.

(c) Recommendation:

1 That commanders take a closer look at the personal habits and activities of individuals during their normal tour, prior to granting extensions.

2 That the lectures continue to be provided on request to units requiring this service.

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Bilingual SICR's

(a) Observation: XXIV Corps SICR's are now being published in a bilingual text to aid in wide dissemination of the requirement.

(b) Evaluation: The program has only been in effect for one month and cannot be accurately evaluated at this time; however, US interrogator personnel working at ARVN interrogation points report the bilingual SICR's have been well received by their counterparts.

(c) Recommendation: That bilingual SICR's be used by all headquarters whose tasking includes advisory elements.

(2) Sensor Emplacements

(a) Observation: Sensors provide the Commander with valuable intelligence concerning enemy activities and movement as well as acquiring valid targets for air and ground attack.

(b) Evaluation: Too few sensors in too few strings and inaccurately emplaced sensors cannot give the analyst enough accurate information to determine pattern and movement of enemy personnel and vehicles.

(c) Recommendation: Sensor strings used for either target acquisition or intelligence should include at least 3, preferably 8 to 12, sensors to accurately determine pattern (speed, length of column, numbers and direction of travel) of enemy movement. This is necessary also to preclude degradation of the string due to loss of sensors through failure, hyperactivity or destruction.

c. (U) Operations

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(1) Reconnaissance by Acoustics (RBA) Project

(a) Observation: An Aircraft used for air readout of sensor strings sometimes inhibit the immediate response of artillery when the aircraft is orbiting over the support bases.

(b) Evaluation: If sensor readout aircraft cannot fly at altitudes above the maximum ordinate of artillery in the area, alternate orbits must be pre-selected and the fire support element be given authority to direct the readout aircraft from one orbit to another so the aircraft does not inhibit immediate response of artillery to sensor activations.

(c) Recommendation: That close coordination between aviation and ground commanders be effected to establish alternate orbits for sensor readout aircraft and procedures for the fire support element to direct which orbit the readout aircraft is to use based on fire missions.

(2) Claymore Mines

(a) Observation: During this quarter two instances have been noted where possible enemy personnel have successfully infiltrated US installation perimeters and tampered with the claymore mines. This tampering consisted of taking the back off the mine, removing all the C4 and replacing the back in its normal position.

(b) Evaluation: The easiest way this tampering can be detected is by picking the mine up and comparing the weight with that of a mine that has been secured from tampering. If there is any doubt the back of the mine should be taken off and its contents checked. It is possible that dirt or mud could be substituted for the C4, thus making the weight check ineffective.

(c) Recommendation: That a qualified individual check all claymore mine to insure that they are operational each morning.

d. (U) Organization None.

e. (U) Training None.

f. (C) Logistics

(1) (C) Minor Combat Bases and Bridge Sites

(a) Observation: MACV requires a report of all facilities excess to US needs and proposed for transfer to RVNAF. Current MACV directives specify that only MACV has approval authority to dispose of any bases excess to US needs. Additionally, proposals for transfer between US units having operational significance must also be approved by MACV. Transfer between US

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components is delegated to the Area Coordinator. The vast majority of transfers will be to RVNAF, and most all transfers have operational significance. These factors, therefore, dictate that any US redeployment from a base to be transferred to RVNAF must be held in abeyance until MACV approval is given. The number of minor forward bases and bridge sites which must await for approval by MACV under this rule works a hardship on the tactical troops deployed in the area. Due to the limited time from notification to actual redeployment of US units, the security of these sites imposes a significant burden on the tactical commander who must remove units from their combat mission and position them on vacated bridges and bases until such time as the bridge or facility is turned over to RVNAF.

(b) Evaluation: The US Marine Corps is currently the primary command responsible for bridge security in ICTZ. In addition, the US Army Divisions have established numerous advanced combat bases. Phase down has necessitated a drawback of forces from these bases to secure the more permanent installations. Should additional forces be redeployed, this would create additional vacant sites to be secured. Tactical commanders cannot continue their full combat mission when they are tasked to provide security of these bases and bridge sites until the reports and requests are staffed through all channels.

(c) Recommendation: That the Zone Coordinator be delegated authority to affect disposition of bridge sites and minor combat bases in forward areas. Preparation of control documents would continue in order to provide a complete listing of facilities transferred to RVNAF and an easy to follow audit trail.

(2) (C) Proposed Property Transfer Request (RCS: MACDC-13)

(a) Observation: Excessive time for action on proposed Property Transfer Request (RCS: MACDC-13). The subject report is the initial notification to higher headquarters of a facility which is excess to current US needs. Procedural channels are from the occupying unit to the Sub-Zone Coordinator (usually the division controlling the particular Tactical Area of Responsibility) and then to the Zone Coordinator (Headquarters, XXIV Corps in ICTZ), and to Headquarters, USARV (the Area Coordinator). Headquarters, USARV then transmits the report to MACV where it is staffed to the Republic of Vietnam - Joint General Staff (RVNAF - JGS). After study at JGS, conceptual approval is granted and a Vietnamese unit is named, as relieving unit. The approval is then transmitted back through US channels to the Zone Coordinator who initiates appropriate action to transfer the facility from US to GVN control.

(b) Evaluation: Experience at the Zone Coordinator level has shown a wide diversity of time involved from initial receipt of the MACDC-13 to receipt of the conceptual approval in writing. The shortest was Camp Sally, 9 February 1970 to 12 March 1970 - 31 days. The longest was Sa Hynh, 14 January 1970 to 21 March 1970 - 65 days. These times do not necessarily

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compatible with US operational requirements and as a result, occasionally cause adverse effects on the tactical commander's mission and forces must, by RVNAF directive, be retained on each base to prevent looting and pilferage until transfer to RVNAF.

(c) Recommendation: That MACV establish a 6 day time frame for the processing of the MACDC-13 at each level of command, i.e., Sub-Zone Coordinator, Zone Coordinator, and MACV.

(3) (C) Proposed Property Transfer Plan (RCS: MACDC-14)

(a) Observation: The Proposed Property Transfer Plan (RCS: MACDC-14) constitutes an additional administrative burden. The current reporting procedure is to submit a Proposed Property Transfer Request (RCS: MACDC-13), await conceptual approval from Republic of Vietnam - Joint General Staff (RVNAF - JGS), forward the MACDC-14 report for approval of the property transfer plan, then accomplish the actual transfer. Data is extracted from the MACDC-14 by higher headquarters for use in funding and programming. This MACDC-14 plan is supposed to be approved prior to transfer; however, due to operational requirements of both US and GVN units, the transfer is conducted as soon as possible after receipt of conceptual approval of the proposed Property Request (MACDC-13). The six bases transferred during this reporting period were all transferred prior to receipt of an approved MACDC-14 plan due to operational requirements.

(b) Evaluation: In actual practice the Property Transfer Plan, MACDC-14, has to date served no useful purpose as a plan. It has always been prepared after the transfer has taken place and becomes an after action report phrased in the future tense. The final report, MACDC-15, follows within 30 days as an additional after action report. Unless MACV withholds transfer approval until after the MACDC-14 plan itself has been approved, the units concerned are presented with an illogical chain of events very difficult to understand.

(c) Recommendation: That the Proposed Property Transfer Plan (RCS: MACDC-14) be eliminated and all data required in the MACDC-14, but not now included in the MACDC-15, be added to the Property Transfer Report (RCS: MACDC-15), after action report.

g. (U) Communications None.

h. (U) Material

(1) (C) Maintenance of EFC Records for M107/M110 Carriages

(a) Observation: Artillery units have experienced considerable difficulty in providing accurate information on the number of equivalent full charge rounds fired from M107/M110 gun carriages.

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(b) Evaluation: The problem stems from the documentation procedures currently prescribed by TM 38-750. The DA Form 2408-4, which records the rounds fired from a given tube must be turned-in to the Direct Support Unit when the gun tube/cannon assembly is removed from the carriage. The information is, therefore, no longer available with the carriage. Carriage rebuild criteria is based on the number of tube changes and equivalent full charge (EFC) rounds fired. Since gun tubes may be changed for reasons other than having fired the maximum allowable number of rounds, it is often impossible to determine how many EFC's have been fired from a carriage even though the number of tube changes can be determined. XXIV Corps Arty has initiated a system to correct this situation. An altered DA Form 2408-10 is used in the Equipment Log Book in addition to one required by TM 28-750. This extra form is maintained as a permanent record. Altered DA Form 2408-10 are now made out on all new and rebuilt carriages received. DA Form 2408-10 is altered by changing the "Hours" column to "Rounds 175mm" and writing "8 inch" above the "Rounds column. The nomenclature column shows the type of tube used, 175mm M113 or M113A1 or 8" M2A1. The "Reading" columns reflect the number of 8" and 175mm EFC's fired from each tube. These columns are totaled, and the percentage of weapon carriage life expended by each type of tube is computed and recorded. The total percentage of carriage life which has been expended is also shown. The "Date Fired" block is changed to show "Date Computed." When a card is completed, a new card is affixed to the completed card to insure the recorded data will not be lost. Data need not be carried forward to the new card. Percentage of remaining weapon carriage life is determined as outlined in USARV Reg 750-30, 26 August 1969.

(c) Recommendation: That other artillery units adopt the system of using a modified DA Form 2408-10 to maintain a record of equivalent full charge rounds fired by all carriages.

(2) (U) Command Management Maintenance Inspection Team

(a) Observation: A Command Management Maintenance Inspection (CMMI) Team was established by XXIV Corps Arty in December 1968. The objective was to upgrade maintenance standards, improve maintenance management and evaluate direct support services by conducting inspections of Corps Arty units on a semi-annual basis. In July 1969, units assigned to XXIV Corps were included in the inspection schedule. The team consists of twelve personnel from assigned and OPCON artillery units and Corps Headquarters. The most significant problem associated with the operation of the CMMI Team is the availability and retention of qualified inspectors.

(b) Evaluation: A team formed for the express purpose of conducting one cycle of semi-annual inspections lacks the experience and professionalism to conduct meaningful inspections. Each member of the team may be an expert in his field, but he may not be qualified as an inspector nor

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conversant in maintenance management and records. To overcome this difficulty key personnel must be assigned to the CMMI Team on a full-time basis. In XXIV Corps Arty the continuity of professionalism is maintained by the assignment of one E-7 or E-8, MOS 63Z40. He serves as the continuity and experience base from one inspection cycle to the next and instructs new team members at the beginning of each cycle. During periods between inspection cycles he assists the Corps Arty S-4 by making continuous instructional staff visits to subordinate units and maintains liaison with service support organizations. Although this personnel space must be taken from some unit, the advantage is worth the inconvenience.

(c) Recommendation: That other headquarters forming CMMI Teams consider assigning one qualified maintenance specialist to the team for his full tour.

i. (U) Other

(1) Military Civic Action

(a) Observation: The use of military Civic Action project priority list facilitates the management of resources by US/FWMAF elements.

(b) Evaluation: The problem confronting US/FWMAF units concerning Civic Action is the application of limited resources in such a manner that best insures support for GVN Pacification and Development plans and programs. Implied in this task are the basic requirements that all projects be coordinated with and approved by province and MACCORDS personnel and the projects be desired by the people. A technique is needed to provide US/FWMAF a management tool to apply resources in the manner that best supports pacification. Requiring the province officials to submit a list stating the priority of projects not completed under GVN programs would provide US/FWMAF such a tool. Also, a list signed by the Province Chief and the Province Senior Advisor would insure that all projects have been coordinated and approved.

(c) Recommendation: That the use of Civic Action priority lists be incorporated in directive from higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



PAUL W. TRAXLER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

2 Incl

as

Incl 1 wd HQ, DA

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AVHGC-DST (23 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 11 APR 70

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Traffic Safety Awards", page 36, paragraph a(1)(c)1b: concur. The present USARV Safety Awards Program is outlined in USARV Reg 385-1. This program encourages major subordinate commanders to establish awards programs to include awards for drivers. This Headquarters is considering the possibility of initiating a Command Safe Driving Award program. The award would be presented to the command achieving the best driving record or showing the greatest reduction in motor vehicle accidents. The award would be presented on a quarterly basis. The program would commence with the 1st Quarter FY 71.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Bilingual SICR's", page 37, paragraph 2b(1): concur. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Emplacements", page 37, paragraph 2b(2): concur. In addition, using combinations of sensors will enhance the probability of detecting enemy activity while reducing the chances of misinterpretation. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Reconnaissance by Acoustics(RBA) Project", page 38, paragraph 2c(1): concur. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

43

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVRGC-DST (23 May 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Claymore Mines", page 38, paragraph 2c(2); concur. Since the substitution of dirt or mud for the C4 would make a weight check ineffective, the qualified individual making the daily check should remove the backs of all the mines to ensure that they have not been tampered with. Item will be considered for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Minor Combat Bases and Bridge Sites", page 38, paragraph f(1); concur. The recommendations in paragraph f(1)(c) were implemented with the publication of revised USARV Regulation 700-26 dated 4 May 1970. This regulation delegates authority to abandon minor bases not on real property records to the zone coordinator and prescribes procedures to insure property accountability. These procedures for abandonment apply only to excess USARV real and related property and not to US Navy and USMC property. It would appear advisable for COMNAVFORV to adopt a similar procedure to insure timely disposal of minor bases and bridge sites belonging to the US Navy and USMC. COMNAVFORV has been advised of the problem, therefore no further action is recommended.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Proposed Property Transfer Request", page 39, paragraph f(2); nonconcur. Referenced item refers to the apparently excessive amount of time required to obtain conceptual approval for transfer of excess US installations to the RVNAF. The proposal to transfer the property must be formally presented to the RVNAF JGS. Past experience has shown that handling in US channels has been expeditious. Processing time from MACV to JGS and back varies between 15 and 45 days. Every effort is made at MACV level to expedite processing of the proposed property transfer. USARV, MACV and the RVNAF are aware of the problem and every effort is made to process the proposed property transfer expeditiously. No further action is required at this time.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Proposed Property Transfer Plan", page 39, paragraph f(3); nonconcur. Referenced item refers to the Proposed Property Transfer Plan (RCS: MACDC-14) which is prepared when excess property is transferred to RVNAF. This plan is required by MACV Dir 735-3. It provides the detailed plan for consummation of the transfer. MACV has recognized that this plan will in most cases be implemented prior to MACV approval. It serves as a historical record of assigned responsibilities and procedures followed in the execution of the transfer. Previous attempts to eliminate this report have been unsuccessful because of its historical value. Zone coordinators have been informed of the need for this report and will continue to submit it for after-the-fact approval. No further action is required.

44
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AVHGC-DST (23 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Reference item concerning "Maintenance of EFC Records for M107/M110 Carriages", page 40, paragraph h(1): concur. When gun tubes are changed for reasons other than having fired the maximum allowable number of rounds, there presently is no accurate means for recording total EFC rounds to establish the remaining life of the carriage. This situation is further complicated and records become less accurate when tubes of different sizes (175mm versus 8") are interchanged since the rebuild criteria for the carriage changes as a function of tube size. For this reason a form is needed to provide the data to compute the remaining carriage life. The DA Form 2408-10, modified as proposed, can provide this information by applying the following principle using the M107/M110 carriage as an example:


$$100 \left(\frac{\text{No. 8" EFC Rounds} + (4.5 \times \text{No. 175mm EFC Rounds})}{45,000} \right) = \text{Percent EFC Remaining on the Carriage}$$

Since modification of TAMMS forms is prohibited by TM 38-750, recommend the following action:

- (1) DA authorize modification of DA Form 2408-10 for this purpose or provide a suitable form for recording remaining carriage life.
- (2) DA provide guidance on the method of and frequency of the calculation of remaining carriage life.

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Command Maintenance Management Inspections", page 41, paragraph h(2): concur with recommendation proposed in sub-paragraph (c), page 42 in assigning a qualified maintenance specialist on a full time basis (Full Tour). No further action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ, XXIV Corps

45
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GPOP-DT (23 May 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOF-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report as indorsed.
2. Concur in ORLL except for paragraph 2h(1), page 40, as modified by paragraph 2i, USARV 1st Indorsement. The use of DA Form 2408-10 for the purpose of record keeping, as explained in the basic ORLL is not considered a modification as stated by the 1st Indorsement. For the purpose of standardization, a message will be dispatched by this headquarters recommending use of this form, as explained in the ORLL, by other artillery units.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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TROOP LIST AS OF 30 APRIL 1970

XXIV CORPS

HHC, XXIV Corps
24th PI Det
7th PsyOps Bn (OPCON)
212th Avn Bn (OPCON)
Co C, 5th Special Forces Gp (OPCON)
Combined Action Forces (OPCON)
204th MI Det
29th Civil Affairs Co
48th Chemical Det
108th Trans Co (CAR)
2d Plat, Co B, 504th MP Bn (OPCON)
31st Mil Hist Det

XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY

HHC, XXIV Corps Arty
1st Bn, 83d Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
1st Bn, 39th Arty (155mm) (SP)
HHC, 108th Arty Gp
8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)
Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 cal Mg)
Btry G, 29th Arty (searchlight)
2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
Btry F, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)
235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)
274th FA Det (AN/TPS-25) (Attached to 108th Arty Gp and OPCOM to DMAC)

III MAF

HQ Co
1st MP Bn
3d MP Bn
7th Engr Bn
9th Engr Bn
1st Radio Bn
5th Comm Bn

1ST MARDIV

HQ Bn
1st Mar Regt
HQ Co
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
5th Mar Regt

ENCLOSURE 2

47
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HQ Co
1st Bn
~~2d Bn~~
3d Bn
7th Mar Regt
HQ Co
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
11th Mar Regt
HQ Btry
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
4th Bn
1st Recon Bn
1st Engr Bn
1st Med Bn
1st MT Bn
1st Bridge Co (-)

1ST MAW

MWMC-1
MAG 11
MAG 13
MAG 16
MWCG - 18
MWSG - 17
FLC

101ST ABN DIV (AMBL)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn (AMBL), 327th Inf
2d Bn (AMBL), 327th Inf
2d Bn (AMBL), 502d Inf
42d Inf Plt (Set Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

HHC, 2d Bde
1st Bn (AMBL), 501st Inf
2d Bn (AMBL), 501st Inf
1st Bn (AMBL), 502d Inf
47th Inf Plt (Set Dog)
25th Pub Info Det (Fld Svc)

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3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

HHC, 3d Bde
3d Bn (AMBL), 187th Inf
1st Bn (AMBL), 506th Inf
2d Bn (AMBL), 506th Inf
58th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
34th Pub Info Det (Fld Svc)

101st Abn Div Arty (AMBL)

HQB, 101st Abn Div Arty (AMBL)
2d Bn (AMBL), 319th Arty
2d Bn (AMBL), 320th Arty
1st Bn (AMBL), 321st Arty
2d Bn (AMBL), 11th Arty
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (AMBL)
268th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
331st Trans Det (Acft Maint)
388th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (AMBL)
650th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

101st Aviation Group (Cbt) (AMBL)

HHC, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (AMBL)
101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (AMBL)
499th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
510th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
516th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
527th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (AMBL)
159th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
168th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
273d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
169th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
159th Avn Bn (Aslt Spt Hel) (AMBL)
478th Avn Co (Hv Hel)
625th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
327th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
649th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
382d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
163d Avn Co (GS) (AMBL)
530th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
359th Avn Det (Div)

Division Support Command

HHC and Band
5th Trans Bn (Acft Maint and Sup) (AMBL)

CONFIDENTIAL

326th Med Bn (AMBL)
426th S&S Bn (AMBL)
801st Maint Bn (AMBL)
101st Admin Co (AMBL)

Division Troops

HHC, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)
2d Sqdn (AMBL), 17th Cav
 Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf
 332d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
 333d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
 507th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
326th Engr Bn (AMBL)
501st Sig Bn (AMBL)
101st MP Co (AMBL)
557th Inf Plt (Cbt Tracker)
265th Rdo Rsch Co
10th Cml Plt (DS)
20th Cml Det (CBR Cen)
22d Mil Hist Det
101st MI Co (AMBL)
Operating Location 6
 5th Weather Det (USAF)
 20th TASS (USAF)

AMERICAL DIV

11th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 11th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 20th Inf
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
Trp E, 1st Cav
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
90th Chem Det
31st Public Information Det
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 1

196th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 196th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 16th Inf
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
Trp F, 17th Cav
48th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

CONFIDENTIAL

27th Chem Det
10th Public Information Det

198th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
Trp H, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
87th Chem Det

Americal Division Artillery

HHC, Div Arty
1st Bn, 14th Arty
1st Bn, 82d Arty
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
3d Bn, 82d Arty
6th Bn, 11th Arty
Metro Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty
Btry G, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)
3d Plat, Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)
251st FA Det (Radar)
252d FA Det (Radar)
271st FA Det (Radar)

16th Combat Aviation Group

HHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)
14th Combat Avn Bn
71st Avn Co
132d Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
174th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
176th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
178th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
534th Med Det
756th Med Det
14th Security Plat
123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)
Troop D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
Co E, 723d Maint Bn
Troop F, 8th Cav
335th Trans Co

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Americal Division Support Command

HHC and Band
23d Admin Co
23d Med Bn
23d S&T Bn
723d Maint Bn (-)
63d Inf Plat (CTT)
Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf
Americal Combat Center (PROV)
Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

Headquarters Americal Division

HHC, Americal Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)
26th Engr Bn
523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
146th MP Plat, 504th MP Bn
3d Mil Hist Det
635th MI Co
328th RR Co
OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

Non-Divisional Units

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
Det 1 (DS of Chu Lai)
Det 2 (DS of Duc Pho)
Det 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)
USASSG, ACSI, DA

1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)

HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co P, (Ranger) 75th Inf
Co A, 7th Engr Bn
Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached from 25th Div to 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div)
3d Sqdn, 5th Armed Cav (-D Troop) (Attached from 9th Div)
43d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
75th GS Spt Bn
48th PI Det
36th Cml Det
298th Sig Co
517th MI Det
407th RR Det
77th Cmbt Tracker Det

TASK FORCE CLEARWATER

HUE RIVSECGRP
Dong Ha RIVSECGRP

UNCLASSIFIED

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